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We must now consider each law by itself; and (1) The eternal law; (2)
The natural law; (3) The human law; (4) The old law; (5) The new law,
which is the law of the Gospel. Of the sixth law which is the law of the
"fomes," suffice what we have said when treating of original sin.
Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:
(1) What is the eternal law?
(2) Whether it is known to all?
(3) Whether every law is derived from it?
(4) Whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law?
(5) Whether natural contingencies are subject to the eternal law?
(6) Whether all human things are subject to it?
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Question: 93 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign type
existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. But there are many
types of things in the Divine mind; for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
46) that God "made each thing according to its type." Therefore the
eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the Divine mind.
Objection 2: Further, it is essential to a law that it be promulgated by word,
as stated above (Question [90], Article [4]). But Word is a Personal name in God, as
stated in the FP, Question [34], Article [1]: whereas type refers to the Essence.
Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a Divine type.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx): "We see a law above our minds, which is called truth." But the law which is above our minds is the eternal law. Therefore truth is the eternal law. But the idea of truth is not the same as the idea of a type. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal
law is the sovereign type, to which we must always conform."
I answer that, Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the
things that are made by his art, so too in every governor there must
pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be done by
those who are subject to his government. And just as the type of the
things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of the
products of that art, so too the type in him who governs the acts of his
subjects, bears the character of a law, provided the other conditions be
present which we have mentioned above (Question [90]). Now God, by His wisdom, is
the Creator of all things in relation to which He stands as the artificer
to the products of his art, as stated in the FP, Question [14], Article [8]. Moreover He
governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single
creature, as was also stated in the FP, Question [103], Article [5]. Wherefore as the
type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all things are created, has
the character of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine Wisdom, as
moving all things to their due end, bears the character of law.
Accordingly the eternal law is nothing else than the type of Divine
Wisdom, as directing all actions and movements.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal types
which regard the proper nature of each single thing; and consequently in
them there is a certain distinction and plurality, according to their
different relations to things, as stated in the FP, Question [15], Article [2]. But law
is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the common good, as
stated above (Question [90], Article [2]). And things, which are in themselves
different, may be considered as one, according as they are ordained to
one common thing. Wherefore the eternal law is one since it is the type
of this order.
Reply to Objection 2: With regard to any sort of word, two points may be
considered: viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed by the
word. For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man, and
expresses that which is signified by the human word. The same applies to
the human mental word, which is nothing else that something conceived by
the mind, by which man expresses his thoughts mentally. So then in God
the Word conceived by the intellect of the Father is the name of a
Person: but all things that are in the Father's knowledge, whether they
refer to the Essence or to the Persons, or to the works of God, are
expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xv, 14). And
among other things expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is
expressed thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Personal
name in God: yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account of the kinship
between type and word.
Reply to Objection 3: The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in the same
relation to things, as the types of the human intellect. For the human
intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is not true by
reason of itself, but by reason of its being consonant with things,
since "an opinion is true or false according as it answers to the
reality." But the Divine intellect is the measure of things: since each
thing has so far truth in it, as it represents the Divine intellect, as
was stated in the FP, Question [16], Article [1]. Consequently the Divine intellect is
true in itself; and its type is truth itself.
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Question: 93 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all. Because,
as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11), "the things that are of God no man
knoweth, but the Spirit of God." But the eternal law is a type existing
in the Divine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God alone.
Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) "the eternal law
is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But
all do not know how all things are most orderly. Therefore all do not
know the eternal law.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that "the eternal
law is not subject to the judgment of man." But according to Ethic. i,
"any man can judge well of what he knows." Therefore the eternal law is
not known to us.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "knowledge of
the eternal law is imprinted on us."
I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself;
secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is found:
thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its
rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself, except
the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows
it in its reflection, greater or less. For every knowledge of truth is a
kind of reflection and participation of the eternal law, which is the
unchangeable truth, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men
know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common principles
of the natural law: and as to the others, they partake of the knowledge
of truth, some more, some less; and in this respect are more or less
cognizant of the eternal law.
