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Question: 77 [<< | >>]
We must now consider the accidents which remain in this sacrament; under
which head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the accidents which remain are without a subject?
(2) Whether dimensive quantity is the subject of the other accidents?
(3) Whether such accidents can affect an extrinsic body?
(4) Whether they can be corrupted?
(5) Whether anything can be generated from them?
(6) Whether they can nourish?
(7) Of the breaking of the consecrated bread?
(8) Whether anything can be mixed with the consecrated wine?
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Question: 77 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that the accidents do not remain in this sacrament
without a subject, because there ought not to be anything disorderly or
deceitful in this sacrament of truth. But for accidents to be without a
subject is contrary to the order which God established in nature; and
furthermore it seems to savor of deceit, since accidents are naturally
the signs of the nature of the subject. Therefore the accidents are not
without a subject in this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, not even by miracle can the definition of a thing be
severed from it, or the definition of another thing be applied to it; for
instance, that, while man remains a man, he can be an irrational animal.
For it would follow that contradictories can exist at the one time: for
the "definition of a thing is what its name expresses," as is said in
Metaph. iv. But it belongs to the definition of an accident for it to be
in a subject, while the definition of substance is that it must subsist
of itself, and not in another. Therefore it cannot come to pass, even by
miracle, that the accidents exist without a subject in this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, an accident is individuated by its subject. If therefore
the accidents remain in this sacrament without a subject, they will not
be individual, but general, which is clearly false, because thus they
would not be sensible, but merely intelligible.
Objection 4: Further, the accidents after the consecration of this sacrament
do not obtain any composition. But before the consecration they were not
composed either of matter and form, nor of existence [quo est] and
essence [quod est]. Therefore, even after consecration they are not
composite in either of these ways. But this is unreasonable, for thus
they would be simpler than angels, whereas at the same time these
accidents are perceptible to the senses. Therefore, in this sacrament the
accidents do not remain without a subject.
On the contrary, Gregory says in an Easter Homily (Lanfranc, De Corp. et
Sang. Dom. xx) that "the sacramental species are the names of those
things which were there before, namely, of the bread and wine." Therefore
since the substance of the bread and the wine does not remain, it seems
that these species remain without a subject.
I answer that, The species of the bread and wine, which are perceived
by our senses to remain in this sacrament after consecration, are not
subjected in the substance of the bread and wine, for that does not
remain, as stated above (Question [75], Article [2]); nor in the substantial form, for
that does not remain (Question [75], Article [6]), and if it did remain, "it could not
be a subject," as Boethius declares (De Trin. i). Furthermore it is
manifest that these accidents are not subjected in the substance of
Christ's body and blood, because the substance of the human body cannot
in any way be affected by such accidents; nor is it possible for Christ's
glorious and impassible body to be altered so as to receive these
qualities.
Now there are some who say that they are in the surrounding atmosphere
as in a subject. But even this cannot be: in the first place, because
atmosphere is not susceptive of such accidents. Secondly, because these
accidents are not where the atmosphere is, nay more, the atmosphere is
displaced by the motion of these species. Thirdly, because accidents do
not pass from subject to subject, so that the same identical accident
which was first in one subject be afterwards in another; because an
accident is individuated by the subject; hence it cannot come to pass for
an accident remaining identically the same to be at one time in one
subject, and at another time in another. Fourthly, since the atmosphere
is not deprived of its own accidents, it would have at the one time its
own accidents and others foreign to it. Nor can it be maintained that
this is done miraculously in virtue of the consecration, because the
words of consecration do not signify this, and they effect only what they
signify.
Therefore it follows that the accidents continue in this sacrament
without a subject. This can be done by Divine power: for since an effect
depends more upon the first cause than on the second, God Who is the
first cause both of substance and accident, can by His unlimited power
preserve an accident in existence when the substance is withdrawn whereby
it was preserved in existence as by its proper cause, just as without
natural causes He can produce other effects of natural causes, even as He
formed a human body in the Virgin's womb, "without the seed of man" (Hymn
for Christmas, First Vespers).
Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing to hinder the common law of nature from ordaining a thing, the contrary of which is nevertheless ordained by a special privilege of grace, as is evident in the raising of the dead, and in the restoring of sight to the blind: even thus in human affairs, to some individuals some things are granted by special privilege which are outside the common law. And so, even though it be according to the common law of nature for an accident to be in a subject, still for a special reason, according to the order of grace, the accidents exist in this sacrament without a subject, on account of the reasons given above (Question [75], Article [5]).
