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After treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself; (2)
the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the corresponding precepts.
The first of these points gives rise to a twofold consideration: (1)
hope, considered in itself; (2) its subject.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether hope is a virtue?
(2) Whether its object is eternal happiness?
(3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another's
happiness?
(4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man?
(5) Whether hope is a theological virtue?
(6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues?
(7) Of its relation to faith;
(8) Of its relation to charity.
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Question: 17 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For "no man makes ill
use of a virtue," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18). But one may
make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope, like the other passions,
is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore hope is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since "God works virtue
in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xvii). But
hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the Master (Sent. iii,
D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing" (Phys.
vii, text. 17,18). But hope is the disposition of an imperfect thing, of
one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have. Therefore hope is not a
virtue.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three daughters of
Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and charity. Therefore hope
is a virtue.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "the virtue
of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work good
likewise." Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it must
correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and ruled,
the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say that a coat
is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its proper measurement.
But, as we stated above (Question [8], Article [3], ad 3) human acts have a twofold
measure; one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the reason, while the
other is remote and excelling, viz. God: wherefore every human act is
good, which attains reason or God Himself. Now the act of hope, whereof
we speak now, attains God. For, as we have already stated (FS, Question [40], Article [1]), when we were treating of the passion of hope, the object of hope
is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Now a thing is
possible to us in two ways: first, by ourselves; secondly, by means of
others, as stated in Ethic. iii. Wherefore, in so far as we hope for
anything as being possible to us by means of the Divine assistance, our
hope attains God Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident
that hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to
attain its due rule.
Reply to Objection 1: In the passions, the mean of virtue depends on right reason
being attained, wherein also consists the essence of virtue. Wherefore in
hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man's attaining, by hoping, the
due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot make ill use of hope which
attains God, as neither can he make ill use of moral virtue which attains
the reason, because to attain thus is to make good use of virtue.
Nevertheless, the hope of which we speak now, is not a passion but a
habit of the mind, as we shall show further on (Article [5]; Question [18], Article [1]).
Reply to Objection 2: Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the thing
hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of grace and
merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of hope,
whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from our merits, but
from grace alone.
Reply to Objection 3: He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to that which
he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect, in so far as
he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose help he leans.
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Question: 17 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper object of
hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpasses every movement of
the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the soul. Now eternal
happiness surpasses every movement of the human soul, for the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 2:9) that it hath not "entered into the heart of man."
Therefore happiness is not the proper object of hope.
Objection 2: Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is written (Ps. 36:5): "Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and He will do it."
Now it is lawful for man to pray God not only for eternal happiness, but
also for the goods, both temporal and spiritual, of the present life,
and, as evidenced by the Lord's Prayer, to be delivered from evils which
will no longer be in eternal happiness. Therefore eternal happiness is
not the proper object of hope.
Objection 3: Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now many
things besides eternal happiness are difficult to man. Therefore eternal
happiness is not the proper object of hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 6:19) that we have hope "which
entereth in," i.e. maketh us to enter . . . "within the veil," i.e. into
the happiness of heaven, according to the interpretation of a gloss on
these words. Therefore the object of hope is eternal happiness.
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), the hope of which we speak now,
attains God by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped for good.
Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore the good
which we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is the infinite
good, which is proportionate to the power of our divine helper, since it
belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an infinite good. Such a
good is eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God Himself. For
we should hope from Him for nothing less than Himself, since His
goodness, whereby He imparts good things to His creature, is no less than
His Essence. Therefore the proper and principal object of hope is
eternal happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart of man
perfectly, i.e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know its nature
and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect good, it is
possible for it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in this way that
the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the Apostle says pointedly
(Heb. 6:19) that hope "enters in, even within the veil," because that
which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to speak.
Reply to Objection 2: We ought not to pray God for any other goods, except in
reference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal happiness
chiefly, and other things, for which we pray God, it regards secondarily
and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith regards God
principally, and, secondarily, those things which are referred to God, as
stated above (Question [1], Article [1]).
Reply to Objection 3: To him that longs for something great, all lesser things
seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness, nothing
else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although, as compared
with the capability of the man who hopes, other things besides may be
arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such things in reference to
its principal object.
