Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 68 [<< | >>]
We now come to consider the Gifts; under which head there are eight
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?
(2) Of the necessity of the Gifts?
(3) Whether the Gifts are habits?
(4) Which, and how many are they?
(5) Whether the Gifts are connected?
(6) Whether they remain in heaven?
(7) Of their comparison with one another;
(8) Of their comparison with the virtues.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 68 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. For
Gregory commenting on Job 1:2, "There were born to him seven sons," says
(Moral. i, 12): "Seven sons were born to us, when through the conception
of heavenly thought, the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost take birth in
us": and he quotes the words of Is. 11:2,3: "And the Spirit . . . of
understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc. where the seven gifts of
the Holy Ghost are enumerated. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy
Ghost are virtues.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine commenting on Mt. 12:45, "Then he goeth and
taketh with him seven other spirits," etc., says (De Quaest. Evang. i,
qu. 8): "The seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues of the Holy
Ghost," i.e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are opposed to the
seven virtues, commonly so called. Therefore the gifts do not differ from
the virtues commonly so called.
Objection 3: Further, things whose definitions are the same, are themselves
the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the gifts; for each
gift is "a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead a good life," etc.
[*Cf. Question [55], Article [4]]. Likewise the definition of a gift can apply to the
infused virtues: for a gift is "an unreturnable giving," according to the
Philosopher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the virtues and gifts do not differ
from one another.
Objection 4: Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are virtues:
for, as stated above (Question [57], Article [2]), wisdom, understanding, and knowledge
are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, piety to a kind
of justice, and fortitude is a moral virtue. Therefore it seems that the
gifts do not differ from the virtues.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes seven gifts, which
he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the three
theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job's three
daughters. He also distinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same seven gifts
from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the four
corners of the house.
I answer that, If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the notion
conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition between them.
Because the word "virtue" conveys the notion that it perfects man in
relation to well-doing, while the word "gift" refers to the cause from
which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that which proceeds from
one as a gift should not perfect another in well-doing: especially as we
have already stated (Question [63], Article [3]) that some virtues are infused into us
by God. Wherefore in this respect we cannot differentiate gifts from
virtues. Consequently some have held that the gifts are not to be
distinguished from the virtues. But there remains no less a difficulty
for them to solve; for they must explain why some virtues are called
gifts and some not; and why among the gifts there are some, fear, for
instance, that are not reckoned virtues.
Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as being
distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned a suitable reason
for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would apply either to all
the virtues, and to none of the gifts, or vice versa. For, seeing that of
the seven gifts, four belong to the reason, viz. wisdom, knowledge,
understanding and counsel, and three to the appetite, viz. fortitude,
piety and fear; they held that the gifts perfect the free-will according
as it is a faculty of the reason, while the virtues perfect it as a
faculty of the will: since they observed only two virtues in the reason
or intellect, viz. faith and prudence, the others being in the appetitive
power or the affections. If this distinction were true, all the virtues
would have to be in the appetite, and all the gifts in the reason.
Others observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the
Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul endows it with prudence, temperance,
justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens it against every
kind of temptation by His sevenfold gift," said that the virtues are
given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we may resist
temptation. But neither is this distinction sufficient. Because the
virtues also resist those temptations which lead to the sins that are
contrary to the virtues; for everything naturally resists its contrary:
which is especially clear with regard to charity, of which it is written
(Cant 8:7): "Many waters cannot quench charity."
Others again, seeing that these gifts are set down in Holy Writ as
having been in Christ, according to Is. 11:2,3, said that the virtues are
given simply that we may do good works, but the gifts, in order to
conform us to Christ, chiefly with regard to His Passion, for it was then
that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor. Yet neither does this
appear to be a satisfactory distinction. Because Our Lord Himself wished
us to be conformed to Him, chiefly in humility and meekness, according to
Mt. 11:29: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart," and in
charity, according to Jn. 15:12: "Love one another, as I have loved you."
Moreover, these virtues were especially resplendent in Christ's Passion.
Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues, we
must be guided by the way in which Scripture expresses itself, for we
find there that the term employed is "spirit" rather than "gift." For
thus it is written (Is. 11:2,3): "The spirit . . . of wisdom and of
understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc.: from which words we are
clearly given to understand that these seven are there set down as being
in us by Divine inspiration. Now inspiration denotes motion from without.
For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold principle of
movement, one within him, viz. the reason; the other extrinsic to him,
viz. God, as stated above (Question [9], Articles [4],6): moreover the Philosopher says
this in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem. vii, 8).
Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its
mover: and the perfection of the mobile as such, consists in a
disposition whereby it is disposed to be well moved by its mover. Hence
the more exalted the mover, the more perfect must be the disposition
whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: thus we see that a
disciple needs a more perfect disposition in order to receive a higher
teaching from his master. Now it is manifest that human virtues perfect
man according as it is natural for him to be moved by his reason in his
interior and exterior actions. Consequently man needs yet higher
perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These perfections
are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but also
because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the Divine
inspiration, according to Is. 50:5: "The Lord . . . hath opened my ear,
and I do not resist; I have not gone back." Even the Philosopher says in
the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem., vii, 8) that for those who
are moved by Divine instinct, there is no need to take counsel according
to human reason, but only to follow their inner promptings, since they
are moved by a principle higher than human reason. This then is what some
say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher than acts
of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes these gifts are called virtues, in the broad
sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and above the
virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are Divine
virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic.
vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of "heroic" or
"divine virtue [*{arete heroike kai theia}]," in respect of which some
men are called "divine."
Reply to Objection 2: The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far as they are
opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are opposed to the
gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine instinct. For the
same thing is opposed both to God and to reason, whose light flows from
God.
Reply to Objection 3: This definition applies to virtue taken in its general
sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as distinguished
from the gifts, we must explain the words, "whereby we lead a good life"
as referring to the rectitude of life which is measured by the rule of
reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be
defined as something given by God in relation to His motion; something,
to wit, that makes man to follow well the promptings of God.
Reply to Objection 4: Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far as it
proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift, according
as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same applies to the
other virtues.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 68 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for
salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing the
ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's
salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing the ordinary
standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not under the precept,
but under a counsel. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for
salvation.
Objection 2: Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave well
in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now man's behavior
to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues; and his
behavior towards men, by the moral virtues. Therefore gifts are not
necessary to man for salvation.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the Holy Ghost gives
wisdom against folly, understanding against dullness, counsel against
rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against ignorance, piety
against hardness of our heart, and fear against pride." But a sufficient
remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues. Therefore the
gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.
On the contrary, Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and
fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation: since of
wisdom it is written (Wis. 7:28): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth
with wisdom"; and of fear (Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is without fear cannot
be justified." Therefore the other gifts that are placed between these
are also necessary for salvation.
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), the gifts are perfections of man,
whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings of God.
Wherefore in those matters where the prompting of reason is not
sufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost, there
is, in consequence, need for a gift.
Now man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its
natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; secondly, with
a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated
above (Question [62], Article [1]). And, though this latter perfection is greater than
the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner
than the latter: because man has the former in his full possession,
whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since we love and know God
imperfectly. Now it is evident that anything that has a nature or a form
or a virtue perfectly, can of itself work according to them: not,
however, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly in every
nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which has a nature, or
form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work, unless it be moved by
another. Thus the sun which possesses light perfectly, can shine by
itself; whereas the moon which has the nature of light imperfectly, sheds
only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows the medical art
perfectly, can work by himself; but his pupil, who is not yet fully
instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive instructions
from him.
Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man's
connatural end, man can work through the judgment of his reason. If,
however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special
promptings from God, this will be out of God's superabundant goodness:
hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the acquired
moral virtues, had also the heroic or divine virtues. But in matters
directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason moves him,
according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the
theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it
receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost, according
to Rm. 8:14,17: "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of
God . . . and if sons, heirs also": and Ps. 142:10: "Thy good Spirit
shall lead me into the right land," because, to wit, none can receive the
inheritance of that land of the Blessed, except he be moved and led
thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to accomplish this end, it
is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues,
not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass the
commandments), but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man
being moved by a higher principle.