Reply to Objection 2: Since being is not a genus, then being cannot be of itself
the essence of either substance or accident. Consequently, the definition
of substance is not---"a being of itself without a subject," nor is the
definition of accident---"a being in a subject"; but it belongs to the
quiddity or essence of substance "to have existence not in a subject";
while it belongs to the quiddity or essence of accident "to have
existence in a subject." But in this sacrament it is not in virtue of
their essence that accidents are not in a subject, but through the Divine
power sustaining them; and consequently they do not cease to be
accidents, because neither is the definition of accident withdrawn from
them, nor does the definition of substance apply to them.
Reply to Objection 3: These accidents acquired individual being in the substance
of the bread and wine; and when this substance is changed into the body
and blood of Christ, they remain in that individuated being which they
possessed before, hence they are individual and sensible.
Reply to Objection 4: These accidents had no being of their own nor other
accidents, so long as the substance of the bread and wine remained; but
their subjects had "such" being through them, just as snow is "white"
through whiteness. But after the consecration the accidents which remain
have being; hence they are compounded of existence and essence, as was
said of the angels, in the FP, Question [50], Article [2], ad 3; and besides they have
composition of quantitative parts.
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Question: 77 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that in this sacrament the dimensive quantity of the
bread or wine is not the subject of the other accidents. For accident is
not the subject of accident; because no form can be a subject, since to
be a subject is a property of matter. But dimensive quantity is an
accident. Therefore dimensive quantity cannot be the subject of the other
accidents.
Objection 2: Further, just as quantity is individuated by substance, so also
are the other accidents. If, then, the dimensive quantity of the bread or
wine remains individuated according to the being it had before, in which
it is preserved, for like reason the other accidents remain individuated
according to the existence which they had before in the substance.
Therefore they are not in dimensive quantity as in a subject, since every
accident is individuated by its own subject.
Objection 3: Further, among the other accidents that remain, of the bread and
wine, the senses perceive also rarity and density, which cannot be in
dimensive quantity existing outside matter; because a thing is rare which
has little matter under great dimensions. while a thing is dense which
has much matter under small dimensions, as is said in Phys. iv. It does
not seem, then, that dimensive quantity can be the subject of the
accidents which remain in this sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, quantity abstract from matter seems to be mathematical
quantity, which is not the subject of sensible qualities. Since, then,
the remaining accidents in this sacrament are sensible, it seems that in
this sacrament they cannot be subjected in the dimensive quantity of the
bread and wine that remains after consecration.
On the contrary, Qualities are divisible only accidentally, that is, by
reason of the subject. But the qualities remaining in this sacrament are
divided by the division of dimensive quantity, as is evident through our
senses. Therefore, dimensive quantity is the subject of the accidents
which remain in this sacrament.
I answer that, It is necessary to say that the other accidents which
remain in this sacrament are subjected in the dimensive quantity of the
bread and wine that remains: first of all, because something having
quantity and color and affected by other accidents is perceived by the
senses; nor is sense deceived in such. Secondly, because the first
disposition of matter is dimensive quantity, hence Plato also assigned
"great" and "small" as the first differences of matter (Aristotle,
Metaph. iv). And because the first subject is matter, the consequence is
that all other accidents are related to their subject through the medium
of dimensive quantity; just as the first subject of color is said to be
the surface, on which account some have maintained that dimensions are
the substances of bodies, as is said in Metaph. iii. And since, when the
subject is withdrawn, the accidents remain according to the being which
they had before, it follows that all accidents remain founded upon
dimensive quantity.
Thirdly, because, since the subject is the principle of individuation of
the accidents, it is necessary for what is admitted as the subject of
some accidents to be somehow the principle of individuation: for it is of
the very notion of an individual that it cannot be in several; and this
happens in two ways. First, because it is not natural to it to be in any
one; and in this way immaterial separated forms, subsisting of
themselves, are also individuals of themselves. Secondly, because a form,
be it substantial or accidental, is naturally in someone indeed, not in
several, as this whiteness, which is in this body. As to the first,
matter is the principle of individuation of all inherent forms, because,
since these forms, considered in themselves, are naturally in something
as in a subject, from the very fact that one of them is received in
matter, which is not in another, it follows that neither can the form
itself thus existing be in another. As to the second, it must be
maintained that the principle of individuation is dimensive quantity. For
that something is naturally in another one solely, is due to the fact
that that other is undivided in itself, and distinct from all others. But
it is on account of quantity that substance can be divided, as is said in
Phys. i. And therefore dimensive quantity itself is a particular
principle of individuation in forms of this kind, namely, inasmuch as
forms numerically distinct are in different parts of the matter. Hence
also dimensive quantity has of itself a kind of individuation, so that we
can imagine several lines of the same species, differing in position,
which is included in the notion of this quantity; for it belongs to
dimension for it to be "quantity having position" (Aristotle, Categor.
