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Question: 80 [<< | >>]
We must now consider the potential parts of justice, namely the virtues
annexed thereto; under which head there are two points of consideration:
(1) What virtues are annexed to justice?
(2) The individual virtues annexed to justice.
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Question: 80 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues annexed to justice are unsuitably
enumerated Tully [*De Invent. ii, 53] reckons six, viz. "religion, piety,
gratitude, revenge, observance, truth." Now revenge is seemingly a
species of commutative justice whereby revenge is taken for injuries
inflicted, as stated above (Question [61], Article [4]). Therefore it should not be
reckoned among the virtues annexed to justice.
Objection 2: Further, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons seven, viz.
"innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection, humanity,"
several of which are omitted by Tully. Therefore the virtues annexed to
justice would seem to be insufficiently enumerated.
Objection 3: Further, others reckon five parts of justice, viz. "obedience" in
respect of one's superiors, "discipline" with regard to inferiors,
"equity" as regards equals, "fidelity" and "truthfulness" towards all;
and of these "truthfulness" alone is mentioned by Tully. Therefore he
would seem to have enumerated insufficiently the virtues annexed to
justice.
Objection 4: Further, the peripatetic Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons nine
parts annexed to justice viz. "liberality, kindliness, revenge,
commonsense, [*{eugnomosyne}] piety, gratitude, holiness, just exchange"
and "just lawgiving"; and of all these it is evident that Tully mentions
none but "revenge." Therefore he would appear to have made an incomplete
enumeration.
Objection 5: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) mentions {epieikeia} as being
annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not included in any of the
foregoing enumerations. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice are
insufficiently enumerated.
I answer that, Two points must be observed about the virtues annexed to
a principal virtue. The first is that these virtues have something in
common with the principal virtue; and the second is that in some respect
they fall short of the perfection of that virtue. Accordingly since
justice is of one man to another as stated above (Question [58], Article [2]), all the
virtues that are directed to another person may by reason of this common
aspect be annexed to justice. Now the essential character of justice
consists in rendering to another his due according to equality, as stated
above (Question [58], Article [11]). Wherefore in two ways may a virtue directed to
another person fall short of the perfection of justice: first, by falling
short of the aspect of equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect
of due. For certain virtues there are which render another his due, but
are unable to render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man
renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man rendered to
God as much as he owes Him, according to Ps. 115:12, "What shall I render
to the Lord for all the things that He hath rendered to me?" In this
respect "religion" is annexed to justice since, according to Tully (De
invent. ii, 53), it consists in offering service and ceremonial rites or
worship to "some superior nature that men call divine." Secondly, it is
not possible to make to one's parents an equal return of what one owes to
them, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 14); and thus "piety" is
annexed to justice, for thereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), a man
"renders service and constant deference to his kindred and the
well-wishers of his country." Thirdly, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 3), man is unable to offer an equal meed for virtue, and thus
"observance" is annexed to justice, consisting according to Tully (De
invent. ii, 53) in the "deference and honor rendered to those who excel
in worth."
A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a
twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13)
assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which one is
bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due is chiefly
the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On the other hand,
the moral due is that to which one is bound in respect of the rectitude
of virtue: and since a due implies necessity, this kind of due has two
degrees. For one due is so necessary that without it moral rectitude
cannot be ensured: and this has more of the character of due. Moreover
this due may be considered from the point of view of the debtor, and in
this way it pertains to this kind of due that a man represent himself to
others just as he is, both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is
annexed "truth," whereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), present,
past and future things are told without perversion. It may also be
considered from the point of view of the person to whom it is due, by
comparing the reward he receives with what he has done---sometimes in
good things; and then annexed to justice we have "gratitude" which
"consists in recollecting the friendship and kindliness shown by others,
and in desiring to pay them back," as Tully states (De invent. ii,
53)---and sometimes in evil things, and then to justice is annexed
"revenge," whereby, as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53), "we resist
force, injury or anything obscure* by taking vengeance or by
self-defense." [*St. Thomas read 'obscurum,' and explains it as meaning
'derogatory,' infra Question [108], Article [2]. Cicero, however, wrote 'obfuturum,'
i.e. 'hurtful.']
There is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces to
greater rectitude, although without it rectitude may be ensured. This due
is the concern of "liberality," "affability" or "friendship," or the
like, all of which Tully omits in the aforesaid enumeration because there
is little of the nature of anything due in them.
Reply to Objection 1: The revenge taken by authority of a public power, in
accordance with a judge's sentence, belongs to commutative justice:
whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative, though not
against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from a judge, belongs to
the virtue annexed to justice.
Reply to Objection 2: Macrobius appears to have considered the two integral
parts of justice, namely, "declining from evil," to which "innocence"
belongs, and "doing good," to which the six others belong. Of these, two
would seem to regard relations between equals, namely, "friendship" in
the external conduct and "concord" internally; two regard our relations
toward superiors, namely, "piety" to parents, and "religion" to God;
while two regard our relations towards inferiors, namely,
"condescension," in so far as their good pleases us, and "humanity,"
whereby we help them in their needs. For Isidore says (Etym. x) that a
man is said to be "humane, through having a feeling of love and pity
towards men: this gives its name to humanity whereby we uphold one
another." In this sense "friendship" is understood as directing our
external conduct towards others, from which point of view the Philosopher
treats of it in Ethic. iv, 6. "Friendship" may also be taken as regarding
properly the affections, and as the Philosopher describes it in Ethic.
viii and ix. In this sense three things pertain to friendship, namely,
"benevolence" which is here called "affection"; "concord," and
"beneficence" which is here called "humanity." These three, however, are
omitted by Tully, because, as stated above, they have little of the
nature of a due.
Reply to Objection 3: "Obedience" is included in observance, which Tully
mentions, because both reverential honor and obedience are due to persons
who excel. "Faithfulness whereby a man's acts agree with his words"
[*Cicero, De Repub. iv, De Offic. i, 7], is contained in "truthfulness"
as to the observance of one's promises: yet "truthfulness" covers a wider
ground, as we shall state further on (Question [109], Articles [1],3). "Discipline" is
not due as a necessary duty, because one is under no obligation to an
inferior as such, although a superior may be under an obligation to watch
over his inferiors, according to Mt. 24:45, "A faithful and wise servant,
whom his lord hath appointed over his family": and for this reason it is
omitted by Tully. It may, however, be included in humanity mentioned by
Macrobius; and equity under {epieikeia} or under "friendship."
Reply to Objection 4: This enumeration contains some belonging to true justice.
To particular justice belongs "justice of exchange," which he describes
as "the habit of observing equality in commutations." To legal justice,
as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes "legislative
justice," which he describes as "the science of political commutations
relating to the community." As regards things which have to be done in
particular cases beside the general laws, he mentions "common sense" or
"good judgment*," which is our guide in such like matters, as stated
above (Question [51], Article [4]) in the treatise on prudence: wherefore he says that
it is a "voluntary justification," because by his own free will man
observes what is just according to his judgment and not according to the
written law. [*St. Thomas indicates the Greek derivation: {eugnomosyne}
quasi 'bona {gnome}.'] These two are ascribed to prudence as their
director, and to justice as their executor. {Eusebeia} [piety] means
"good worship" and consequently is the same as religion, wherefore he
says that it is the science of "the service of God" (he speaks after the
manner of Socrates who said that 'all the virtues are sciences')
[*Aristotle, Ethic. vi, 13]: and "holiness" comes to the same, as we
shall state further on (Question [81], Article [8]). {Eucharistia} (gratitude) means
"good thanksgiving," and is mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore
says (Etym. x) that "a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to
do good, and is of gentle speech": and Andronicus too says that
"kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence." "Liberality" would seem
to pertain to "humanity."
Reply to Objection 5: {Epieikeia} is annexed, not to particular but to legal
justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the name of
{eugnomosyne} [common sense].