Reply to Objection 1: We cannot know the things that are of God, as they are in
themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects, according to
Rm. 1:20: "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made."
Reply to Objection 2: Although each one knows the eternal law according to his own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can comprehend it: for it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects. Therefore it does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law in the way aforesaid, knows also the whole order of things, whereby they are most orderly.
Reply to Objection 3: To judge a thing may be understood in two ways. First, as
when a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according to Job
12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words, and the palate of him that
eateth, the taste?" It is to this kind of judgment that the Philosopher
alludes when he says that "anyone can judge well of what he knows," by
judging, namely, whether what is put forward is true. In another way we
speak of a superior judging of a subordinate by a kind of practical
judgment, as to whether he should be such and such or not. And thus none
can judge of the eternal law.
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Question: 93 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that not every law is derived from the eternal law.
For there is a law of the "fomes," as stated above (Question [91], Article [6]), which
is not derived from that Divine law which is the eternal law, since
thereunto pertains the "prudence of the flesh," of which the Apostle says
(Rm. 8:7), that "it cannot be subject to the law of God." Therefore not
every law is derived from the eternal law.
Objection 2: Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law,
because, as stated above (Article [2], Objection [2]), "the eternal law is that,
according to which it is right that all things should be most orderly."
But some laws are unjust, according to Is. 10:1: "Woe to them that make
wicked laws." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) that "the law which
is framed for ruling the people, rightly permits many things which are
punished by Divine providence." But the type of Divine providence is the
eternal law, as stated above (Article [1]). Therefore not even every good law is
derived from the eternal law.
On the contrary, Divine Wisdom says (Prov. 8:15): "By Me kings reign,
and lawgivers decree just things." But the type of Divine Wisdom is the
eternal law, as stated above (Article [1]). Therefore all laws proceed from the
eternal law.
I answer that, As stated above (Question [90], Articles [1],2), the law denotes a kind
of plan directing acts towards an end. Now wherever there are movers
ordained to one another, the power of the second mover must needs be
derived from the power of the first mover; since the second mover does
not move except in so far as it is moved by the first. Wherefore we
observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan of government
is derived by secondary governors from the governor in chief; thus the
plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the king's command to
his inferior administrators: and again in things of art the plan of
whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman to the
under-crafts-men, who work with their hands. Since then the eternal law
is the plan of government in the Chief Governor, all the plans of
government in the inferior governors must be derived from the eternal
law. But these plans of inferior governors are all other laws besides the
eternal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right
reason, are derived from the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib.
Arb. i, 6) that "in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but
what man has drawn from the eternal law."
Reply to Objection 1: The "fomes" has the nature of law in man, in so far as it
is a punishment resulting from Divine justice; and in this respect it is
evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it
denotes a proneness to sin, it is contrary to the Divine law, and has not
the nature of law, as stated above (Question [91], Article [6]).
Reply to Objection 2: Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of
right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived from
the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called
an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law but of violence.
Nevertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance
of law, though being framed by one who is in power, is derived from the
eternal law; since all power is from the Lord God, according to Rm. 13:1.
Reply to Objection 3: Human law is said to permit certain things, not as
approving them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things are
directed by the Divine law, which human law is unable to direct, because
more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause. Hence the very
fact that human law does not meddle with matters it cannot direct, comes
under the ordination of the eternal law. It would be different, were
human law to sanction what the eternal law condemns. Consequently it does
not follow that human law is not derived from the eternal law, but that
it is not on a perfect equality with it.
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Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that necessary and eternal things are subject to
the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to reason. But the
Divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore it is subject to
(the Divine) reason. But the eternal law is the Divine reason. Therefore
God's will is subject to the eternal law. But God's will is eternal.