iv), and therefore dimensive quantity can be the subject of the other
accidents, rather than the other way about.
Reply to Objection 1: One accident cannot of itself be the subject of another,
because it does not exist of itself. But inasmuch as an accident is
received in another thing, one is said to be the subject of the other,
inasmuch as one is received in a subject through another, as the surface
is said to be the subject of color. Hence when God makes an accident to
exist of itself, it can also be of itself the subject of another.
Reply to Objection 2: The other accidents, even as they were in the substance of
the bread, were individuated by means of dimensive quantity, as stated
above. And therefore dimensive quantity is the subject of the other
accidents remaining in this sacrament, rather than conversely.
Reply to Objection 3: Rarity and density are particular qualities accompanying
bodies, by reason of their having much or little matter under dimensions;
just as all other accidents likewise follow from the principles of
substance. And consequently, as the accidents are preserved by Divine
power when the substance is withdrawn, so, when matter is withdrawn, the
qualities which go with matter, such as rarity and density, are preserved
by Divine power.
Reply to Objection 4: Mathematical quantity abstracts not from intelligible
matter, but from sensible matter, as is said in Metaph. vii. But matter
is termed sensible because it underlies sensible qualities. And therefore
it is manifest that the dimensive quantity, which remains in this
sacrament without a subject, is not mathematical quantity.
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Question: 77 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that the species which remain in this sacrament cannot
affect external objects. For it is proved in Phys. vii, that forms which
are in matter are produced by forms that are in matter, but not from
forms which are without matter, because like makes like. But the
sacramental species are species without matter, since they remain without
a subject, as is evident from what was said above (Article [1]). Therefore they
cannot affect other matter by producing any form in it.
Objection 2: Further, when the action of the principal agent ceases, then the
action of the instrument must cease, as when the carpenter rests, the
hammer is moved no longer. But all accidental forms act instrumentally in
virtue of the substantial form as the principal agent. Therefore, since
the substantial form of the bread and wine does not remain in this
sacrament, as was shown above (Question [75], Article [6]), it seems that the accidental
forms which remain cannot act so as to change external matter.
Objection 3: Further, nothing acts outside its species, because an effect
cannot surpass its cause. But all the sacramental species are accidents.
Therefore they cannot change external matter, at least as to a
substantial form.
On the contrary, If they could not change external bodies, they could
not be felt; for a thing is felt from the senses being changed by a
sensible thing, as is said in De Anima ii.
I answer that, Because everything acts in so far as it is an actual
being, the consequence is that everything stands in the same relation to
action as it does to being. Therefore, because, according to what was
said above (Article [1]), it is an effect of the Divine power that the
sacramental species continue in the being which they had when the
substance of the bread and wine was present, it follows that they
continue in their action. Consequently they retain every action which
they had while the substance of the bread and wine remained, now that the
substance of the bread and wine has passed into the body and blood of
Christ. Hence there is no doubt but that they can change external bodies.
Reply to Objection 1: The sacramental species, although they are forms existing
without matter, still retain the same being which they had before in
matter, and therefore as to their being they are like forms which are in
matter.
Reply to Objection 2: The action of an accidental form depends upon the action of
a substantial form in the same way as the being of accident depends upon
the being of substance; and therefore, as it is an effect of Divine power
that the sacramental species exist without substance, so is it an effect
of Divine power that they can act without a substantial form, because
every action of a substantial or accidental form depends upon God as the
first agent.
Reply to Objection 3: The change which terminates in a substantial form is not
effected by a substantial form directly, but by means of the active and
passive qualities, which act in virtue of the substantial form. But by
Divine power this instrumental energy is retained in the sacramental
species, just as it was before: and consequently their action can be
directed to a substantial form instrumentally, just in the same way as
anything can act outside its species, not as by its own power, but by the
power of the chief agent.
