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We must now consider each kind of precept of the Old Law: and (1) the
moral precepts, (2) the ceremonial precepts, (3) the judicial precepts.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of
nature?
(2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of all
the virtues?
(3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the
ten precepts of the decalogue?
(4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one another?
(5) Their number;
(6) Their order;
(7) The manner in which they were given;
(8) Whether they are dispensable?
(9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept of
the Law?
(10) Whether the mode of charity comes under the precept?
(11) The distinction of other moral precepts;
(12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?
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Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to the law
of nature. For it is written (Ecclus. 17:9): "Moreover He gave them
instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance." But instruction is
in contradistinction to the law of nature; since the law of nature is not
learnt, but instilled by natural instinct. Therefore not all the moral
precepts belong to the natural law.
Objection 2: Further, the Divine law is more perfect than human law. But human
law adds certain things concerning good morals, to those that belong to
the law of nature: as is evidenced by the fact that the natural law is
the same in all men, while these moral institutions are various for
various people. Much more reason therefore was there why the Divine law
should add to the law of nature, ordinances pertaining to good morals.
Objection 3: Further, just as natural reason leads to good morals in certain
matters, so does faith: hence it is written (Gal. 5:6) that faith
"worketh by charity." But faith is not included in the law of nature;
since that which is of faith is above nature. Therefore not all the moral
precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of nature.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 2:14) that "the Gentiles, who
have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law": which
must be understood of things pertaining to good morals. Therefore all the
moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature.
I answer that, The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and
judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature to
good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to reason,
which is the proper principle of human acts, those morals are called good
which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are discordant
from reason. And as every judgment of speculative reason proceeds from
the natural knowledge of first principles, so every judgment of practical
reason proceeds from principles known naturally, as stated above (Question [94], Articles [2],4): from which principles one may proceed in various ways to judge
of various matters. For some matters connected with human actions are so
evident, that after very little consideration one is able at once to
approve or disapprove of them by means of these general first principles:
while some matters cannot be the subject of judgment without much
consideration of the various circumstances, which all are not competent
to do carefully, but only those who are wise: just as it is not possible
for all to consider the particular conclusions of sciences, but only for
those who are versed in philosophy: and lastly there are some matters of
which man cannot judge unless he be helped by Divine instruction; such as
the articles of faith.
It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about matters
which concern good morals; and since good morals are those which are in
accord with reason; and since also every judgment of human reason must
needs by derived in some way from natural reason; it follows, of
necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature; but
not all in the same way. For there are certain things which the natural
reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges to be done or
not to be done: e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," and "Thou shalt
not kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these belong to the law of nature
absolutely. And there are certain things which, after a more careful
consideration, wise men deem obligatory. Such belong to the law of
nature, yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the
less wise: e.g. "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of
the aged man," and the like. And there are some things, to judge of
which, human reason needs Divine instruction, whereby we are taught about
the things of God: e.g. "Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing,
nor the likeness of anything; Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord
thy God in vain."
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Objection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not about
all the acts of virtue. For observance of the precepts of the Old Law is
called justification, according to Ps. 118:8: "I will keep Thy
justifications." But justification is the execution of justice. Therefore
the moral precepts are only about acts of justice.
Objection 2: Further, that which comes under a precept has the character of a
duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice alone and to none of
the other virtues, for the proper act of justice consists in rendering to
each one his due. Therefore the precepts of the moral law are not about
the acts of the other virtues, but only about the acts of justice.
Objection 3: Further, every law is made for the common good, as Isidore says
(Etym. v, 21). But of all the virtues justice alone regards the common
good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the moral precepts
are only about the acts of justice.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Paradiso viii) that "a sin is a
transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience to the commandments
of heaven." But there are sins contrary to all the acts of virtue.
Therefore it belongs to Divine law to direct all the acts of virtue.
I answer that, Since the precepts of the Law are ordained to the common
good, as stated above (Question [90], Article [2]), the precepts of the Law must needs
be diversified according to the various kinds of community: hence the
Philosopher (Polit. iv, 1) teaches that the laws which are made in a
state which is ruled by a king must be different from the laws of a state
which is ruled by the people, or by a few powerful men in the state. Now
human law is ordained for one kind of community, and the Divine law for
another kind. Because human law is ordained for the civil community,
implying mutual duties of man and his fellows: and men are ordained to
one another by outward acts, whereby men live in communion with one
another. This life in common of man with man pertains to justice, whose
proper function consists in directing the human community. Wherefore
human law makes precepts only about acts of justice; and if it commands
acts of other virtues, this is only in so far as they assume the nature
of justice, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. v, 1).
But the community for which the Divine law is ordained, is that of men
in relation to God, either in this life or in the life to come. And
therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters
whereby men are well ordered in their relations to God. Now man is united
to God by his reason or mind, in which is God's image. Wherefore the
Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby human reason
is well ordered. But this is effected by the acts of all the virtues:
since the intellectual virtues set in good order the acts of the reason
in themselves: while the moral virtues set in good order the acts of the
reason in reference to the interior passions and exterior actions. It is
therefore evident that the Divine law fittingly proposes precepts about
the acts of all the virtues: yet so that certain matters, without which
the order of virtue, which is the order of reason, cannot even exist,
come under an obligation of precept; while other matters, which pertain
to the well-being of perfect virtue, come under an admonition of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: The fulfilment of the commandments of the Law, even of
those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the character of
justification, inasmuch as it is just that man should obey God: or again,
inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs to man should be subject to
reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Justice properly so called regards the duty of one man to
another: but all the other virtues regard the duty of the lower powers to
reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the Philosopher speaks
(Ethic. v, 11) of a kind of metaphorical justice.
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said about
the different kinds of community.
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Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old Law are
reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue. For the first and
principal precepts of the Law are, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God,"
and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor," as stated in Mt. 22:37,39. But these
two are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore not all
the moral precepts are contained in the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 2: Further, the moral precepts are not reducible to the ceremonial
precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of the decalogue,
one is ceremonial, viz. "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day."