Reply to Objection 2: By the theological and moral virtues, man is not so
perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual need
of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for the
reason already given.
Reply to Objection 3: Whether we consider human reason as perfected in its
natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it does
not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is unable
to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the objection. God,
however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by His
motion safeguards us from all folly, ignorance, dullness of mind and
hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently the gifts of the Holy
Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given as
remedies to these defects.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 68 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.
Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined as "a quality
difficult to remove," as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now it
is proper to Christ that the gifts of the Holy Ghost rest in Him, as
stated in Is. 11:2,3: "He upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending
and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth"; on which words Gregory
comments as follows (Moral. ii, 27): "The Holy Ghost comes upon all the
faithful; but, in a singular way, He dwells always in the Mediator."
Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according as he
is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above (Articles [1],2). But in so far
as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like an instrument
in His regard. Now to be perfected by a habit is befitting, not an
instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost
are not habits.
Objection 3: Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine
inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a habit: for
"the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets," as
Gregory states (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither, therefore, are the gifts of
the Holy Ghost.
On the contrary, Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His
disciples (Jn. 14:17): "He shall abide with you, and shall be in you."
Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore His gifts
abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but abiding
habits.
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), the gifts are perfections of man,
whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost. Now it
is evident from what has been already said (Question [56], Article [4]; Question [58], Article [2]),
that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according as it
partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as it has a natural
aptitude to be moved by the command of reason. Accordingly the gifts of
the Holy Ghost, as compared with the Holy Ghost Himself, are related to
man, even as the moral virtues, in comparison with the reason, are
related to the appetitive power. Now the moral virtues are habits,
whereby the powers of appetite are disposed to obey reason promptly.
Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits whereby man is perfected
to obey readily the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory solves this objection (Moral. ii, 27) by saying that "by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the Holy Ghost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts." Now the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated above (Article [2]). Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever abides in holy men.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds, in the case of an instrument which has
no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man is not an
instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy Ghost, that
he also acts himself, in so far as he has a free-will. Therefore he needs
a habit.
Reply to Objection 3: Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the
manifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation: hence
the comparison fails.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 68 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably
enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down corresponding to
the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and
counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing is set down
corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual virtue. Moreover,
something is included corresponding to justice, viz. piety, and something
corresponding to fortitude, viz. the gift of fortitude; while there is
nothing to correspond to temperance. Therefore the gifts are enumerated
insufficiently.
Objection 2: Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of fortitude is
assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself. Therefore justice
itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down.
Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us to
God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is moved by God,
it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological virtues,
should have been included.
Objection 4: Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of love, of
hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions condivided with
fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so ought the other three.
Objection 5: Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding;
counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore, some
gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear. Therefore
the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Holy Writ (Is. 11:2,3).
I answer that, As stated above (Article [3]), the gifts are habits perfecting
man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the Holy Ghost, even
as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey the
reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be moved
by the command of reason, so it is natural for all the forces in man to
be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior power. Therefore
whatever powers in man can be the principles of human actions, can also
be the subjects of gifts, even as they are virtues; and such powers are
the reason and appetite.
Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the
apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery of truth), and
judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of
truth, the speculative reason is perfected by "understanding"; the
practical reason, by "counsel." In order to judge aright, the speculative
reason is perfected by "wisdom"; the practical reason by "knowledge." The
appetitive power, in matters touching a man's relations to another, is
perfected by "piety"; in matters touching himself, it is perfected by
"fortitude" against the fear of dangers; and against inordinate lust for
pleasures, by "fear," according to Prov. 15:27: "By the fear of the Lord
every one declineth from evil," and Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh
with Thy fear: for I am afraid of Thy judgments." Hence it is clear that
these gifts extend to all those things to which the virtues, both
intellectual and moral, extend.
