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Question: 129 [<< | >>]
We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including, however,
the other parts under those mentioned by Tully, with the exception of
confidence, for which we shall substitute magnanimity, of which Aristotle
treats. Accordingly we shall consider (1) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence;
(3) Patience; (4) Perseverance. As regards the first we shall treat (1)
of magnanimity; (2) of its contrary vices. Under the first head there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether magnanimity is about honors?
(2) Whether magnanimity is only about great honors?
(3) Whether it is a virtue?
(4) Whether it is a special virtue?
(5) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
(6) Of its relation to confidence;
(7) Of its relation to assurance;
(8) Of its relation to goods of fortune.
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Question: 129 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For magnanimity is
in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows, since "magnanimity"
signifies greatness of mind, and "mind" denotes the irascible part, as
appears from De Anima iii, 42, where the Philosopher says that "in the
sensitive appetite are desire and mind," i.e. the concupiscible and
irascible parts. But honor is a concupiscible good since it is the reward
of virtue. Therefore it seems that magnanimity is not about honors.
Objection 2: Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must needs be
about either passions or operations. Now it is not about operations, for
then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows that it is about
passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore magnanimity is not about
honors.
Objection 3: Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit rather
than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because he tends to
great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring honors, but
for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "magnanimity
is about honor and dishonor."
I answer that, Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth of
the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to two things,
first to the matter about which is the field of its activity, secondly to
its proper act, which consists in the right use of such matter. And since
a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act, a man is said to be
magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to do some great act. Now an act
may be called great in two ways: in one way proportionately, in another
absolutely. An act may be called great proportionately, even if it
consist in the use of some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one
make a very good use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great
when it consists in the best use of the greatest thing.
The things which come into man's use are external things, and among
these honor is the greatest simply, both because it is the most akin to
virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue, as stated above
(Question [103], Articles [1],2); and because it is offered to God and to the best; and
again because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid shame, men set
aside all other things. Now a man is said to be magnanimous in respect of
things that are great absolutely and simply, just as a man is said to be
brave in respect of things that are difficult simply. It follows
therefore that magnanimity is about honors.
Reply to Objection 1: Good and evil absolutely considered regard the
concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is added,
they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity regards honor,
inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something great or difficult.
Reply to Objection 2: Although honor is neither a passion nor an operation, yet
it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which tends to a difficult
good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the passions of hope,
and mediately about honor as the object of hope: even so, we have stated
(Question [123], Articles [4],5) with regard to fortitude that it is about dangers of
death in so far as they are the object of fear and daring.
Reply to Objection 3: Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a way
as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor have too great a
desire for them. If, however, one were to despise honors so as not to
care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be deserving of blame.
Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a man strives
to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so as to think much of the
honor accorded by man.
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Question: 129 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great honors.
For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated above (Article [1]).
But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore it is not
essential to magnanimity to be about great honors.
Objection 2: Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is meekness about
anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about either great or
little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to magnanimity to be
about great honor.
Objection 3: Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than is
dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor, and
consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is not only
about great honors.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that magnanimity is
about great honors.
I answer that According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18), virtue
is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the perfection of a
power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that power, as stated in
De Coelo i, 116. Now the perfection of a power is not perceived in every
operation of that power, but in such operations as are great or
difficult: for every power, however imperfect, can extend to ordinary and
trifling operations. Hence it is essential to a virtue to be about the
difficult and the good, as stated in Ethic. ii, 3.
Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act of
virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point
of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and establish the
rational means in some particular matter: and this difficulty is found
only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also of justice. The other
difficulty is on the part of the matter, which may involve a certain
opposition to the moderation of reason, which moderation has to be
applied thereto: and this difficulty regards chiefly the other moral
virtues, which are about the passions, because the passions resist reason
as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4).
Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness of
this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases from the
passions themselves, and in others from the things that are the objects
of the passions. The passions themselves have no great power of
resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive appetite, which
is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to reason. Hence the
resisting virtues that are about these passions regard only that which is
great in such passions: thus fortitude is about very great fear and
daring; temperance about the concupiscence of the greatest pleasures, and
likewise meekness about the greatest anger. On the other hand, some
passions have great power of resistance to reason arising from the
external things themselves that are the objects of those passions: such
are the love or desire of money or of honor. And for these it is
necessary to have a virtue not only regarding that which is greatest in
those passions, but also about that which is ordinary or little: because
things external, though they be little, are very desirable, as being
necessary for human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there
are two virtues, one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely
liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely "magnificence."
In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary
honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes,
which are {philotimia}, i.e. love of honor, and {aphilotimia}, i.e.
without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving honor,
and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both these
things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great honors there
is "magnanimity." Wherefore we must conclude that the proper matter of
magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous man tends to such
things as are deserving of honor.
Reply to Objection 1: Great and little are accidental to honor considered in
itself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason, the
mode of which has to be observed in the use of honor, for it is much more
difficult to observe it in great than in little honors.
Reply to Objection 2: In anger and other matters only that which is greatest
presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any need
of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are things
existing outside the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: He that makes good use of great things is much more able to
make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous man looks
upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even little honors
as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot sufficiently honor
virtue which deserves to be honored by God. Hence he is not uplifted by
great honors, because he does not deem them above him; rather does he
despise them, and much more such as are ordinary or little. In like
manner he is not cast down by dishonor, but despises it, since he
recognizes that he does not deserve it.
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Question: 129 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every moral virtue
observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean but the greater
extreme: because the "magnanimous man deems himself worthy of the
greatest things" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as stated above
(FS, Question [65], Article [1]). But one may have a virtue without having magnanimity:
since the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whosoever is worthy of
little things and deems himself worthy of them, is temperate, but he is
not magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, "Virtue is a good quality of the mind," as stated above
(FS, Question [55], Article [4]). But magnanimity implies certain dispositions of the
body: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of "a magnanimous man that
his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his utterance calm." Therefore
magnanimity is not a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But magnanimity
is opposed to humility, since "the magnanimous deems himself worthy of
great things, and despises others," according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore
magnanimity is not a virtue.
Objection 5: Further, the properties of every virtue are praiseworthy. But
magnanimity has certain properties that call for blame. For, in the first
place, the magnanimous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is remiss and
slow of action; thirdly, he employs irony [*Cf. Question [113]] towards many;
fourthly, he is unable to associate with others; fifthly, because he
holds to the barren things rather than to those that are fruitful.
Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
On the contrary, It is written in praise of certain men (2 Macc. 15:18):
"Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas' companions, and the greatness of
courage [animi magnitudinem] with which they fought for their country,
was afraid to try the matter by the sword." Now, only deeds of virtue are
worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity which consists in greatness of
courage is a virtue.
I answer that, The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding the
good of reason in human affairs, for this is man's proper good. Now among
external human things honors take precedence of all others, as stated
above (Article [1]; FS, Question [11], Article [2], Objection [3]). Therefore magnanimity, which
observes the mode of reason in great honors, is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), "the
magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes," in so far as he tends
to what is greatest, "but in the matter of becomingness, he follows the
mean," because he tends to the greatest things according to reason, for
"he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth" (Ethic. iv, 3),
since his aims do not surpass his deserts.
Reply to Objection 2: The mutual connection of the virtues does not apply to
their acts, as though every one were competent to practice the acts of
all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming to
every virtuous man, but only to great men. on the other hand, as regards
the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all virtues are
connected together, since their habits reside together in the soul,
either in act or by way of a proximate disposition thereto. Thus it is
possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not competent, to have
the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed to practice that act if
it were competent to him according to his state.
Reply to Objection 3: The movements of the body are differentiated according to
the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And so it happens
that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by way of bodily
movements. For quickness of movement results from a man being intent on
many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish, whereas the magnanimous
is intent only on great things; these are few and require great
attention, wherefore they call for slow movement. Likewise shrill and
rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who are quick to quarrel
about anything, and this becomes not the magnanimous who are busy only
about great things. And just as these dispositions of bodily movements
are competent to the magnanimous man according to the mode of his
emotions, so too in those who are naturally disposed to magnanimity these
conditions are found naturally.