Therefore the moral precepts are not reducible to all the precepts of the
decalogue.
Objection 3: Further, the moral precepts are about all the acts of virtue. But
among the precepts of the decalogue are only such as regard acts of
justice; as may be seen by going through them all. Therefore the precepts
of the decalogue do not include all the moral precepts.
On the contrary, The gloss on Mt. 5:11: "Blessed are ye when they shall
revile you," etc. says that "Moses, after propounding the ten precepts,
set them out in detail." Therefore all the precepts of the Law are so
many parts of the precepts of the decalogue.
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue differ from the other
precepts of the Law, in the fact that God Himself is said to have given
the precepts of the decalogue; whereas He gave the other precepts to the
people through Moses. Wherefore the decalogue includes those precepts the
knowledge of which man has immediately from God. Such are those which
with but slight reflection can be gathered at once from the first general
principles: and those also which become known to man immediately through
divinely infused faith. Consequently two kinds of precepts are not
reckoned among the precepts of the decalogue: viz. first general
principles, for they need no further promulgation after being once
imprinted on the natural reason to which they are self-evident; as, for
instance, that one should do evil to no man, and other similar
principles: and again those which the careful reflection of wise men
shows to be in accord with reason; since the people receive these
principles from God, through being taught by wise men. Nevertheless both
kinds of precepts are contained in the precepts of the decalogue; yet in
different ways. For the first general principles are contained in them,
as principles in their proximate conclusions; while those which are known
through wise men are contained, conversely, as conclusions in their
principles.
Reply to Objection 1: Those two principles are the first general principles of
the natural law, and are self-evident to human reason, either through
nature or through faith. Wherefore all the precepts of the decalogue are
referred to these, as conclusions to general principles.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in one
respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things of
God, according to Ps. 45:11: "Be still and see that I am God." In this
respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue: but not as to
the fixing of the time, in which respect it is a ceremonial precept.
Reply to Objection 3: The notion of duty is not so patent in the other virtues as
it is in justice. Hence the precepts about the acts of the other virtues
are not so well known to the people as are the precepts about acts of
justice. Wherefore the acts of justice especially come under the precepts
of the decalogue, which are the primary elements of the Law.
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Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably
distinguished from one another. For worship is a virtue distinct from
faith. Now the precepts are about acts of virtue. But that which is said
at the beginning of the decalogue, "Thou shalt not have strange gods
before Me," belongs to faith: and that which is added, "Thou shalt not
make . . . any graven thing," etc. belongs to worship. Therefore these
are not one precept, as Augustine asserts (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), but
two.
Objection 2: Further, the affirmative precepts in the Law are distinct from
the negative precepts; e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," and, "Thou
shalt not kill." But this, "I am the Lord thy God," is affirmative: and
that which follows, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me," is
negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and do not, as Augustine says
(Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), make one.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 7:7): "I had not known
concupiscence, if the Law did not say: 'Thou shalt not covet.'" Hence it
seems that this precept, "Thou shalt not covet," is one precept; and,
therefore, should not be divided into two.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Augustine who, in commenting on
Exodus (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi) distinguishes three precepts as referring
to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor.
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are differently divided by
different authorities. For Hesychius commenting on Lev. 26:26, "Ten women
shall bake your bread in one oven," says that the precept of the
Sabbath-day observance is not one of the ten precepts, because its
observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time. But he
distinguishes four precepts pertaining to God, the first being, "I am the
Lord thy God"; the second, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me,"
(thus also Jerome distinguishes these two precepts, in his commentary on
Osee 10:10, "On thy" [Vulg.: "their"] "two iniquities"); the third
precept according to him is, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven
thing"; and the fourth, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God
in vain." He states that there are six precepts pertaining to our
neighbor; the first, "Honor thy father and thy mother"; the second, "Thou
shalt not kill"; the third, "Thou shalt not commit adultery"; the fourth,
"Thou shalt not steal"; the fifth, "Thou shalt not bear false witness";
the sixth, "Thou shalt not covet."
But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the precept of the
Sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of the decalogue, if
it nowise belonged to the decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is
written (Mt. 6:24), "No man can serve two masters," the two statements,
"I am the Lord thy God," and, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before
Me" seem to be of the same nature and to form one precept. Hence Origen
(Hom. viii in Exod.) who also distinguishes four precepts as referring to
God, unites these two under one precept; and reckons in the second place,
"Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing"; as third, "Thou shalt not
take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; and as fourth, "Remember that
thou keep holy the Sabbath-day." The other six he reckons in the same way
as Hesychius.
Since, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of anything
is not forbidden except as to the point of their being worshipped as
gods---for God commanded an image of the Seraphim [Vulg.: Cherubim] to be
made and placed in the tabernacle, as related in Ex. 25:18---Augustine
more fittingly unites these two, "Thou shalt not have strange gods
before Me," and, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing," into one
precept. Likewise to covet another's wife, for the purpose of carnal
knowledge, belongs to the concupiscence of the flesh; whereas, to covet
other things, which are desired for the purpose of possession, belongs to
the concupiscence of the eyes; wherefore Augustine reckons as distinct
precepts, that which forbids the coveting of another's goods, and that
which prohibits the coveting of another's wife. Thus he distinguishes
three precepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our
neighbor. And this is better.
Reply to Objection 1: Worship is merely a declaration of faith: wherefore the
precepts about worship should not be reckoned as distinct from those
about faith. Nevertheless precepts should be given about worship rather
than about faith, because the precept about faith is presupposed to the
precepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept of charity. For just as
the first general principles of the natural law are self-evident to a
subject having natural reason, and need no promulgation; so also to
believe in God is a first and self-evident principle to a subject
possessed of faith: "for he that cometh to God, must believe that He is"
(Heb. 11:6). Hence it needs no other promulgation that the infusion of
faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The affirmative precepts are distinct from the negative,
when one is not comprised in the other: thus that man should honor his
parents does not include that he should not kill another man; nor does
the latter include the former. But when an affirmative precept is
included in a negative, or vice versa, we do not find that two distinct
precepts are given: thus there is not one precept saying that "Thou shalt
not steal," and another binding one to keep another's property intact, or
to give it back to its owner. In the same way there are not different
precepts about believing in God, and about not believing in strange gods.