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Question: 17 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that one may hope for another's eternal happiness.
For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): "Being confident of this very thing,
that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it unto the day
of Jesus Christ." Now the perfection of that day will be eternal
happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another's eternal happiness.
Objection 2: Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from Him. But
we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according to James 5:16:
"Pray for one another that you may be saved." Therefore we can hope for
another's eternal happiness.
Objection 3: Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now it is
possible to despair of another's eternal happiness, else Augustine would
have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we should not
despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one can also hope for
another's eternal salvation.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is only of
such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for them."
I answer that, We can hope for something in two ways: first, absolutely,
and thus the object of hope is always something arduous and pertaining to
the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for something, through
something else being presupposed, and in this way its object can be
something pertaining to someone else. In order to explain this we must
observe that love and hope differ in this, that love denotes union
between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a movement or a stretching
forth of the appetite towards an arduous good. Now union is of things
that are distinct, wherefore love can directly regard the other whom a
man unites to himself by love, looking upon him as his other self:
whereas movement is always towards its own term which is proportionate to
the subject moved. Therefore hope regards directly one's own good, and
not that which pertains to another. Yet if we presuppose the union of
love with another, a man can hope for and desire something for another
man, as for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another eternal's
life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the same
virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his neighbor, so
too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes for himself and
for another.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It wold seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the object of
hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain eternal happiness
by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says (Dial. i, 8) that
"predestination is furthered by the saints' prayers." Therefore one may
hope in man.
Objection 2: Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought not to be
reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to hope in him. Yet
this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4: "Let every man
take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in any brother of his."
Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man.
Objection 3: Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above (Article [2], Objection [2]). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something. Therefore it is
lawful to trust in him.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 17:5): "Cursed be the man that
trusteth in man."
I answer that, Hope, as stated above (Article [1]; FS, Question [40], Article [7]), regards
two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain, and the help by
which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man hopes to obtain,
has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by which one hopes to
obtain that good, has the character of an efficient cause. Now in each of
these kinds of cause we find a principal and a secondary cause. For the
principal end is the last end, while the secondary end is that which is
referred to an end. In like manner the principal efficient cause is the
first agent, while the secondary efficient cause is the secondary and
instrumental agent. Now hope regards eternal happiness as its last end,
and the Divine assistance as the first cause leading to happiness.
Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save
happiness, as one's last end, but only as something referred to final
happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any creature, as
though it were the first cause of movement towards happiness. It is,
however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as being the secondary and
instrumental agent through whom one is helped to obtain any goods that
are ordained to happiness. It is in this way that we turn to the saints,
and that we ask men also for certain things; and for this reason some are
blamed in that they cannot be trusted to give help.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Question: 17 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For a
theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has for
its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to obtain from
God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
Objection 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two vices, as
stated above (FS, Question [64], Article [4]). But hope is a mean between presumption
and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
Objection 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a species of
fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it seems that hope
is not a theological, but a moral virtue.
Objection 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it belongs
to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the arduous.
Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.
On the contrary, Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith and
charity, which are theological virtues.
I answer that, Since specific differences, by their very nature, divide
a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place hope, we
must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.
Now it has been stated above (Article [1]) that hope has the character of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in as much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one that has God for its object, as stated above (FS, Question [62], Article [1]), it is evident that hope is a theological virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for it in
reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient cause, as
stated above (Article [4]).
Reply to Objection 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in the
measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is
excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the
rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes. Now
a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and these things
are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to follow the mean as
regards its proper object. On the other hand, a theological virtue is
concerned with the First Rule not ruled by another rule, and that Rule is
its proper object. Wherefore it is not proper for a theological virtue,
with regard to its proper object, to follow the mean, although this may
happen to it accidentally with regard to something that is referred to
its principal object. Thus faith can have no mean or extremes in the
point of trusting to the First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust
too much; whereas on the part of the things believed, it may have a mean
and extremes; for instance one truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So
too, hope has no mean or extremes, as regards its principal object, since
it is impossible to trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may
have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to obtain,
in so far as he either presumes above his capability, or despairs of
things of which he is capable.