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Question: 77 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that the sacramental species cannot be corrupted,
because corruption comes of the separation of the form from the matter.
But the matter of the bread does not remain in this sacrament, as is
clear from what was said above (Question [75], Article [2]). Therefore these species
cannot be corrupted.
Objection 2: Further, no form is corrupted except accidentally, that is, when
its subject is corrupted; hence self-subsisting forms are incorruptible,
as is seen in spiritual substances. But the sacramental species are forms
without a subject. Therefore they cannot be corrupted.
Objection 3: Further, if they be corrupted, it will either be naturally or
miraculously. But they cannot be corrupted naturally, because no subject
of corruption can be assigned as remaining after the corruption has taken
place. Neither can they be corrupted miraculously, because the miracles
which occur in this sacrament take place in virtue of the consecration,
whereby the sacramental species are preserved: and the same thing is not
the cause of preservation and of corruption. Therefore, in no way can the
sacramental species be corrupted.
On the contrary, We perceive by our senses that the consecrated hosts
become putrefied and corrupted.
I answer that, Corruption is "movement from being into non-being"
(Aristotle, Phys. v). Now it has been stated (Article [3]) that the sacramental
species retain the same being as they had before when the substance of
the bread was present. Consequently, as the being of those accidents
could be corrupted while the substance of the bread and wine was present,
so likewise they can be corrupted now that the substance has passed away.
But such accidents could have been previously corrupted in two ways: in
one way, of themselves; in another way, accidentally. They could be
corrupted of themselves, as by alteration of the qualities, and increase
or decrease of the quantity, not in the way in which increase or decrease
is found only in animated bodies, such as the substances of the bread and
wine are not, but by addition or division; for, as is said in Metaph.
iii, one dimension is dissolved by division, and two dimensions result;
while on the contrary, by addition, two dimensions become one. And in
this way such accidents can be corrupted manifestly after consecration,
because the dimensive quantity which remains can receive division and
addition; and since it is the subject of sensible qualities, as stated
above (Article [1]), it can likewise be the subject of their alteration, for
instance, if the color or the savor of the bread or wine be altered.
An accident can be corrupted in another way, through the corruption of
its subject, and in this way also they can be corrupted after
consecration; for although the subject does not remain, still the being
which they had in the subject does remain, which being is proper, and
suited to the subject. And therefore such being can be corrupted by a
contrary agent, as the substance of the bread or wine was subject to
corruption, and, moreover, was not corrupted except by a preceding
alteration regarding the accidents.
Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between each of the aforesaid
corruptions; because, when the body and the blood of Christ succeed in
this sacrament to the substance of the bread and wine, if there be such
change on the part of the accidents as would not have sufficed for the
corruption of the bread and wine, then the body and blood of Christ do
not cease to be under this sacrament on account of such change, whether
the change be on the part of the quality, as for instance, when the color
or the savor of the bread or wine is slightly modified; or on the part of
the quantity, as when the bread or the wine is divided into such parts as
to keep in them the nature of bread or of wine. But if the change be so
great that the substance of the bread or wine would have been corrupted,
then Christ's body and blood do not remain under this sacrament; and this
either on the part of the qualities, as when the color, savor, and other
qualities of the bread and wine are so altered as to be incompatible with
the nature of bread or of wine; or else on the part of the quantity, as,
for instance, if the bread be reduced to fine particles, or the wine
divided into such tiny drops that the species of bread or wine no longer
remain.
Reply to Objection 1: Since it belongs essentially to corruption to take away the
being of a thing, in so far as the being of some form is in matter, it
results that by corruption the form is separated from the matter. But if
such being were not in matter, yet like such being as is in matter, it
could be taken away by corruption, even where there is no matter; as
takes place in this sacrament, as is evident from what was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the sacramental species are forms not in matter,
yet they have the being which they had in matter.
Reply to Objection 3: This corruption of species is not miraculous, but natural;
nevertheless, it presupposes the miracle which is wrought in the
consecration, namely, that those sacramental species retain without a
subject, the same being as they had in a subject; just as a blind man, to
whom sight is given miraculously, sees naturally.
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Question: 77 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that nothing can be generated from the sacramental
species: because, whatever is generated, is generated out of some matter:
for nothing is generated out of nothing, although by creation something
is made out of nothing. But there is no matter underlying the sacramental
species except that of Christ's body, and that body is incorruptible.