Reply to Objection 3: All covetousness has one common ratio: and therefore the
Apostle speaks of the commandment about covetousness as though it were
one. But because there are various special kinds of covetousness,
therefore Augustine distinguishes different prohibitions against
coveting: for covetousness differs specifically in respect of the
diversity of actions or things coveted, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
x, 5).
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Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably
set forth. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose (De Paradiso viii), is "a
transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to the commandments of
heaven." But sins are distinguished according as man sins against God, or
his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the decalogue does not include any
precepts directing man in his relations to himself, but only such as
direct him in his relations to God and himself, it seems that the
precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently enumerated.
Objection 2: Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to the
worship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities, and the
offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept about the
Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should contain others also,
pertaining to the other solemnities, and to the sacrificial rite.
Objection 3: Further, as sins against God include the sin of perjury, so also
do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against the teaching of
God. But there is a precept forbidding perjury, "Thou shalt not take the
name of the Lord thy God in vain." Therefore there should be also a
precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and false doctrine.
Objection 4: Further, just as man has a natural affection for his parents, so
has he also for his children. Moreover the commandment of charity extends
to all our neighbors. Now the precepts of the decalogue are ordained unto
charity, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the commandment is
charity." Therefore as there is a precept referring to parents, so should
there have been some precepts referring to children and other neighbors.
Objection 5: Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin in thought
or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and adultery, the
prohibition of sins of deed, when it is said, "Thou shalt not commit
adultery, Thou shalt not steal," is distinct from the prohibition of the
sin of thought, when it is said, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's
goods," and, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife." Therefore the
same should have been done in regard to the sins of homicide and false
witness.
Objection 6: Further, just as sin happens through disorder of the
concupiscible faculty, so does it arise through disorder of the irascible
part. But some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence, when it is said,
"Thou shalt not covet." Therefore the decalogue should have included some
precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible faculty. Therefore it
seems that the ten precepts of the decalogue are unfittingly enumerated.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13): "He shewed you His covenant,
which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in two
tablets of stone."
I answer that, As stated above (Article [2]), just as the precepts of human law
direct man in his relations to the human community, so the precepts of
the Divine law direct man in his relations to a community or commonwealth
of men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell aright in a
community, two things are required: the first is that he behave well to
the head of the community; the other is that he behave well to those who
are his fellows and partners in the community. It is therefore necessary
that the Divine law should contain in the first place precepts ordering
man in his relations to God; and in the second place, other precepts
ordering man in his relations to other men who are his neighbors and live
with him under God.
Now man owes three things to the head of the community: first, fidelity;
secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity to his master consists in
his not giving sovereign honor to another: and this is the sense of the
first commandment, in the words "Thou shalt not have strange gods."
Reverence to his master requires that he should do nothing injurious to
him: and this is conveyed by the second commandment, "Thou shalt not take
the name of the Lord thy God in vain." Service is due to the master in
return for the benefits which his subjects receive from him: and to this
belongs the third commandment of the sanctification of the Sabbath in
memory of the creation of all things.
To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in
general. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted, by paying his
debts: and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about honoring
one's parents. In general, as to all men, by doing harm to none, either
by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is done to one's
neighbor---sometimes in his person, i.e. as to his personal existence;
and this is forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not kill": sometimes in a
person united to him, as to the propagation of offspring; and this is
prohibited by the words, "Thou shalt not commit adultery": sometimes in
his possessions, which are directed to both the aforesaid; and with this
regard to this it is said, "Thou shalt not steal." Harm done by word is
forbidden when it is said, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy
neighbor": harm done by thought is forbidden in the words, "Thou shalt
not covet."
The three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards God may also
be differentiated in this same way. For the first refers to deeds;
wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not make . . . a graven thing": the
second, to words; wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not take the name of
the Lord thy God in vain": the third, to thoughts; because the
sanctification of the Sabbath, as the subject of a moral precept,
requires repose of the heart in God. Or, according to Augustine (In Ps.
32: Conc. 1), by the first commandment we reverence the unity of the
First Principle; by the second, the Divine truth; by the third, His
goodness whereby we are sanctified, and wherein we rest as in our last
end.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection may be answered in two ways. First, because
the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the precepts of charity.
Now there was need for man to receive a precept about loving God and his
neighbor, because in this respect the natural law had become obscured on
account of sin: but not about the duty of loving oneself, because in this
respect the natural law retained its vigor: or again, because love of
oneself is contained in the love of God and of one's neighbor: since true
self-love consists in directing oneself to God. And for this reason the
decalogue includes those precepts only which refer to our neighbor and
to God.
Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the decalogue are
those which the people received from God immediately; wherefore it is
written (Dt. 10:4): "He wrote in the tables, according as He had written
before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you." Hence the precepts
of the decalogue need to be such as the people can understand at once.
Now a precept implies the notion of duty. But it is easy for a man,
especially for a believer, to understand that, of necessity, he owes
certain duties to God and to his neighbor. But that, in matters which
regard himself and not another, man has, of necessity, certain duties to
himself, is not so evident: for, at the first glance, it seems that
everyone is free in matters that concern himself. And therefore the
precepts which prohibit disorders of a man with regard to himself, reach
the people through the instruction of men who are versed through the
instruction of men who are versed in such matters; and, consequently,
they are not contained in the decalogue.
Reply to Objection 2: All the solemnities of the Old Law were instituted in
celebration of some Divine favor, either in memory of past favors, or in
sign of some favor to come: in like manner all the sacrifices were
offered up with the same purpose. Now of all the Divine favors to be
commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was called to mind
by the sanctification of the Sabbath; wherefore the reason for this
precept is given in Ex. 20:11: "In six days the Lord made heaven and
earth," etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and final was the
repose of the mind in God, either, in the present life, by grace, or, in
the future life, by glory; which repose was also foreshadowed in the
Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is written (Is. 58:13): "If thou
turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy own will in My holy
day, and call the Sabbath delightful, and the holy of the Lord glorious."