Reply to Objection 1: The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in matters
concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such matters, but
to external things that can be made, since art is the right reason, not
about things to be done, but about things to be made (Ethic. vi, 4).
However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of the gifts, the art
is on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who is the principal mover, and not on
the part of men, who are His organs when He moves them. The gift of fear
corresponds, in a manner, to temperance: for just as it belongs to
temperance, properly speaking, to restrain man from evil pleasures for
the sake of the good appointed by reason, so does it belong to the gift
of fear, to withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God.
Reply to Objection 2: Justice is so called from the rectitude of the reason, and
so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the name of piety
denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to our country. And
since God is the Father of all, the worship of God is also called piety,
as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Therefore the gift whereby a man,
through reverence for God, works good to all, is fittingly called piety.
Reply to Objection 3: The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost, unless in
some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not moved by the
craftsman, unless there by contact or some other kind of union between
them. Now the primal union of man with God is by faith, hope and charity:
and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as being
their roots. Therefore all the gifts correspond to these three virtues,
as being derived therefrom.
Reply to Objection 4: Love, hope and joy have good for their object. Now God is
the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions are
transferred to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On the
other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to God:
hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from certain
things through reverence for God. Hence it does not give its name to a
theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws us from evil, for
higher motives than moral virtue does.
Reply to Objection 5: Wisdom directs both the intellect and the affections of
man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to wisdom as their
directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the gift of
understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear. Because
the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a consideration of the
Divine excellence, which wisdom considers.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 68 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 12:8): "To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the word of
wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same
Spirit." Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of the
Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to divers
men, and are not connected together in the same man.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the
faithful have not knowledge, though they have faith." But some of the
gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it seems
that the gifts are not necessarily connected together in one and the same
man.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that wisdom "is of small account
if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless if it be
not based upon wisdom . . . Counsel is worthless, when the strength of
fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude is very weak if it be
not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if it hath not the use
of piety . . . and piety is very useless if it lack the discernment of
knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it has these virtues with it, fear
itself rises up to the doing of no good action": from which it seems that
it is possible to have one gift without another. Therefore the gifts of
the Holy Ghost are not connected.
On the contrary, Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the
following remark: "It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's sons, that
by turns they fed one another." Now the sons of Job, of whom he is
speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the
Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another.
I answer that, The true answer to this question is easily gathered from
what has been already set down. For it has been stated (Article [3]) that as the
powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as regards the
governance of reason, so all the powers of the soul are disposed by the
gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost dwells
in us by charity, according to Rm. 5:5: "The charity of God is poured
forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us," even as our
reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, just as the moral virtues are
united together in prudence, so the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected
together in charity: so that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the
Holy Ghost, none of which can one possess without charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way as
gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the
knowledge of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct
the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense that the
Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he
mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and the "word" of knowledge. They
may be taken in another way for the gifts of the Holy Ghost: and thus
wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human mind,
rendering it amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost in the
knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that these
gifts are in all who are possessed of charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while expounding
the passage of the Apostle quoted above (OBJ 1): hence he is referring to
knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous grace. This is
clear from the context which follows: "For it is one thing to know only
what a man must believe in order to gain the blissful life, which is no
other than eternal life; and another, to know how to impart this to godly
souls, and to defend it against the ungodly, which latter the Apostle
seems to have styled by the proper name of knowledge."
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is proved in
one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by another, as
stated above (Question [65], Article [1]); so Gregory wishes to prove the connection of
the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that one cannot be perfect
without the other. Hence he had already observed that "each particular
virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless one virtue lend its
support to another." We are therefore not to understand that one gift can
be without another; but that if understanding were without wisdom, it
would not be a gift; even as temperance, without justice, would not be a
virtue.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 68 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not remain in
heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of His sevenfold
gift the "Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all temptations." Now
there will be no temptations in heaven, according to Is. 11:9: "They
shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy mountain." Therefore
there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in heaven.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated above
(Article [3]). But habits are of no use, where their acts are impossible. Now
the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for Gregory says
(Moral. i, 15) that "understanding . . . penetrates the truths heard . .
. counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly . . . fortitude . . . has no
fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of
mercy," all of which are incompatible with the heavenly state. Therefore
these gifts will not remain in the state of glory.
Objection 3: Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the contemplative life,
e.g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the active life, e.g. piety
and fortitude. Now the active life ends with this as Gregory states
(Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of the Holy Ghost will be in the
state of glory.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): "The city of
God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly
river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who,
proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more abundantly in those
celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly virtue."
I answer that, We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to their
essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may be
gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for this is
that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human mind amenable to the
motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially realized in heaven,
where God will be "all in all" (1 Cor. 15:28), and man entirely subject
unto Him. Secondly, they may be considered as regards the matter about
which their operations are: and thus, in the present life they have an
operation about a matter, in respect of which they will have no operation
in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they will not remain in
the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the case with regard to
the cardinal virtues (Question [67], Article [1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according as they
are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they afford us
protection against evil temptations. But in the state of glory, where all
evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected in good by the gifts of the
Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something that
passes away with the present state, and something that remains in the
future state. For he says that "wisdom strengthens the mind with the hope
and certainty of eternal things"; of which two, hope passes, and
certainty remains. Of understanding, he says "that it penetrates the
truths heard, refreshing the heart and enlightening its darkness," of
which, hearing passes away, since "they shall teach no more every man . .
. his brother" (Jer. 31:3,4); but the enlightening of the mind remains.
Of counsel he says that it "prevents us from being impetuous," which is
necessary in the present life; and also that "it makes the mind full of
reason," which is necessary even in the future state. Of fortitude he
says that it "fears not adversity," which is necessary in the present
life; and further, that it "sets before us the viands of confidence,"
which remains also in the future life. With regard to knowledge he
mentions only one thing, viz. that "she overcomes the void of ignorance,"
which refers to the present state. When, however, he adds "in the womb of
the mind," this may refer figuratively to the fulness of knowledge, which
belongs to the future state. Of piety he says that "it satisfies the
inmost heart with deeds of mercy." These words taken literally refer only
to the present state: yet the inward regard for our neighbor, signified
by "the inmost heart," belongs also to the future state, when piety will
achieve, not works of mercy, but fellowship of joy. Of fear he say that
"it oppresses the mind, lest it pride itself in present things," which
refers to the present state, and that "it strengthens it with the meat of
hope for the future," which also belongs to the present state, as regards
hope, but may also refer to the future state, as regards being
"strengthened" for things we hope are here, and obtain there.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the gifts as to their matter. For
the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active life; but all
the gifts will have their respective acts about things pertaining to the
contemplative life, which is the life of heavenly bliss.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 68 [<< | >>]
Article: 7 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in their
order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly, that which, more
than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of man fear, more
than the other gifts: for it is written (Dt. 10:12): "And now, Israel,
what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord
thy God?" and (Malachi 1:6): "If . . . I be a master, where is My fear?"
Therefore it seems that fear, which is mentioned last, is not the lowest
but the greatest of the gifts.
Objection 2: Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since the
Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:8): "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is profitable to
all things." Now a common good is preferable to particular goods.
Therefore piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to be the
most excellent gift.
Objection 3: Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel
pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry.
Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it is
set down as being below it.
Objection 4: Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while
science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power than the
appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than fortitude;
and yet the latter is given the precedence. Therefore the gifts are not
set down in their order of dignity.
On the contrary, Augustine says [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4]: "It
seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which
Isaias speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these [of which we
read in Mt. 5:3]: but there is a difference of order, for there [viz. in
Isaias] the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here, with
the lower gifts."