Therefore it seems that nothing can be generated from the sacramental
species.
Objection 2: Further, things which are not of the same genus cannot spring
from one another: thus a line is not made of whiteness. But accident and
substance differ generically. Therefore, since the sacramental species
are accidents, it seems that no substance can be generated from them.
Objection 3: Further, if any corporeal substance be generated from them, such
substance will not be without accident. Therefore, if any corporeal
substance be generated from the sacramental species, then substance and
accident would be generated from accident, namely, two things from one,
which is impossible. Consequently, it is impossible for any corporeal
substance to be generated out of the sacramental species.
On the contrary, The senses are witness that something is generated out
of the sacramental species, either ashes, if they be burned, worms if
they putrefy, or dust if they be crushed.
I answer that, Since "the corruption of one thing is the generation of
another" (De Gener. i), something must be generated necessarily from the
sacramental species if they be corrupted, as stated above (Article [4]); for
they are not corrupted in such a way that they disappear altogether, as
if reduced to nothing; on the contrary, something sensible manifestly
succeeds to them.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how anything can be generated from
them. For it is quite evident that nothing is generated out of the body
and blood of Christ which are truly there, because these are
incorruptible. But if the substance, or even the matter, of the bread and
wine were to remain in this sacrament, then, as some have maintained, it
would be easy to account for this sensible object which succeeds to them.
But that supposition is false, as was stated above (Question [75], Articles [2],4,8).
Hence it is that others have said that the things generated have not
sprung from the sacramental species, but from the surrounding atmosphere.
But this can be shown in many ways to be impossible. In the first place,
because when a thing is generated from another, the latter at first
appears changed and corrupted; whereas no alteration or corruption
appeared previously in the adjacent atmosphere; hence the worms or ashes
are not generated therefrom. Secondly, because the nature of the
atmosphere is not such as to permit of such things being generated by
such alterations. Thirdly, because it is possible for many consecrated
hosts to be burned or putrefied; nor would it be possible for an earthen
body, large enough to be generated from the atmosphere, unless a great
and, in fact, exceedingly sensible condensation of the atmosphere took
place. Fourthly, because the same thing can happen to the solid bodies
surrounding them, such as iron or stone, which remain entire after the
generation of the aforesaid things. Hence this opinion cannot stand,
because it is opposed to what is manifest to our senses.
And therefore others have said that the substance of the bread and wine
returns during the corruption of the species, and so from the returning
substance of the bread and wine, ashes or worms or something of the kind
are generated. But this explanation seems an impossible one. First of
all, because if the substance of the bread and wine be converted into
the body and blood of Christ, as was shown above (Question [75], Articles [2],4), the
substance of the bread and wine cannot return, except the body and blood
of Christ be again changed back into the substance of bread and wine,
which is impossible: thus if air be turned into fire, the air cannot
return without the fire being again changed into air. But if the
substance of bread or wine be annihilated, it cannot return again,
because what lapses into nothing does not return numerically the same.
Unless perchance it be said that the said substance returns, because God
creates anew another new substance to replace the first. Secondly, this
seems to be impossible, because no time can be assigned when the
substance of the bread returns. For, from what was said above (Article [4]; Question [76], Article [6], ad 3), it is evident that while the species of the bread and
wine remain, there remain also the body and blood of Christ, which are
not present together with the substance of the bread and wine in this
sacrament, according to what was stated above (Question [75], Article [2]). Hence the
substance of the bread and wine cannot return while the sacramental
species remain; nor, again, when these species pass away; because then
the substance of the bread and wine would be without their proper
accidents, which is impossible. Unless perchance it be said that in the
last instant of the corruption of the species there returns (not, indeed,
the substance of bread and wine, because it is in that very instant that
they have the being of the substance generated from the species, but) the
matter of the bread and wine; which, matter, properly speaking, would be
more correctly described as created anew, than as returning. And in this
sense the aforesaid position might be held.
However, since it does not seem reasonable to say that anything takes
place miraculously in this sacrament, except in virtue of the
consecration itself, which does not imply either creation or return of
matter, it seems better to say that in the actual consecration it is
miraculously bestowed on the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine to
be the subject of subsequent forms. Now this is proper to matter; and
therefore as a consequence everything which goes with matter is bestowed
on dimensive quantity; and therefore everything which could be generated
from the matter of bread or wine, if it were present, can be generated
from the aforesaid dimensive quantity of the bread or wine, not, indeed,
by a new miracle, but by virtue of the miracle which has already taken
place.