Because these favors first and chiefly are borne in mind by men,
especially by the faithful. But other solemnities were celebrated on
account of certain particular favors temporal and transitory, such as the
celebration of the Passover in memory of the past favor of the delivery
from Egypt, and as a sign of the future Passion of Christ, which though
temporal and transitory, brought us to the repose of the spiritual
Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath alone, and none of the other
solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the precepts of the decalogue.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), "men swear by one greater
than themselves; and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their
controversy." Hence, since oaths are common to all, inordinate swearing
is the matter of a special prohibition by a precept of the decalogue.
According to one interpretation, however, the words, "Thou shalt not take
the name of the Lord thy God in vain," are a prohibition of false
doctrine, for one gloss expounds them thus: "Thou shalt not say that
Christ is a creature."
Reply to Objection 4: That a man should not do harm to anyone is an immediate
dictate of his natural reason: and therefore the precepts that forbid
the doing of harm are binding on all men. But it is not an immediate
dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing in return for
another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone. Now a son's debt to
his father is so evident that one cannot get away from it by denying it:
since the father is the principle of generation and being, and also of
upbringing and teaching. Wherefore the decalogue does not prescribe deeds
of kindness or service to be done to anyone except to one's parents. On
the other hand parents do not seem to be indebted to their children for
any favors received, but rather the reverse is the case. Again, a child
is a part of his father; and "parents love their children as being a part
of themselves," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Hence, just
as the decalogue contains no ordinance as to man's behavior towards
himself, so, for the same reason, it includes no precept about loving
one's children.
Reply to Objection 5: The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of wealth, in
so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful good, are of
themselves, objects of appetite: and for this reason they needed to be
forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire. But murder and
falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion (since it is natural
for man to love his neighbor and the truth): and are desired only for the
sake of something else. Consequently with regard to sins of murder and
false witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of thought, but
only sins of deed.
Reply to Objection 6: As stated above (Question [25], Article [1]), all the passions of the
irascible faculty arise from the passions of the concupiscible part.
Hence, as the precepts of the decalogue are, as it were, the first
elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of the irascible
passions, but only of the concupiscible passions.
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Question: 100 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are not set
in proper order. Because love of one's neighbor is seemingly previous to
love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us than God is;
according to 1 Jn. 4:20: "He that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth,
how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?" But the first three precepts
belong to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to the love of
our neighbor. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not set in
proper order.
Objection 2: Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the affirmative
precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative precepts. But
according to Boethius in his commentary on the Categories [*Lib. iv, cap.
De Oppos.], vices should be uprooted before virtues are sown. Therefore
among the precepts concerning our neighbor, the negative precepts should
have preceded the affirmative.
Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about men's actions. But
actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed. Therefore the
precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are unsuitably
placed last in order.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 13:1): "The things that are of
God, are well ordered" [Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of God'].
But the precepts of the decalogue were given immediately by God, as
stated above (Article [3]). Therefore they are arranged in becoming order.
I answer that, As stated above (Articles [3],5, ad 1), the precepts of the
decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once. Now it
is evident that a thing is so much the more easily grasped by the reason,
as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason. Moreover, it is
clear, since the order of reason begins with the end, that, for a man to
be inordinately disposed towards his end, is supremely contrary to
reason. Now the end of human life and society is God. Consequently it was
necessary for the precepts of the decalogue, first of all, to direct man
to God; since the contrary to this is most grievous. Thus also, in an
army, which is ordained to the commander as to its end, it is requisite
first that the soldier should be subject to the commander, and the
opposite of this is most grievous; and secondly it is requisite that he
should be in coordination with the other soldiers.
Now among those things whereby we are ordained to God, the first is that
man should be subjected to Him faithfully, by having nothing in common
with His enemies. The second is that he should show Him reverence: the
third that he should offer Him service. Thus, in an army, it is a greater
sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a compact with the foe,
than to be insolent to his commander: and this last is more grievous than
if he be found wanting in some point of service to him.
As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his neighbor,
it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason, and a more grievous
sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those persons to whom he
is most indebted. Consequently, among those precepts that direct man in
his relations to his neighbor, the first place is given to that one which
regards his parents. Among the other precepts we again find the order to
be according to the gravity of sin. For it is more grave and more
repugnant to reason, to sin by deed than by word; and by word than by
thought. And among sins of deed, murder which destroys life in one
already living is more grievous than adultery, which imperils the life of
the unborn child; and adultery is more grave than theft, which regards
external goods.
Reply to Objection 1: Although our neighbor is better known than God by the way of the senses, nevertheless the love of God is the reason for the love of our neighbor, as shall be declared later on (SS, Question [25], Article [1]; SS, Question [26], Article [2]). Hence the precepts ordaining man to God demanded precedence of the others.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as God is the universal principle of being in respect
of all things, so is a father a principle of being in respect of his son.
Therefore the precept regarding parents was fittingly placed after the
precepts regarding God. This argument holds in respect of affirmative and
negative precepts about the same kind of deed: although even then it is
not altogether cogent. For although in the order of execution, vices
should be uprooted before virtues are sown, according to Ps. 33:15: "Turn
away from evil, and do good," and Is. 1:16,17: "Cease to do perversely;
learn to do well"; yet, in the order of knowledge, virtue precedes vice,
because "the crooked line is known by the straight" (De Anima i): and "by
the law is the knowledge of sin" (Rm. 3:20). Wherefore the affirmation
precept demanded the first place. However, this is not the reason for the
order, but that which is given above. Because in the precepts regarding
God, which belongs to the first table, an affirmative precept is placed
last, since its transgression implies a less grievous sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Although sin of thought stands first in the order of
execution, yet its prohibition holds a later position in the order of
reason.
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Question: 100 [<< | >>]
Article: 7 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably
formulated. Because the affirmative precepts direct man to acts of
virtue, while the negative precepts withdraw him from acts of vice. But
in every matter there are virtues and vices opposed to one another.
Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a precept of the
decalogue, there should have been an affirmative and a negative precept.
Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative precepts should be framed in
some matters, and negative precepts in others.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. ii, 10) that every law is based on
reason. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Divine law.
Therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each precept, and
not only in the first and third.
Objection 3: Further, by observing the precepts man deserves to be rewarded by
God. But the Divine promises concern the rewards of the precepts.
Therefore the promise should have been included in each precept, and not
only in the second and fourth.
Objection 4: Further, the Old Law is called "the law of fear," in so far as it
induced men to observe the precepts, by means of the threat of
punishments. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old Law.
Therefore a threat of punishment should have been included in each, and
not only in the first and second.
Objection 5: Further, all the commandments of God should be retained in the
memory: for it is written (Prov. 3:3): "Write them in the tables of thy
heart." Therefore it was not fitting that mention of the memory should be
made in the third commandment only. Consequently it seems that the
precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 11:21) that "God made all things,
in measure, number and weight." Much more therefore did He observe a
suitable manner in formulating His Law.
I answer that, The highest wisdom is contained in the precepts of the
Divine law: wherefore it is written (Dt. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of nations." Now it belongs to wisdom to
arrange all things in due manner and order. Therefore it must be evident
that the precepts of the Law are suitably set forth.
Reply to Objection 1: Affirmation of one thing always leads to the denial of its
opposite: but the denial of one opposite does not always lead to the
affirmation of the other. For it follows that if a thing is white, it is
not black: but it does not follow that if it is not black, it is white:
because negation extends further than affirmation. And hence too, that
one ought not to do harm to another, which pertains to the negative
precepts, extends to more persons, as a primary dictate of reason, than
that one ought to do someone a service or kindness. Nevertheless it is a
primary dictate of reason that man is a debtor in the point of rendering
a service or kindness to those from whom he has received kindness, if he
has not yet repaid the debt. Now there are two whose favors no man can
sufficiently repay, viz. God and man's father, as stated in Ethic. viii,
14. Therefore it is that there are only two affirmative precepts; one
about the honor due to parents, the other about the celebration of the
Sabbath in memory of the Divine favor.
Reply to Objection 2: The reasons for the purely moral precepts are manifest;
hence there was no need to add the reason. But some of the precepts
include ceremonial matter, or a determination of a general moral precept;
thus the first precept includes the determination, "Thou shalt not make a
graven thing"; and in the third precept the Sabbath-day is fixed.
Consequently there was need to state the reason in each case.
Reply to Objection 3: Generally speaking, men direct their actions to some point
of utility. Consequently in those precepts in which it seemed that there
would be no useful result, or that some utility might be hindered, it was
necessary to add a promise of reward. And since parents are already on
the way to depart from us, no benefit is expected from them: wherefore a
promise of reward is added to the precept about honoring one's parents.
The same applies to the precept forbidding idolatry: since thereby it
seemed that men were hindered from receiving the apparent benefit which
they think they can get by entering into a compact with the demons.
Reply to Objection 4: Punishments are necessary against those who are prone to
evil, as stated in Ethic. x, 9. Wherefore a threat of punishment is only
affixed to those precepts of the law which forbade evils to which men
were prone. Now men were prone to idolatry by reason of the general
custom of the nations. Likewise men are prone to perjury on account of
the frequent use of oaths. Hence it is that a threat is affixed to the
first two precepts.
Reply to Objection 5: The commandment about the Sabbath was made in memory of a
past blessing. Wherefore special mention of the memory is made therein.
Or again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a determination affixed
to it that does not belong to the natural law, wherefore this precept
needed a special admonition.
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Article: 8 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.
For the precepts of the decalogue belong to the natural law. But the
natural law fails in some cases and is changeable, like human nature, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7). Now the failure of law to apply in
certain particular cases is a reason for dispensation, as stated above
(Question [96], Article [6]; Question [97], Article [4]). Therefore a dispensation can be granted in
the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 2: Further, man stands in the same relation to human law as God does
to Divine law. But man can dispense with the precepts of a law made by
man. Therefore, since the precepts of the decalogue are ordained by God,
it seems that God can dispense with them. Now our superiors are God's
viceregents on earth; for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 2:10): "For what I
have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it
in the person of Christ." Therefore superiors can dispense with the
precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 3: Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is one forbidding
murder. But it seems that a dispensation is given by men in this precept:
for instance, when according to the prescription of human law, such as
evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain. Therefore the precepts of the
decalogue are dispensable.
Objection 4: Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a precept
of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this precept; for it
is written (1 Macc. 2:4): "And they determined in that day, saying:
Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the Sabbath-day, we will
fight against him." Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are
dispensable.
On the contrary, are the words of Is. 24:5, where some are reproved for
that "they have changed the ordinance, they have broken the everlasting
covenant"; which, seemingly, apply principally to the precepts of the
decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be changed by
dispensation.
I answer that, As stated above (Question [96], Article [6]; Question [97], Article [4]), precepts
admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in which, if
the letter of the law be observed, the intention of the lawgiver is
frustrated. Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first and
chiefly to the common good; secondly, to the order of justice and virtue,
whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If therefore there by
any precepts which contain the very preservation of the common good, or
the very order of justice and virtue, such precepts contain the intention
of the lawgiver, and therefore are indispensable. For instance, if in
some community a law were enacted, such as this---that no man should work
for the destruction of the commonwealth, or betray the state to its
enemies, or that no man should do anything unjust or evil, such precepts
would not admit of dispensation. But if other precepts were enacted,
subordinate to the above, and determining certain special modes of
procedure, these latter precepts would admit of dispensation, in so far
as the omission of these precepts in certain cases would not be
prejudicial to the former precepts which contain the intention of the
lawgiver. For instance if, for the safeguarding of the commonwealth, it
were enacted in some city that from each ward some men should keep watch
as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on
account of some greater utility.
Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the
lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, which direct
us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which is
God; while the precepts of the second table contain the order of justice
to be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to anyone, and that
each one be given his due; for it is in this sense that we are to take
the precepts of the decalogue. Consequently the precepts of the decalogue
admit of no dispensation whatever.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is not speaking of the natural law which
contains the very order of justice: for it is a never-failing principle
that "justice should be preserved." But he is speaking in reference to
certain fixed modes of observing justice, which fail to apply in certain
cases.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:13), "God continueth
faithful, He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself if He were
to do away with the very order of His own justice, since He is justice
itself. Wherefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be lawful for him
not to direct himself to God, or not to be subject to His justice, even
in those matters in which men are directed to one another.
Reply to Objection 3: The slaying of a man is forbidden in the decalogue, in so
far as it bears the character of something undue: for in this sense the
precept contains the very essence of justice. Human law cannot make it
lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is not undue for evil-doers
or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence this is not contrary to the
precept of the decalogue; and such a killing is no murder as forbidden by
that precept, as Augustine observes (De Lib. Arb. i, 4). In like manner
when a man's property is taken from him, if it be due that he should lose
it, this is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue.
Consequently when the children of Israel, by God's command, took away
the spoils of the Egyptians, this was not theft; since it was due to them
by the sentence of God. Likewise when Abraham consented to slay his son,
he did not consent to murder, because his son was due to be slain by the
command of God, Who is Lord of life and death: for He it is Who inflicts
the punishment of death on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account of
the sin of our first parent, and if a man be the executor of that
sentence by Divine authority, he will be no murderer any more than God
would be. Again Osee, by taking unto himself a wife of fornications, or
an adulterous woman, was not guilty either of adultery or of fornication:
because he took unto himself one who was his by command of God, Who is
the Author of the institution of marriage.
Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the essence
of justice which they contain, are unchangeable: but as to any
determination by application to individual actions---for instance, that
this or that be murder, theft or adultery, or not---in this point they
admit of change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in such
matters as are exclusively of Divine institution, as marriage and the
like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in such matters as are
subject to human jurisdiction: for in this respect men stand in the place
of God: and yet not in all respects.
Reply to Objection 4: This determination was an interpretation rather than a dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath, if he does something necessary for human welfare; as Our Lord proves (Mt. 12:3, seqq.).
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Article: 9 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the mode of virtue falls under the precept of
the law. For the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice should be done
justly, that deeds of fortitude should be done bravely, and in like
manner as to the other virtues. But it is commanded (Dt. 26:20) that
"thou shalt follow justly after that which is just." Therefore the mode
of virtue falls under the precept.
Objection 2: Further, that which belongs to the intention of the lawgiver
comes chiefly under the precept. But the intention of the lawgiver is
directed chiefly to make men virtuous, as stated in Ethic. ii: and it
belongs to a virtuous man to act virtuously. Therefore the mode of virtue
falls under the precept.
Objection 3: Further, the mode of virtue seems to consist properly in working
willingly and with pleasure. But this falls under a precept of the Divine
law, for it is written (Ps. 99:2): "Serve ye the Lord with gladness";
and (2 Cor. 9:7): "Not with sadness or necessity: for God loveth a
cheerful giver"; whereupon the gloss says: "Whatever ye do, do gladly;
and then you will do it well; whereas if you do it sorrowfully, it is
done in thee, not by thee." Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the
precept of the law.
On the contrary, No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he has the
habit of virtue, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. ii, 4; v, 8). Now
whoever transgresses a precept of the law, deserves to be punished. Hence
it would follow that a man who has not the habit of virtue, would deserve
to be punished, whatever he does. But this is contrary to the intention
of the law, which aims at leading man to virtue, by habituating him to
good works. Therefore the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept.
I answer that, As stated above (Question [90], Article [3], ad 2), a precept of law has
compulsory power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the law is
brought to bear, falls directly under the precept of the law. Now the law
compels through fear of punishment, as stated in Ethic. x, 9, because
that properly falls under the precept of the law, for which the penalty
of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human law are differently
situated as to the appointment of penalties; since the penalty of the law
is inflicted only for those things which come under the judgment of the
lawgiver; for the law punishes in accordance with the verdict given. Now
man, the framer of human law, is competent to judge only of outward acts;
because "man seeth those things that appear," according to 1 Kgs. 16:7:
while God alone, the framer of the Divine law, is competent to judge of
the inward movements of wills, according to Ps. 7:10: "The searcher of
hearts and reins is God."
Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in some
sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in some respect it is
regarded by the Divine, but not by the human law; and in another way, it
is regarded neither by the human nor by the Divine law. Now the mode of
virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. ii.
The first is that man should act "knowingly": and this is subject to the
judgment of both Divine and human law; because what a man does in
ignorance, he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and Divine
law, certain things are judged in respect of ignorance to be punishable
or pardonable.
The second point is that a man should act "deliberately," i.e. "from
choice, choosing that particular action for its own sake"; wherein a
twofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention, about
which we have spoken above (Questions [8], 12): and concerning these two, Divine
law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. For human law does
not punish the man who wishes to slay, and slays not: whereas the Divine
law does, according to Mt. 5:22: "Whosoever is angry with his brother,
shall be in danger of the judgment."
The third point is that he should "act from a firm and immovable
principle": which firmness belongs properly to a habit, and implies that
the action proceeds from a rooted habit. In this respect, the mode of
virtue does not fall under the precept either of Divine or of human law,
since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the law, who
gives due honor to his parents and yet has not the habit of filial piety.
Reply to Objection 1: The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls under the
precept, is that they be done in accordance with right; but not that they
be done from the habit of justice.
Reply to Objection 2: The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His aim, in the
first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of the law: and
this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear on the matter
itself of the precept: and this is something leading or disposing to
virtue, viz. an act of virtue. For the end of the precept and the matter
of the precept are not the same: just as neither in other things is the
end the same as that which conduces to the end.
Reply to Objection 3: That works of virtue should be done without sadness, falls
under the precept of the Divine law; for whoever works with sadness works
unwillingly. But to work with pleasure, i.e. joyfully or cheerfully, in
one respect falls under the precept, viz. in so far as pleasure ensues
from the love of God and one's neighbor (which love falls under the
precept), and love causes pleasure: and in another respect does not fall
under the precept, in so far as pleasure ensues from a habit; for
"pleasure taken in a work proves the existence of a habit," as stated in
Ethic. ii, 3. For an act may give pleasure either on account of its end,
or through its proceeding from a becoming habit.