Reply to Objection 4: There is in man something great which he possesses through
the gift of God; and something defective which accrues to him through the
weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man deem himself
worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from God:
thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue, magnanimity makes him tend
to perfect works of virtue; and the same is to be said of the use of any
other good, such as science or external fortune. On the other hand,
humility makes a man think little of himself in consideration of his own
deficiency, and magnanimity makes him despise others in so far as they
fall away from God's gifts: since he does not think so much of others as
to do anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honor others
and esteem them better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of God's
gifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man (Ps. 14:4): "In his
sight a vile person is contemned [*Douay: 'The malignant is brought to
nothing, but he glorifieth,' etc.]," which indicates the contempt of
magnanimity, "but he honoreth them that fear the Lord," which points to
the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore evident that
magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one another, although they
seem to tend in contrary directions, because they proceed according to
different considerations.
Reply to Objection 5: These properties in so far as they belong to a magnanimous
man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For in the first
place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful of those from
whom he has received favors, this points to the fact that he takes no
pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he repay them with yet
greater favor; this belongs to the perfection of gratitude, in the act of
which he wishes to excel, even as in the acts of other virtues. Again, in
the second place, it is said that he is remiss and slow of action, not
that he is lacking in doing what becomes him, but because he does not
busy himself with all kinds of works, but only with great works, such as
are becoming to him. He is also said, in the third place, to employ
irony, not as opposed to truth, and so as either to say of himself vile
things that are not true, or deny of himself great things that are true,
but because he does not disclose all his greatness, especially to the
large number of those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 3), "it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards
persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle
class." In the fourth place, it is said that he cannot associate with
others: this means that he is not at home with others than his friends:
because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which belong to
littleness of mind. But he associates with all, both great and little,
according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also said, fifthly,
that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed any, but good, i.e.
virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to the useful, as
being greater: since the useful is sought in order to supply a defect
which is inconsistent with magnanimity.
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Question: 129 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For no special
virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher states (Ethic.
iv, 3) that "whatever is great in each virtue belongs to the
magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to any
special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed to the
magnanimous man. For it is stated in Ethic. iv, 3 that "it belongs to the
magnanimous not to avoid reproof" (which is an act of prudence), "nor to
act unjustly" (which is an act of justice), "that he is ready to do
favors" (which is an act of charity), "that he gives his services
readily" (which is an act of liberality), that "he is truthful" (which is
an act of truthfulness), and that "he is not given to complaining" (which
is an act of patience). Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is a special ornament of the soul, according to the saying of Is. 61:10, "He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation," and afterwards he adds, "and as a bride adorned with her jewels." But magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) distinguishes it from
the other virtues.
I answer that, As stated above (Question [123], Article [2]), it belongs to a special
virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate matter. Now
magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a determinate matter,
namely honors, as stated above (Articles [1],2): and honor, considered in
itself, is a special good, and accordingly magnanimity considered in
itself is a special virtue.
Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as stated above
(Question [103], Article [1], ad 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it regards
all the virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Magnanimity is not about any kind of honor, but great
honor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a great
deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on doing great
deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to what is worthy
of great honors.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows
that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence, and
shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a man is
beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself ready to
perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other virtues. on
the other hand, it is a proof of defect, that a man thinks so much of
certain external goods or evils, that for their sake he abandons and
gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again, all concealment of the
truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be the outcome of fear. Also
that a man be given to complaining denotes a defect, because by so doing
the mind seems to give way to external evils. Wherefore these and like
things the magnanimous man avoids under a special aspect, inasmuch as
they are contrary to his excellence or greatness.
Reply to Objection 3: Every virtue derives from its species a certain luster or
adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment results
from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through magnanimity which
makes all virtues greater as stated in Ethic. iv, 3.