Therefore eternal and necessary things are subject to the eternal law.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject to the
King's law. Now the Son, according to 1 Cor. 15:28,24, "shall be subject
. . . to God and the Father . . . when He shall have delivered up the
Kingdom to Him." Therefore the Son, Who is eternal, is subject to the
eternal law.
Objection 3: Further, the eternal law is Divine providence as a type. But many
necessary things are subject to Divine providence: for instance, the
stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly bodies. Therefore
even necessary things are subject to the eternal law.
On the contrary, Things that are necessary cannot be otherwise, and
consequently need no restraining. But laws are imposed on men, in order
to restrain them from evil, as explained above (Question [92], Article [2]). Therefore
necessary things are not subject to the eternal law.
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), the eternal law is the type of
the Divine government. Consequently whatever is subject to the Divine
government, is subject to the eternal law: while if anything is not
subject to the Divine government, neither is it subject to the eternal
law. The application of this distinction may be gathered by looking
around us. For those things are subject to human government, which can be
done by man; but what pertains to the nature of man is not subject to
human government; for instance, that he should have a soul, hands, or
feet. Accordingly all that is in things created by God, whether it be
contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law: while things
pertaining to the Divine Nature or Essence are not subject to the eternal
law, but are the eternal law itself.
Reply to Objection 1: We may speak of God's will in two ways. First, as to the
will itself: and thus, since God's will is His very Essence, it is
subject neither to the Divine government, nor to the eternal law, but is
the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we may speak of God's will,
as to the things themselves that God wills about creatures; which things
are subject to the eternal law, in so far as they are planned by Divine
Wisdom. In reference to these things God's will is said to be reasonable
[rationalis]: though regarded in itself it should rather be called their
type [ratio].
Reply to Objection 2: God the Son was not made by God, but was naturally born of
God. Consequently He is not subject to Divine providence or to the
eternal law: but rather is Himself the eternal law by a kind of
appropriation, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig. xxxi). But He is
said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human nature, in
respect of which also the Father is said to be greater than He.
The third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary
things that are created.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 6), some
necessary things have a cause of their necessity: and thus they derive
from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise. And this is
in itself a most effective restraint; for whatever is restrained, is said
to be restrained in so far as it cannot do otherwise than it is allowed
to.
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Question: 93 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to the
eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as stated above
(Question [90], Article [4]). But a law cannot be promulgated except to rational
creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement. Therefore none
but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law; and consequently
natural contingents are not.
Objection 2: Further, "Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason," as
stated in Ethic. i. But the eternal law, is the supreme type, as stated
above (Article [1]). Since then natural contingents do not partake of reason in
any way, but are altogether void of reason, it seems that they are not
subject to the eternal law.
Objection 3: Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural
contingents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the eternal
law.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 8:29): "When He compassed the sea
with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should not pass
their limits."
I answer that, We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of the
eternal law which is the law of God. For the law of man extends only to
rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is because law
directs the actions of those that are subject to the government of
someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a law on his own
actions. Now whatever is done regarding the use of irrational things
subject to man, is done by the act of man himself moving those things,
for these irrational creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by
others, as stated above (Question [1], Article [2]). Consequently man cannot impose laws
on irrational beings, however much they may be subject to him. But he can
impose laws on rational beings subject to him, in so far as by his
command or pronouncement of any kind, he imprints on their minds a rule
which is a principle of action.
Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward
principle of action on the man that is subject to him, so God imprints on
the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions. And so, in this
way, God is said to command the whole of nature, according to Ps. 148:6:
"He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." And thus all actions
and movements of the whole of nature are subject to the eternal law.
Consequently irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law, through
being moved by Divine providence; but not, as rational creatures are,
through understanding the Divine commandment.
