存在與時間(Being and Time) - 海德格 Martin Heidegger, 1927.
「時間」這樣的東西最初是如何對日常的尋視操勞(circumspect taking care)顯現的？ 在何種使用著用具的操勞打交道之際它明確地成為可通達的？ 隨著世界的展開，時間就公共化了；世界的這一展開(disclosedness)包括世內存在者的揭示(discoveredness)，隨著這一被揭示狀態，時間向來已經被操勞了，因為「此在」凡有所計較就要計算時間。 然而，要說到「人們」明確地依照時間調整自己，那就在於鐘錶的使用。
第六章 Chapter VI
第八十一節 時間內狀態(Within-Timeness)與流俗(Vulgar)時間概念的發生
81. Within-Timeness and the Genesis of the Vulgar Concept of Time
How does something like "time" initially show itself for everyday, circumspect taking care? In what mode of taking care and using tools does it become explicitly accessible? If time has been made public with the disclosedness of world, if it has always already been taken care of with the discoveredness of innerworldly beings belonging to the disclosedness of world since Da-sein calculates time reckoning with itself, then the mode of behavior in which "one" orients oneself explicitly toward time lies in the use of the clock.
鐘錶所使用的生存論時間性意義顯示自己為週行的指針的當前化(making present)。 以當前化方式追隨指針的位置，這種活動就是計數。 這種當前化是在有所居持(ecstatic unity)的期備的綻出(ecstatic)統一中到時的(temporalizes)。 有所當前化地居持於“當時”，這意味著：以道說現在的方式對“早先(on that former occasion)”之事的視野敞開著，亦即對不再現在(now-no-longer)的視野敞開著。 有所當前化的期備著“而後(then)”，這等於說：以道說現在的方式對“晚後”的視野敞開著，亦即對尚未現在(now-not-yet)的視野敞開著。 在這樣一種當前化中到時的東西就是時間。
The existential and temporal meaning of the clock turns out to be making present of the moving pointer. By following the positions of the pointer in a way that makes present, one counts them. This making present temporalizes itself in the ecstatic unity of a retaining that awaits. To retain the "on that former occasion" in making present means that in saying-now to be open for the horizon of the earlier, that is, the now-no-longer. To await the "then" in making present means that in saying-now to be open for the horizon of the later, that is, the now-not-yet. What shows itself in this making present is time.
怎麼樣據此來定義在尋視操勞地使用鐘錶為自己獲取時間的視野上公開出來的時間呢？ 追隨週行的指針這一活動有所當前化，有所計數，而時間就是在這一活動中到時的所計之數；其情形是這樣：居持與期備是依照早先與晚後而在視野上敞開的，而當前化則在與這樣的居持與期備的綻出(ecstatic)統一中到時(temporalizes)。
Then how are we to define the time manifest in the horizon of the use of the clock that is circumspect and takes time for itself in taking care? This time is what is counted, showing itself in following, making present, and counting the moving pointer in such a way that making present temporalizes itself in ecstatic unity with retaining and awaiting horizonally open according to the earlier and later.
不過，這無非是亞里斯多德給時間下的定義的生存論(existential)存在論(ontological)解釋：“時間即是計算在早先與晚後的視野上照面的(encountered) 運動時所得之數。」亞里斯多德是從生存論存在論的視野上取得這一定義的；而一旦我們界定了這一視野，這一定義就成為那麼“自明”，那麼灼識 真創了，一如初看上去它是那麼奇特一樣。 但亞里斯多德卻沒有把如此公開出來的時間的源頭當作問題。 他的時間解釋倒是沿著「自然的」存在之領會的方向行進的。 然而，因為前面的探索從原則上使「自然的」存在之領會本身以及它所領會的存在成了問題，所以，只有解決了存在問題以後才能夠專題解釋亞里斯多德的時間分析。 古代的一般存在論對問題的提法有其嚴重的限制。 無論如何，對於積極地掌握這種問題的提法的工作來說，亞里斯多德的時間分析將獲得根本性的意義。
But that is nothing more than an existential and ontological interpretation of the definition that Aristotle gave of time: "That, namely, is time, what is counted in the motion encountered in the horizon of the earlier and the later." As strange as this definition may appear at first glance, it is "self-evident" and genuinely drawn if the existential and ontological horizon is defined from which Aristotle took it. The origin of time thus revealed is not a problem for Aristotle. His interpretation of time rather moves in the direction of the "natural" understanding of being. However, since that understanding and the being understood in it have been made a problem in principle in our present inquiry, the Aristotelian analysis of time can be thematically interpreted only after the solution to the question of being, and indeed in such a way that that analysis gains a fundamental significance for a positive appropriation of the critically limited line of questioning of ancient ontology in general.