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Article: 10 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the mode of charity falls under the precept of
the Divine law. For it is written (Mt. 19:17): "If thou wilt enter into
life, keep the commandments": whence it seems to follow that the
observance of the commandments suffices for entrance into life. But good
works do not suffice for entrance into life, except they be done from
charity: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should distribute all my
goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and
have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore the mode of charity
is included in the commandment.
Objection 2: Further, the mode of charity consists properly speaking in doing
all things for God. But this falls under the precept; for the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the glory of God." Therefore the mode of
charity falls under the precept.
Objection 3: Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the precept,
it follows that one can fulfil the precepts of the law without having
charity. Now what can be done without charity can be done without grace,
which is always united to charity. Therefore one can fulfil the precepts
of the law without grace. But this is the error of Pelagius, as Augustine
declares (De Haeres. lxxxviii). Therefore the mode of charity is included
in the commandment.
On the contrary, Whoever breaks a commandment sins mortally. If
therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept, it follows that
whoever acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But whoever has
not charity, acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it follows that
whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he does, however good
this may be in itself: which is absurd.
I answer that, Opinions have been contrary on this question. For some
have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the precept;
and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to fulfil this
precept: because he can dispose himself to receive charity from God. Nor
(say they) does it follow that a man not having charity sins mortally
whenever he does something good of its kind: because it is an affirmative
precept that binds one to act from charity, and is binding not for all
time, but only for such time as one is in a state of charity. On the
other hand, some have said that the mode of charity is altogether outside
the precept.
Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Because the act of
charity can be considered in two ways. First, as an act by itself: and
thus it falls under the precept of the law which specially prescribes it,
viz. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," and "Thou shalt love thy
neighbor." In this sense, the first opinion is true. Because it is not
impossible to observe this precept which regards the act of charity;
since man can dispose himself to possess charity, and when he possesses
it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity can be considered as
being the mode of the acts of the other virtues, i.e. inasmuch as the
acts of the other virtues are ordained to charity, which is "the end of
the commandment," as stated in 1 Tim. i, 5: for it has been said above
(Question [12], Article [4]) that the intention of the end is a formal mode of the act
ordained to that end. In this sense the second opinion is true in saying
that the mode of charity does not fall under the precept, that is to say
that this commandment, "Honor thy father," does not mean that a man must
honor his father from charity, but merely that he must honor him.
Wherefore he that honors his father, yet has not charity, does not break
this precept: although he does break the precept concerning the act of
charity, for which reason he deserves to be punished.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did not say, "If thou wilt enter into life, keep
one commandment"; but "keep" all "the commandments": among which is
included the commandment concerning the love of God and our neighbor.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept of charity contains the injunction that God
should be loved from our whole heart, which means that all things would
be referred to God. Consequently man cannot fulfil the precept of
charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Wherefore he that honors
his father and mother, is bound to honor them from charity, not in virtue
of the precept, "Honor thy father and mother," but in virtue of the
precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart." And
since these are two affirmative precepts, not binding for all times, they
can be binding, each one at a different time: so that it may happen that
a man fulfils the precept of honoring his father and mother, without at
the same time breaking the precept concerning the omission of the mode of
charity.
Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot fulfil all the precepts of the law, unless he
fulfil the precept of charity, which is impossible without charity.
Consequently it is not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for man to
fulfil the law without grace.
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Article: 11 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other moral
precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Because, as Our Lord declared
(Mt. 22:40), "on these two commandments" of charity "dependeth the whole
law and the prophets." But these two commandments are explained by the
ten commandments of the decalogue. Therefore there is no need for other
moral precepts.
Objection 2: Further, the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial and
ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Question [99], Articles [3],4). But the
determinations of the general moral precepts belong to the judicial and
ceremonial precepts: and the general moral precepts are contained in the
decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as stated above
(Article [3]). Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral precepts
besides the decalogue.
Objection 3: Further, the moral precepts are about the acts of all the
virtues, as stated above (Article [2]). Therefore, as the Law contains, besides
the decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to religion, liberality, mercy,
and chastity; so there should have been added some precepts pertaining to
the other virtues, for instance, fortitude, sobriety, and so forth. And
yet such is not the case. It is therefore unbecoming to distinguish other
moral precepts in the Law besides those of the decalogue.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:8): "The law of the Lord is
unspotted, converting souls." But man is preserved from the stain of sin,
and his soul is converted to God by other moral precepts besides those of
the decalogue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include other moral
precepts.
I answer that, As is evident from what has been stated (Question [99], Articles [3],4),
the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from their
institution alone: since before they were instituted, it seemed of no
consequence whether things were done in this or that way. But the moral
precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural reason,
even if they were never included in the Law. Now of these there are three
grades: for some are most certain, and so evident as to need no
promulgation; such as the commandments of the love of God and our
neighbor, and others like these, as stated above (Article [3]), which are, as it
were, the ends of the commandments; wherefore no man can have an
erroneous judgment about them. Some precepts are more detailed, the
reason of which even an uneducated man can easily grasp; and yet they
need to be promulgated, because human judgment, in a few instances,
happens to be led astray concerning them: these are the precepts of the
decalogue. Again, there are some precepts the reason of which is not so
evident to everyone, but only the wise; these are moral precepts added to
the decalogue, and given to the people by God through Moses and Aaron.
But since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we know
those that are not evident, these other moral precepts added to the
decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so many
corollaries. Thus the first commandment of the decalogue forbids the
worship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts forbidding
things relating to worship of idols: thus it is written (Dt. 18:10,11):
"Neither let there be found among you anyone that shall expiate his son
or daughter, making them to pass through the fire: . . . neither let
there by any wizard nor charmer, nor anyone that consulteth pythonic
spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead."