Reply to Objection 1: Although no matter is there out of which a thing may be
generated, nevertheless dimensive quantity supplies the place of matter,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Those sacramental species are indeed accidents, yet they
have the act and power of substance, as stated above (Article [3]).
Reply to Objection 3: The dimensive quantity of the bread and wine retains its
own nature, and receives miraculously the power and property of
substance; and therefore it can pass to both, that is, into substance and
dimension.
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Question: 77 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that the sacramental species cannot nourish, because, as
Ambrose says (De Sacram. v), "it is not this bread that enters into our
body, but the bread of everlasting life, which supports the substance of
our soul." But whatever nourishes enters into the body. Therefore this
bread does not nourish: and the same reason holds good of the wine.
Objection 2: Further, as is said in De Gener. ii, "We are nourished by the
very things of which we are made." But the sacramental species are
accidents, whereas man is not made of accidents, because accident is not
a part of substance. Therefore it seems that the sacramental species
cannot nourish.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii) that "food nourishes
according as it is a substance, but it gives increase by reason of its
quantity." But the sacramental species are not a substance. Consequently
they cannot nourish.
On the contrary, The Apostle speaking of this sacrament says (1 Cor. 11:21): "One, indeed, is hungry, and another is drunk": upon which the
gloss observes that "he alludes to those who after the celebration of the
sacred mystery, and after the consecration of the bread and wine, claimed
their oblations, and not sharing them with others, took the whole, so as
even to become intoxicated thereby." But this could not happen if the
sacramental species did not nourish. Therefore the sacramental species do
nourish.
I answer that, This question presents no difficulty, now that we have
solved the preceding question. Because, as stated in De Anima ii, food
nourishes by being converted into the substance of the individual
nourished. Now it has been stated (Article [5]) that the sacramental species can
be converted into a substance generated from them. And they can be
converted into the human body for the same reason as they can into ashes
or worms. Consequently, it is evident that they nourish.
But the senses witness to the untruth of what some maintain; viz. that
the species do not nourish as though they were changed into the human
body, but merely refresh and hearten by acting upon the senses (as a man
is heartened by the odor of meat, and intoxicated by the fumes of wine).
Because such refreshment does not suffice long for a man, whose body
needs repair owing to constant waste: and yet a man could be supported
for long if he were to take hosts and consecrated wine in great quantity.
In like manner the statement advanced by others cannot stand, who hold
that the sacramental species nourish owing to the remaining substantial
form of the bread and wine: both because the form does not remain, as
stated above (Question [75], Article [6]): and because to nourish is the act not of a
form but rather of matter, which takes the form of the one nourished,
while the form of the nourishment passes away: hence it is said in De
Anima ii that nourishment is at first unlike, but at the end is like.
Reply to Objection 1: After the consecration bread can be said to be in this
sacrament in two ways. First, as to the species, which retain the name of
the previous substance, as Gregory says in an Easter Homily (Lanfranc, De
Corp. et Sang. Dom. xx). Secondly, Christ's very body can be called
bread, since it is the mystical bread "coming down from heaven."
Consequently, Ambrose uses the word "bread" in this second meaning, when
he says that "this bread does not pass into the body," because, to wit,
Christ's body is not changed into man's body, but nourishes his soul. But
he is not speaking of bread taken in the first acceptation.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the sacramental species are not those things out
of which the human body is made, yet they are changed into those things
stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the sacramental species are not a substance, still
they have the virtue of a substance, as stated above.
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Question: 77 [<< | >>]
Article: 7 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that the sacramental species are not broken in this
sacrament, because the Philosopher says in Meteor. iv that bodies are
breakable owing to a certain disposition of the pores; a thing which
cannot be attributed to the sacramental species. Therefore the
sacramental species cannot be broken.
Objection 2: Further, breaking is followed by sound. But the sacramental
species emit no sound: because the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), that
what emits sound is a hard body, having a smooth surface. Therefore the
sacramental species are not broken.
Objection 3: Further, breaking and mastication are seemingly of the same
object. But it is Christ's true body that is eaten, according to Jn.