Reply to Objection 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the definition of
hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which belongs to
longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine assistance, whether
that which we hope for be delayed or not.
Reply to Objection 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of
obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its proper
object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a
theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by
another's help, as stated above (Article [1]).
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Question: 17 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other
theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects, as
stated above (FS, Question [54], Article [2]). Now the object of hope is the same as of
the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not distinct from the
other theological virtues.
Objection 2: Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make profession of
faith, we say: "I expect the resurrection of the dead and the life of the
world to come." Now expectation of future happiness belongs to hope, as
stated above (Article [5]). Therefore hope is not distinct from faith.
Objection 3: Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs properly to
charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.
On the contrary, There cannot be number without distinction. Now hope is
numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says (Moral. i,
16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity. Therefore hope
is distinct from the theological virtues.
I answer that, A virtue is said to be theological from having God for
the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in two
ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else is
attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for His own
sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.
On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a
principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from God
both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness.
Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive
the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells us is true:
while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive perfect
goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to the Divine assistance
for obtaining happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: God is the object of these virtues under different aspects,
as stated above: and a different aspect of the object suffices for the
distinction of habits, as stated above (FS, Question [54], Article [2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith, not as
though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of hope
presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on (Article [7]). Hence
an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be obtained
finally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity, properly
speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to Him, so that
we live, not for ourselves, but for God.
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Question: 17 [<< | >>]
Article: 7 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss on Ps.
36:3, "Trust in the Lord, and do good," says: "Hope is the entrance to
faith and the beginning of salvation." But salvation is by faith whereby
we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.
Objection 2: Further, that which is included in a definition should precede
the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in the
definition of faith (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the substance of things to be
hoped for." Therefore hope precedes faith.
Objection 3: Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle says
(1 Cor. 9:10): "He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive
fruit." But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope precedes
faith.
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 1:2): "Abraham begot Isaac," i.e.
"Faith begot hope," according to a gloss.
I answer that, Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the object
of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In order,
therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of hope to be
proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in one way,
eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine assistance, as
explained above (Article [2]; Article [6], ad 3): and both of these are proposed to us
by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able to obtain eternal
life, and that for this purpose the Divine assistance is ready for us,
according to Heb. 11:6: "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is,
and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." Therefore it is evident that
faith precedes hope.
Reply to Objection 1: As the same gloss observes further on, "hope" is called
"the entrance" to faith, i.e. of the thing believed, because by hope we
enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is called the
"entrance to faith," because thereby man begins to be established and
perfected in faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The thing to be hoped for is included in the definition of
faith, because the proper object of faith, is something not apparent in
itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a circumlocution by
something resulting from faith.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but it
suffices for it to accompany or follow it.
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Question: 17 [<< | >>]
Article: 8 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose says on Lk.
27:6, "If you had faith like to a grain of mustard seed," etc.: "Charity
flows from faith, and hope from charity." But faith precedes charity.
Therefore charity precedes hope.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "good emotions
and affections proceed from love and holy charity." Now to hope,
considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul. Therefore it
flows from charity.
Objection 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope proceeds
from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but also hope
itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by charity. Therefore
charity precedes hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience," i.e.
"from hope," according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes charity.
I answer that, Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and of
matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect: the other
is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which the perfect
naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of the first order hope
precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that hope and all
movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated above (FS, Question [27], Article [4]; FS, Question [28], Article [6], ad 2; FS, Question [40], Article [7]) in the treatise on the
passions.
Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that
whereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person some
good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect love is
that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but that he may
obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he desires. The first
love of God pertains to charity, which adheres to God for His own sake;
while hope pertains to the second love, since he that hopes, intends to
obtain possession of something for himself.
Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as a
man is led to love God, through fear of being punished by Him for his
sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so too,
hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be rewarded
by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments. On the other
hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally precedes hope,
wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made more perfect, because
we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this sense that Ambrose states
(Objection [1]) that charity flows from hope: so that this suffices for the
Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed from some
kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not every kind of
hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of living hope, viz.
that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as from a friend.
Reply to Objection 3: The Master is speaking of living hope, which is naturally
preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity.