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We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since
habits, as we have said (Question [54], Article [3]), are divided into good and bad, we
must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues, and of
other matters connected with them, namely the Gifts, Beatitudes and
Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of vices and sins. Now
five things must be considered about virtues: (1) the essence of virtue;
(2) its subject; (3) the division of virtue; (4) the cause of virtue; (5)
certain properties of virtue.
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human virtue is a habit?
(2) Whether it is an operative habit?
(3) Whether it is a good habit?
(4) Of the definition of virtue.
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Question: 55 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For virtue is
"the limit of power" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit of anything
is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the limit; as a point is
reducible to the genus of line. Therefore virtue is reducible to the
genus of power, and not to the genus of habit.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) [*Retract. ix; cf. De
Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that "virtue is good use of free-will." But use of
free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act.
Objection 3: Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions:
otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep. But we do
merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "virtue is the
order of love," and (Questions. lxxxiii, qu. 30) that "the ordering which is
called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using what
we ought to use." Now order, or ordering, denominates either an action or
a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action or a relation.
Objection 5: Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there natural
virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers. Neither
therefore are human virtues habits.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science and virtue are habits.
I answer that, Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a
thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But the
end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according as
it is determinate to its act.
Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we have said above (Question [49], Article [4]). Therefore human virtues are habits.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the
virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act: for
instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act
of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe. When therefore we
say that "virtue is the limit of power," virtue is taken for the object
of virtue. For the furthest point to which a power can reach, is said to
be its virtue; for instance, if a man can carry a hundredweight and not
more, his virtue [*In English we should say 'strength,' which is the
original signification of the Latin 'virtus': thus we speak of an engine
being so many horse-power, to indicate its 'strength'] is put at a
hundredweight, and not at sixty. But the objection takes virtue as being
essentially the limit of power.
Reply to Objection 2: Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in the same
sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because it is that to which virtue
is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is nothing else
than the good use of free-will.
Reply to Objection 3: We are said to merit by something in two ways. First, as by
merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and thus we merit by
acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by the principle
whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the motive power; and thus are
we said to merit by virtues and habits.
Reply to Objection 4: When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love,
we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us love is set
in order by virtue.
Reply to Objection 5: Natural powers are of themselves determinate to one act:
not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as we have
said.
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Question: 55 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an
operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as health and beauty
belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health and beauty
are not operative habits. Therefore neither is virtue.
Objection 2: Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in reference
to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from the Philosopher
(De Coelo i), since some have a virtue to be always, while some have a
virtue to be not always, but at some definite time. Now as natural virtue
is in natural things, so is human virtue in rational beings. Therefore
also human virtue is referred not only to act, but also to being.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that virtue
"is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best." Now the
best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God Himself, as
Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. 3,6, 14) to Whom the soul is disposed
by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that virtue is a quality of
the soul in reference to God, likening it, as it were, to Him; and not in
reference to operation. It is not, therefore, an operative habit.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says that "virtue of a
thing is that which makes its work good."
I answer that, Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies some
perfection of power, as we have said above (Article [1]). Wherefore, since power
[*The one Latin word 'potentia' is rendered 'potentiality' in the first
case, and 'power' in the second] is of two kinds, namely, power in
reference to being, and power in reference to act; the perfection of each
of these is called virtue. But power in reference to being is on the part
of matter, which is potential being, whereas power in reference to act,
is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since
everything acts in so far as it is in act.
Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the
soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common with other
animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to the
soul and body: and only those forces which are proper to the soul,
namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, human
virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but
belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human virtue
does not imply reference to being, but rather to act. Consequently it is
essential to human virtue to be an operative habit.
Reply to Objection 1: Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: for
such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue is the
principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the
operator in respect of virtue some corresponding disposition. Now virtue
causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered
disposition of the soul, in so far as, to wit, the powers of the soul are
in some way ordered to one another, and to that which is outside. Hence
virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable disposition of the soul, is like
health and beauty, which are suitable dispositions of the body. But this
does not hinder virtue from being a principle of operation.
Reply to Objection 2: Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man; but
only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which are proper
to man.
Reply to Objection 3: As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of man
to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have said above
(Question [3], Article [2]), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly
conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an
operation.
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Question: 55 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it should
be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense. But there is a
virtue even of sin; according to 1 Cor. 15:56: "The virtue [Douay:
'strength'] of sin is the Law." Therefore virtue is not always a good
habit.