Reply to Objection 1: The impression of an inward active principle is to natural
things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law, by being
promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human actions, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are obedient
to human reason: whereas they do partake of the Divine Reason by obeying
it; because the power of Divine Reason extends over more things than
human reason does. And as the members of the human body are moved at the
command of reason, and yet do not partake of reason, since they have no
apprehension subordinate to reason; so too irrational creatures are moved
by God, without, on that account, being rational.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the defects which occur in natural things are
outside the order of particular causes, they are not outside the order of
universal causes, especially of the First Cause, i.e. God, from Whose
providence nothing can escape, as stated in the FP, Question [22], Article [2]. And
since the eternal law is the type of Divine providence, as stated above
(Article [1]), hence the defects of natural things are subject to the eternal
law.
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Question: 93 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to the
eternal law. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:18): "If you are led by the
spirit you are not under the law." But the righteous who are the sons of
God by adoption, are led by the spirit of God, according to Rm. 8:14:
"Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God."
Therefore not all men are under the eternal law.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 8:7): "The prudence [Vulg.:
'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not subject to the
law of God." But many are those in whom the prudence of the flesh
dominates. Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal law which is
the law of God.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law
is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a life of
blessedness." But those who are already blessed, and those who are
already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore they are not under
the eternal law.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): "Nothing evades
the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by Him the peace of
the universe is administered."
I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the
eternal law, as explained above (Article [5]): first, by partaking of the
eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and passion,
i.e. by partaking of the eternal law by way of an inward motive
principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are subject to
the eternal law, as stated above (Article [5]). But since the rational nature,
together with that which it has in common with all creatures, has
something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational, consequently it is
subject to the eternal law in both ways; because while each rational
creature has some knowledge of the eternal law, as stated above (Article [2]),
it also has a natural inclination to that which is in harmony with the
eternal law; for "we are naturally adapted to the recipients of virtue"
(Ethic. ii, 1).
Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed, in
the wicked; because in them the natural inclination to virtue is
corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of good
is darkened by passions and habits of sin. But in the good both ways are
found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural knowledge of
good, there is the added knowledge of faith and wisdom; and again,
besides the natural inclination to good, there is the added motive of
grace and virtue.
Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as
always acting according to it: whereas the wicked are subject to the
eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions, indeed, since both their
knowledge of good, and their inclination thereto, are imperfect; but this
imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of passion, in
so far as they suffer what the eternal law decrees concerning them,
according as they fail to act in harmony with that law. Hence Augustine
says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): "I esteem that the righteous act according to
the eternal law; and (De Catech. Rud. xviii): Out of the just misery of
the souls which deserted Him, God knew how to furnish the inferior parts
of His creation with most suitable laws."
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Apostle may be understood in two ways.
First, so that a man is said to be under the law, through being pinned
down thereby, against his will, as by a load. Hence, on the same passage
a gloss says that "he is under the law, who refrains from evil deeds,
through fear of punishment threatened by the law, and not from love of
virtue." In this way the spiritual man is not under the law, because he
fulfils the law willingly, through charity which is poured into his heart
by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood as meaning that the
works of a man, who is led by the Holy Ghost, are the works of the Holy
Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost is not under
the law, as neither is the Son, as stated above (Article [4], ad 2); it follows
that such works, in so far as they are of the Holy Ghost, are not under
the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when he says (2 Cor. 3:17): "Where
the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty."
Reply to Objection 2: The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to the law of
God as regards action; since it inclines to actions contrary to the
Divine law: yet it is subject to the law of God, as regards passion;
since it deserves to suffer punishment according to the law of Divine
justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the flesh dominate
so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature: and consequently there
remains in man the inclination to act in accordance with the eternal law.
For we have seen above (Question [85], Article [2]) that sin does not destroy entirely
the good of nature.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing is maintained in the end and moved towards the end
by one and the same cause: thus gravity which makes a heavy body rest in
the lower place is also the cause of its being moved thither. We
therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal law that some
deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the eternal law that
some are maintained in a happy state, others in an unhappy state.
Accordingly both the blessed and the damned are under the eternal law.