I answer that, The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways:
first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding from
their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to their
matter. If we consider the excellence of the gifts simply, they follow
the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with another;
because the gifts perfect man for all the acts of the soul's powers, even
as the virtues do, as stated above (Article [4]). Hence, as the intellectual
virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues, and among the
intellectual virtues, the contemplative are preferable to the active,
viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and art (yet so that
wisdom stands before understanding, and understanding before science, and
prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the gifts, wisdom,
understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent than piety,
fortitude, and fear; and among the latter, piety excels fortitude, and
fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, and fortitude
temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude and counsel precede
knowledge and piety: because fortitude and counsel are concerned with
difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge regard ordinary matters.
Consequently the excellence of the gifts corresponds with the order in
which they are enumerated; but so far as wisdom and understanding are
given the preference to the others, their excellence is considered
simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are preferred to
knowledge and piety, it is considered with regard to their matter.
Reply to Objection 1: Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation, so to
speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the Lord is
the beginning of wisdom" (Ps. 110:10; Ecclus. 1:16), and not as though it
were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of generation,
man departs from evil on account of fear (Prov. 16:16), before doing good
works, and which result from the other gifts.
Reply to Objection 2: In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is not compared
with all God's gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of which he had
said it "is profitable to little."
Reply to Objection 3: Although knowledge stands before counsel by reason of its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its matter: for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty (Ethic. iii, 3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters.
Reply to Objection 4: The directive gifts which pertain to the reason are more
excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in relation to
their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason transcends the
appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. But on the part of the
matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the directive power to the
executive, and so is knowledge united to piety: because counsel and
fortitude are concerned with matters of difficulty, while knowledge and
piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel together with
fortitude, by reason of their matter, are given the preference to
knowledge and piety.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 68 [<< | >>]
Article: 8 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts.
For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of charity: "No gift
of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which divides the
children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal damnation.
Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but, without charity, they
avail nothing." But charity is a virtue. Therefore a virtue is more
excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more
excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; for
Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost in the mind
it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, fortitude, temperance
. . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven virtues" [viz.
the gifts], so "as against folly to bestow wisdom; against dullness,
understanding; against rashness, counsel; against fear, fortitude;
against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of heart, piety; against
piety, fear." Therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "the virtues
cannot be used to evil purpose." But it is possible to make evil use of
the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): "We offer up the sacrifice of
prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift; or understanding, while it runs
nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it multiplies
itself, grow into confusion; that fortitude, while it gives confidence,
may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while it knows and yet loves not,
may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from the right line, may
become distorted; and lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may plunge
us into the pit of despair." Therefore the virtues are more excellent
than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
On the contrary, The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to
remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (OBJ 2), so
that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the
gifts are more excellent than the virtues.
I answer that, As was shown above (Question [58], Article [3]; Question [62], Article [1]), there are
three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some intellectual, and
some moral. The theological virtues are those whereby man's mind is
united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself
is perfected; and the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of
appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other hand the gifts of the
Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the
Divine motion.
Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues, by
which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, in the same way as the
moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the
reason, the moving principle of the moral virtues. Wherefore as the
intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues and
control them, so the theological virtues are more excellent than the
gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory says (Moral. i,
12) that "the seven sons," i.e. the seven gifts, "never attain the
perfection of the number ten, unless all they do be done in faith, hope,
and charity."
But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and
moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. Because the
gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their
Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either the reason itself, or the
other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more
exalted the mover, the more excellent the disposition whereby the thing
moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect than
the virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is a theological virtue; and such we grant to be
more perfect than the gifts.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two ways in which one thing precedes another. One
is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God precedes love of
our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the intellectual and
moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues. The other is the order
of generation or disposition: thus love of one's neighbor precedes love
of God, as regards the act: and in this way moral and intellectual
virtues precede the gifts, since man, through being well subordinate to
his own reason, is disposed to be rightly subordinate to God.
Reply to Objection 3: Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts of the Holy
Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which "dealeth not
perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Consequently wisdom and understanding and the
like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as they are gifts of the
Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from the perfection of charity, they
assist one another. This is what Gregory means to say.