Objection 2: Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not only
referred to good, but also to evil: according to Is. 5: "Woe to you that
are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness." Therefore virtue
also is referred to good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:9): "Virtue [Douay:
'power'] is made perfect in infirmity." But infirmity is an evil.
Therefore virtue is referred not only to good, but also to evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can doubt
that virtue makes the soul exceeding good": and the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his
work good likewise."
I answer that, As we have said above (Article [1]), virtue implies a perfection
of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its
power (De Coelo i). Now the limit of any power must needs be good: for
all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Hom. ii) that
every evil is a weakness. And for this reason the virtue of a thing must
be regarded in reference to good. Therefore human virtue which is an
operative habit, is a good habit, productive of good works.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as bad things are said metaphorically to be perfect, so are they said to be good: for we speak of a perfect thief or robber; and of a good thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. v, text. 21). In this way therefore virtue is applied to evil things: so that the "virtue" of sin is said to be law, in so far as occasionally sin is aggravated through the law, so as to attain to the limit of its possibility.
Reply to Objection 2: The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink, consists in a
falling away from the order of reason. Now it happens that, together with
this falling away from reason, some lower power is perfect in reference
to that which belongs to its own kind, even in direct opposition to
reason, or with some falling away therefrom. But the perfection of that
power, since it is compatible with a falling away from reason, cannot be
called a human virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Reason is shown to be so much the more perfect, according
as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the weakness of the body
and of the lower powers. And therefore human virtue, which is attributed
to reason, is said to be "made perfect in infirmity," not of the reason
indeed, but of the body and of the lower powers.
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Question: 55 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the definition, usually given, of virtue, is
not suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we
live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in
us, without us." For virtue is man's goodness, since virtue it is that
makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to be good, as neither
is whiteness white. It is therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a
"good quality."
Objection 2: Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since it is
that which divides the genus. But good is more common than quality, since
it is convertible with being. Therefore "good" should not be put in the
definition of virtue, as a difference of quality.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3): "When we come
across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the field, it
is something appertaining to the mind." But there are virtues even of the
irrational parts; as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10). Every virtue,
therefore, is not a good quality "of the mind."
Objection 4: Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the
righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. It is
therefore unsuitable to put "righteous" in the definition of virtue, when
we say that virtue is that "by which we live righteously."
Objection 5: Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. But
many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule, that "pride
lies in wait for good works in order to slay them." It is untrue,
therefore, "that no one can make bad use of virtue."
Objection 6: Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine commenting on
Jn. 15:11: "He shall do greater things than these," says [*Tract. xxvii
in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb. Ap. 11]: "He who created thee without thee,
will not justify thee without thee." It is therefore unsuitable to say
that "God works virtue in us, without us."
On the contrary, We have the authority of Augustine from whose words
this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, 19.
I answer that, This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential
notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of anything is
gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the
causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is
gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a good
quality": for "quality" is the genus of virtue, and the difference,
"good." But the definition would be more suitable if for "quality" we
substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus.
Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any
other accident; but it has matter "about which" it is concerned, and
matter "in which" it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about which
virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be included in the
above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain
species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And
so for material cause we have the subject, which is mentioned when we say
that virtue is a good quality "of the mind."
The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it
must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil,
as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to
evil; for instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to the
untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good: and
so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred
to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live righteously": and
its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good,
sometimes unto evil, in the words, "of which no one makes bad use."
Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this
definition applies; and this is expressed in the words "which God works
in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the
definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or
infused.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is first seized by the intellect is being:
wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and
consequently as gone, and as good, which are convertible with being.
Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that
oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. But this
is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for
everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the notion of white
and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and
non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had
being, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or
one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, but because by them
something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it
something is good.
Reply to Objection 2: Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good
in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further
than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of the soul is to be in
accord with reason."
Reply to Objection 3: Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except
in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i, 13). And
therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue.
Reply to Objection 4: Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and are the proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (Question [60], Article [2]; SS, Question [58], Article [8]). But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as stated above (Question [19], Article [4]), is common to all virtues.
Reply to Objection 5: One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance
by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, or by being
proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of
action, so that an act of virtue be evil.
Reply to Objection 6: Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on
our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words,
"which God works in us without us." As to those things which are done by
us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He
works in every will and in every nature.