The second commandment forbids perjury. To this is added the prohibition
of blasphemy (Lev. 24:15, seqq) and the prohibition of false doctrine
(Dt. 13). To the third commandment are added all the ceremonial precepts.
To the fourth commandment prescribing the honor due to parents, is added
the precept about honoring the aged, according to Lev. 19:32: "Rise up
before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man"; and
likewise all the precepts prescribing the reverence to be observed
towards our betters, or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. To
the fifth commandment, which forbids murder, is added the prohibition of
hatred and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbor, according
to Lev. 19:16: "Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neighbor":
likewise the prohibition against hating one's brother (Lev. 19:17): "Thou
shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart." To the sixth commandment which
forbids adultery, is added the prohibition about whoredom, according to
Dt. 23:17: "There shall be no whore among the daughters of Israel, nor
whoremonger among the sons of Israel"; and the prohibition against
unnatural sins, according to Lev. 28:22,23: "Thou shalt not lie with
mankind . . . thou shalt not copulate with any beast." To the seventh
commandment which prohibits theft, is added the precept forbidding usury,
according to Dt. 23:19: "Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to
usury"; and the prohibition against fraud, according to Dt. 25:13: "Thou
shalt not have divers weights in thy bag"; and universally all
prohibitions relating to peculations and larceny. To the eighth
commandment, forbidding false testimony, is added the prohibition
against false judgment, according to Ex. 23:2: "Neither shalt thou yield
in judgment, to the opinion of the most part, to stray from the truth";
and the prohibition against lying (Ex. 23:7): "Thou shalt fly lying," and
the prohibition against detraction, according to Lev. 19:16: "Thou shalt
not be a detractor, nor a whisperer among the people." To the other two
commandments no further precepts are added, because thereby are forbidden
all kinds of evil desires.
Reply to Objection 1: The precepts of the decalogue are ordained to the love of
God and our neighbor as pertaining evidently to our duty towards them;
but the other precepts are so ordained as pertaining thereto less
evidently.
Reply to Objection 2: It is in virtue of their institution that the ceremonial
and judicial precepts "are determinations of the precepts of the
decalogue," not by reason of a natural instinct, as in the case of the
superadded moral precepts.
Reply to Objection 3: The precepts of a law are ordained for the common good, as
stated above (Question [90], Article [2]). And since those virtues which direct our
conduct towards others pertain directly to the common good, as also does
the virtue of chastity, in so far as the generative act conduces to the
common good of the species; hence precepts bearing directly on these
virtues are given, both in the decalogue and in addition thereto. As to
the act of fortitude there are the order to be given by the commanders in
the war, which is undertaken for the common good: as is clear from Dt.
20:3, where the priest is commanded (to speak thus): "Be not afraid, do
not give back." In like manner the prohibition of acts of gluttony is
left to paternal admonition, since it is contrary to the good of the
household; hence it is said (Dt. 21:20) in the person of parents: "He
slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling, and to
debauchery and banquetings."
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 100 [<< | >>]
Article: 12 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Old Law justified
man. Because the Apostle says (Rm. 2:13): "For not the hearers of the Law
are justified before God, but the doers of the Law shall be justified."
But the doers of the Law are those who fulfil the precepts of the Law.
Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of
justification.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 18:5): "Keep My laws and My
judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them." But the spiritual
life of man is through justice. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts
of the Law was a cause of justification.
Objection 3: Further, the Divine law is more efficacious than human law. But human law justifies man; since there is a kind of justice consisting in fulfilling the precepts of law. Therefore the precepts of the Law justified man.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6): "The letter killeth":
which, according to Augustine (De Spir. et Lit. xiv), refers even to the
moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts did not cause justice.
I answer that, Just as "healthy" is said properly and first of that
which is possessed of health, and secondarily of that which is a sign or
a safeguard of health; so justification means first and properly the
causing of justice; while secondarily and improperly, as it were, it may
denote a sign of justice or a disposition thereto. If justice be taken in
the last two ways, it is evident that it was conferred by the precepts of
the Law; in so far, to wit, as they disposed men to the justifying grace
of Christ, which they also signified, because as Augustine says (Contra
Faust. xxii, 24), "even the life of that people foretold and foreshadowed
Christ."
But if we speak of justification properly so called, then we must notice
that it can be considered as in the habit or as in the act: so that
accordingly justification may be taken in two ways. First, according as
man is made just, by becoming possessed of the habit of justice:
secondly, according as he does works of justice, so that in this sense
justification is nothing else than the execution of justice. Now justice,
like the other virtues, may denote either the acquired or the infused
virtue, as is clear from what has been stated (Question [63], Article [4]). The acquired
virtue is caused by works; but the infused virtue is caused by God
Himself through His grace. The latter is true justice, of which we are
speaking now, and in this respect of which a man is said to be just
before God, according to Rm. 4:2: "If Abraham were justified by works, he
hath whereof to glory, but not before God." Hence this justice could not
be caused by moral precepts, which are about human actions: wherefore the
moral precepts could not justify man by causing justice.
If, on the other hand, by justification we understand the execution of
justice, thus all the precepts of the Law justified man, but in various
ways. Because the ceremonial precepts taken as a whole contained
something just in itself, in so far as they aimed at offering worship to
God; whereas taken individually they contained that which is just, not in
itself, but by being a determination of the Divine law. Hence it is said
of these precepts that they did not justify man save through the devotion
and obedience of those who complied with them. On the other hand the
moral and judicial precepts, either in general or also in particular,
contained that which is just in itself: but the moral precepts contained
that which is just in itself according to that "general justice" which is
"every virtue" according to Ethic. v, 1: whereas the judicial precepts
belonged to "special justice," which is about contracts connected with
the human mode of life, between one man and another.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle takes justification for the execution of
justice.
Reply to Objection 2: The man who fulfilled the precepts of the Law is said to
live in them, because he did not incur the penalty of death, which the
Law inflicted on its transgressors: in this sense the Apostle quotes this
passage (Gal. 3:12).
Reply to Objection 3: The precepts of human law justify man by acquired justice:
it is not about this that we are inquiring now, but only about that
justice which is before God.