6:57: "He that eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood." Therefore it is
Christ's body that is broken and masticated: and hence it is said in the
confession of Berengarius: "I agree with the Holy Catholic Church, and
with heart and lips I profess, that the bread and wine which are placed
on the altar, are the true body and blood of Christ after consecration,
and are truly handled and broken by the priest's hands, broken and
crushed by the teeth of believers." Consequently, the breaking ought not
to be ascribed to the sacramental species.
On the contrary, Breaking arises from the division of that which has quantity. But nothing having quantity except the sacramental species is broken here, because neither Christ's body is broken, as being incorruptible, nor is the substance of the bread, because it no longer remains. Therefore the sacramental species are broken.
I answer that, Many opinions prevailed of old on this matter. Some held
that in this sacrament there was no breaking at all in reality, but
merely in the eyes of the beholders. But this contention cannot stand,
because in this sacrament of truth the sense is not deceived with regard
to its proper object of judgment, and one of these objects is breaking,
whereby from one thing arise many: and these are common sensibles, as is
stated in De Anima ii.
Others accordingly have said that there was indeed a genuine breaking,
but without any subject. But this again contradicts our senses; because a
quantitative body is seen in this sacrament, which formerly was one, and
is now divided into many, and this must be the subject of the breaking.
But it cannot be said that Christ's true body is broken. First of all,
because it is incorruptible and impassible: secondly, because it is
entire under every part, as was shown above (Question [76], Article [3]), which is
contrary to the nature of a thing broken.
It remains, then, that the breaking is in the dimensive quantity of the
bread, as in a subject, just as the other accidents. And as the
sacramental species are the sacrament of Christ's true body, so is the
breaking of these species the sacrament of our Lord's Passion, which was
in Christ's true body.
Reply to Objection 1: As rarity and density remain under the sacramental species,
as stated above (Article [2], ad 3), so likewise porousness remains, and in
consequence breakableness.
Reply to Objection 2: Hardness results from density; therefore, as density
remains under the sacramental species, hardness remains there too, and
the capability of sound as a consequence.
Reply to Objection 3: What is eaten under its own species, is also broken and
masticated under its own species; but Christ's body is eaten not under
its proper, but under the sacramental species. Hence in explaining Jn.
6:64, "The flesh profiteth nothing," Augustine (Tract. xxvii in Joan.)
says that this is to be taken as referring to those who understood
carnally: "for they understood the flesh, thus, as it is divided
piecemeal, in a dead body, or as sold in the shambles." Consequently,
Christ's very body is not broken, except according to its sacramental
species. And the confession made by Berengarius is to be understood in
this sense, that the breaking and the crushing with the teeth is to be
referred to the sacramental species, under which the body of Christ truly
is.
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Question: 77 [<< | >>]
Article: 8 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that no liquid can be mingled with the consecrated wine,
because everything mingled with another partakes of its quality. But no
liquid can share in the quality of the sacramental species, because
those accidents are without a subject, as stated above (Article [1]). Therefore
it seems that no liquid can be mingled with the sacramental species of
the wine.
Objection 2: Further, if any kind of liquid be mixed with those species, then
some one thing must be the result. But no one thing can result from the
liquid, which is a substance, and the sacramental species, which are
accidents; nor from the liquid and Christ's blood, which owing to its
incorruptibility suffers neither increase nor decrease. Therefore no
liquid can be mixed with the consecrated wine.
Objection 3: Further, if any liquid be mixed with the consecrated wine, then
that also would appear to be consecrated; just as water added to
holy-water becomes holy. But the consecrated wine is truly Christ's
blood. Therefore the liquid added would likewise be Christ's blood
otherwise than by consecration, which is unbecoming. Therefore no liquid
can be mingled with the consecrated wine.
Objection 4: Further, if one of two things be entirely corrupted, there is no
mixture (De Gener. i). But if we mix any liquid, it seems that the entire
species of the sacramental wine is corrupted, so that the blood of Christ
ceases to be beneath it; both because great and little are difference of
quantity, and alter it, as white and black cause a difference of color;
and because the liquid mixed, as having no obstacle, seems to permeate
the whole, and so Christ's blood ceases to be there, since it is not
there with any other substance. Consequently, no liquid can be mixed with
the consecrated wine.
On the contrary, It is evident to our senses that another liquid can be
mixed with the wine after it is consecrated, just as before.