Index [<< | >>]
Second Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 129 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude. For a thing
is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be the same as
fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "If magnanimity, which is
also called fortitude, be in thy soul, thou shalt live in great
assurance": and Tully says (De Offic. i): "If a man is brave we expect
him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far removed from deception."
Therefore magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a magnanimous
man is not {philokindynos}, that is, a lover of danger. But it belongs to
a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore magnanimity has
nothing in common with fortitude so as to be called a part thereof.
Objection 3: Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped for,
whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared or dared. But
good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is a more
important virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part thereof.
On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon
magnanimity as a part of fortitude.
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question [61], Article [3]), a principal virtue is
one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of virtue in a
principal matter. Now one of the general modes of virtue is firmness of
mind, because "a firm standing is necessary in every virtue," according
to Ethic. ii. And this is chiefly commended in those virtues that tend to
something difficult, in which it is most difficult to preserve firmness.
Wherefore the more difficult it is to stand firm in some matter of
difficulty, the more principal is the virtue which makes the mind firm in
that matter.
Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein
fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the greatest
goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as man loves
his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of death more than
any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity agrees with
fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult matter; but it
falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind about a matter wherein
it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of
fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1,3), "to lack evil is
looked upon as a good," wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous evil,
such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were the
obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude, and the
latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity may be
considered as identical. Since, however, there is a difference as regards
the difficulty on the part of either of the aforesaid, it follows that
properly speaking magnanimity, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii,
7), is a distinct virtue from fortitude.
Reply to Objection 2: A man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to all
kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who thinks "many" the
same as "great." This is contrary to the nature of a magnanimous man, for
no one seemingly exposes himself to danger for the sake of a thing that
he does not deem great. But for things that are truly great, a
magnanimous man is most ready to expose himself to danger, since he does
something great in the act of fortitude, even as in the acts of the other
virtues. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that the magnanimous
man is not {mikrokindynos}, i.e. endangering himself for small things,
but {megalokindynos}, i.e. endangering himself for great things. And
Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither
seekest dangers like a rash man, nor fearest them like a coward. For
nothing makes the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life."
Reply to Objection 3: Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one has to
withstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has to suffer an
evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be desired, and
that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to wit, as it is deemed
to surpass the ability of the one who desires it. Now that which is so
essentially is always of more account than that which is so accidentally.
Wherefore the difficult in evil things is always more opposed to firmness
of mind than the difficult in good things. Hence the virtue of fortitude
takes precedence of the virtue of magnanimity. For though good is simply
of more import than evil, evil is of more import in this particular
respect.
Index [<< | >>]
Second Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 129 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity. For a
man may have assurance not only in himself, but also in another,
according to 2 Cor. 3:4,5, "Such confidence we have, through Christ
towards God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves,
as of ourselves." But this seems inconsistent with the idea of
magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according to Is.
12:2, "I will deal confidently and will not fear." But to be without fear
seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also belongs to
fortitude rather than to magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward is due
to confidence, according to Heb. 3:6, where it is said that we are the
house of Christ, "if we hold fast the confidence and glory of hope unto
the end." Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from magnanimity: and
this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius enumerates it with
magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i).
On the contrary, Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to substitute confidence
for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question (ad 6) and in
the prologue to this.
I answer that, Confidence takes its name from "fides" [faith]: and it
belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But confidence
belongs to hope, according to Job 11:18, "Thou shalt have confidence,
hope being set before thee." Wherefore confidence apparently denotes
chiefly that a man derives hope through believing the word of one who
promises to help him. Since, however, faith signifies also a strong
opinion, and since one may come to have a strong opinion about something,
not only on account of another's statement, but also on account of
something we observe in another, it follows that confidence may denote
the hope of having something, which hope we conceive through observing
something either in oneself---for instance, through observing that he is
healthy, a man is confident that he will live long. or in another, for
instance, through observing that another is friendly to him and powerful,
a man is confident that he will receive help from him.
Now it has been stated above (Article [1], ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly
about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since confidence
denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation which
gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good, it
follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it belongs to the
"magnanimous to need nothing," for need is a mark of the deficient. But
this is to be understood according to the mode of a man, hence he adds
"or scarcely anything." For it surpasses man to need nothing at all. For
every man needs, first, the Divine assistance, secondly, even human
assistance, since man is naturally a social animal, for he is sufficient
by himself to provide for his own life. Accordingly, in so far as he
needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous man to have confidence in
others, for it is also a point of excellence in a man that he should have
at hand those who are able to be of service to him. And in so far as his
own ability goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in
himself.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (FS, Question [23], Article [2]; FS, Question [40], Article [4]), when we
were treating of the passions, hope is directly opposed to despair,
because the latter is about the same object, namely good. But as regards
contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because the latter's object
is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain strength of hope, wherefore it
is opposed to fear even as hope is. Since, however, fortitude properly
strengthens a man in respect of evil, and magnanimity in respect of the
obtaining of good, it follows that confidence belongs more properly to
magnanimity than to fortitude. Yet because hope causes daring, which
belongs to fortitude, it follows in consequence that confidence pertains
to fortitude.
Reply to Objection 3: Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain mode of
hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion. Now the
mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the act, so
that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it to a species
of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking, confidence cannot
denote a virtue, though it may denote the conditions of a virtue. For
this reason it is reckoned among the parts of fortitude, not as an
annexed virtue, except as identified with magnanimity by Tully (De Suv.
Rhet. ii), but as an integral part, as stated in the preceding Question.
Index [<< | >>]
Second Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 129 [<< | >>]
Article: 7 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity. For
security, as stated above (Question [128], ad 6), denotes freedom from the
disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively. Wherefore
security is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude does not
belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case. Neither therefore
does security belong to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man "is said to be secure
because he is without care." But this seems to be contrary to virtue,
which has a care for honorable things, according to 2 Tim. 2:15,
"Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God." Therefore
security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great things in all
the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is accounted
the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14,18, "If thou wilt put away
from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand . . . being buried thou shalt
sleep secure." Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity or to
any other virtue, as a part thereof.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading:
"Magnanimity consists of two things," that "it belongs to magnanimity to
give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune." But a
man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to
magnanimity.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes a man
take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he fears. Now
security takes its name from the removal of this care, of which fear is
the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom of the mind from
fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope. Now, as hope directly
belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly regards fortitude. Wherefore as
confidence belongs immediately to magnanimity, so security belongs
immediately to fortitude.
It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so is
fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating of the
passion (FS, Question [45], Article [2]). Wherefore as confidence belongs indirectly to
fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so security belongs
indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes despair.
Reply to Objection 1: Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes
fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness of
mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same as
fortitude, but is a condition thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one
puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not fear: in
this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 3: There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and
participation of, future happiness, as stated above (FS, Question [5], Articles [3],7).
Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a condition of a
virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's reward.
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Second Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 129 [<< | >>]
Article: 8 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi): "virtue suffices for itself." Now magnanimity takes every virtue great, as stated above (Article [4], ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But the
magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune: for Tully
says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists of two
things," that "a great soul is commended for despising external things."
Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of fortune.
Objection 3: Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that "it belongs to a great
soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from his
natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man." And Aristotle says
(Ethic. iv, 3) that "a magnanimous man does not grieve at misfortune."
Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of fortune, for every
one grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him. Therefore external
goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "good fortune
seems to conduce to magnanimity."
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), magnanimity regards two things:
honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something great as its
end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things. For since honor
is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but also by the
multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest esteem, the
result is that they show greater honor to those who possess goods of
fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful organs or instruments of
virtuous deeds: since we can easily accomplish things by means of riches,
power and friends. Hence it is evident that goods of fortune conduce to
magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it can
be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order to act
more expeditiously.
Reply to Objection 2: The magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch as
he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything unbecoming
for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he esteems them
useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.
Reply to Objection 3: If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither very
joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it. Wherefore, since
the magnanimous man does not think much of external goods, that is goods
of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them if he has them, nor much
cast down by their loss.