I answer that, The truth of this question is evident from what has been
said already. For it was said above (Article [3]; Article [5], ad 2) that the species
remaining in this sacrament, as they acquire the manner of being of
substance in virtue of the consecration, so likewise do they obtain the
mode of acting and of being acted upon, so that they can do or receive
whatever their substance could do or receive, were it there present. But
it is evident that if the substance of wine were there present, then some
other liquid could be mingled with it.
Nevertheless there would be a different effect of such mixing both
according to the form and according to the quantity of the liquid. For if
sufficient liquid were mixed so as to spread itself all through the wine,
then the whole would be a mixed substance. Now what is made up of things
mixed is neither of them, but each passes into a third resulting from
both: hence it would result that the former wine would remain no longer.
But if the liquid added were of another species, for instance, if water
were mixed, the species of the wine would be dissolved, and there would
be a liquid of another species. But if liquid of the same species were
added, of instance, wine with wine, the same species would remain, but
the wine would not be the same numerically, as the diversity of the
accidents shows: for instance, if one wine were white and the other red.
But if the liquid added were of such minute quantity that it could not
permeate the whole, the entire wine would not be mixed, but only part of
it, which would not remain the same numerically owing to the blending of
extraneous matter: still it would remain the same specifically, not only
if a little liquid of the same species were mixed with it, but even if it
were of another species, since a drop of water blended with much wine
passes into the species of wine (De Gener. i).
Now it is evident that the body and blood of Christ abide in this
sacrament so long as the species remain numerically the same, as stated
above (Article [4]; Question [76], Article [6], ad 3); because it is this bread and this wine
which is consecrated. Hence, if the liquid of any kind whatsoever added
be so much in quantity as to permeate the whole of the consecrated wine,
and be mixed with it throughout, the result would be something
numerically distinct, and the blood of Christ will remain there no
longer. But if the quantity of the liquid added be so slight as not to
permeate throughout, but to reach only a part of the species, Christ's
blood will cease to be under that part of the consecrated wine, yet will
remain under the rest.
Reply to Objection 1: Pope Innocent III in a Decretal writes thus: "The very
accidents appear to affect the wine that is added, because, if water is
added, it takes the savor of the wine. The result is, then, that the
accidents change the subject, just as subject changes accidents; for
nature yields to miracle, and power works beyond custom." But this must
not be understood as if the same identical accident, which was in the
wine previous to consecration, is afterwards in the wine that is added;
but such change is the result of action; because the remaining accidents
of the wine retain the action of substance, as stated above, and so they
act upon the liquid added, by changing it.
Reply to Objection 2: The liquid added to the consecrated wine is in no way mixed
with the substance of Christ's blood. Nevertheless it is mixed with the
sacramental species, yet so that after such mixing the aforesaid species
are corrupted entirely or in part, after the way mentioned above (Article [5]),
whereby something can be generated from those species. And if they be
entirely corrupted, there remains no further question, because the whole
will be uniform. But if they be corrupted in part, there will be one
dimension according to the continuity of quantity, but not one according
to the mode of being, because one part thereof will be without a subject
while the other is in a subject; as in a body that is made up of two
metals, there will be one body quantitatively, but not one as to the
species of the matter.
Reply to Objection 3: As Pope Innocent says in the aforesaid Decretal, "if after
the consecration other wine be put in the chalice, it is not changed
into the blood, nor is it mingled with the blood, but, mixed with the
accidents of the previous wine, it is diffused throughout the body which
underlies them, yet without wetting what surrounds it." Now this is to be
understood when there is not sufficient mixing of extraneous liquid to
cause the blood of Christ to cease to be under the whole; because a thing
is said to be "diffused throughout," not because it touches the body of
Christ according to its proper dimensions, but according to the
sacramental dimensions, under which it is contained. Now it is not the
same with holy water, because the blessing works no change in the
substance of the water, as the consecration of the wine does.
Reply to Objection 4: Some have held that however slight be the mixing of
extraneous liquid, the substance of Christ's blood ceases to be under the
whole, and for the reason given above (Objection [4]); which, however, is not a
cogent one; because "more" or "less" diversify dimensive quantity, not as
to its essence, but as to the determination of its measure. In like
manner the liquid added can be so small as on that account to be hindered
from permeating the whole, and not simply by the dimensions; which,
although they are present without a subject, still they are opposed to
another liquid, just as substance would be if it were present, according
to what was said at the beginning of the article.