後來對時間概念的一切討論原則上都依附於亞里斯多德的定義；亦即，它們都就時間在尋視操勞中所顯現的情況而使時間成為課題。 時間是“所計之數”，亦即是在周行的指針（或影子）當前化之際所道出的東西和 —雖未成為專題— 所意指的東西。 被推動的東西在其運動中當前化，而在這當前化之中所道出的是「現在這裡，現在這裡，等等」。 所列計的都是現在。這些現在是在各個現在中顯現出來的，而這各個現在則作為「立刻不再(right-away-no-longer-now)」和「剛剛還不現在(just-now-not-yet)」。 我們把以這種方式在鐘錶使用上所視的「世界時間」稱作現在時間。
All subsequent discussion of the concept of time in principle keeps to the Aristotelian definition, that is, it makes time thematic in the way that it shows itself in circumspect taking care. Time is "what is counted," that is, it is what is expressed and what is meant, although unthematically, in the making present of the moving pointer (or shadow). In making present what is moved in its motion, one says "now here, now here, and so on." What is counted are the nows. And they show themselves "in every now" as "right-away-no-longer-now" and "just-now-not-yet." The world time "caught sight of" in this way in the use of the clock we shall call now-time.
給與自己時間的操勞活動對時間的計算愈是“自然”，它便愈少地逗留於道出的(expressed)時間本身；它倒是喪失於向來有其時間的所操勞的用具了。 操勞活動「愈自然地」規定時間和排定時間，亦即，這種規定和排定愈少專題地指向時間本身，當前沉淪著寓於所操勞之事的存在也就愈多地干脆說：現在 、而後、當時，無論這是否形諸音聲。 於是對於流俗的時間領會來說時間就顯現為一系列始終「現成在手的(objectively present)」、一面逝去一面來臨的現在。 時間被領會為前後相續，被領會為現在之“流(flux)”，或“時間長河”。 那麼，對所操勞的世界時間的解釋包含著什麼呢？
The more "naturally" the taking care of time that gives itself time reckons with time, the less it dwells together with the expressed time as such. Rather, it is lost in the useful things taken care of that always have their time. When taking care determines time and gives it, the more "naturally" it does so - that is, the less it is directed toward treating time as such thematically - all the more does the being-together-with what is taken care of (the being-together making present and falling prey) say unhesitatingly (whether with or without utterance): now, then, on that former occasion. And thus time shows itself for the vulgar understanding as a succession of constantly "objectively present" nows that pass away and arrive at the same time. Time is understood as a sequence, as the "flux" of nows, as the "course of time." What is implied by this interpretation of world time taken care of?
如果我們問到世界時間的完整本質結構並拿它來同流俗時間領會所識認的東西相比，就不難得到答案。 我們曾經把可定期性(datability)提出來作為所操勞的時間的第一個本質環節。 可定期性根據於時間性的綻出(ecstatic)建構。 「現在」本質上是現在之時。.... 在操勞之際對可定期的(datable)現在有所領會，雖未就其本身加以把握；這個可定期的現在向來是一個適當的或不適當的現在。 現在結構包含有意蘊(significance)。 所以我們曾經把所操勞的時間稱為世界時間。 流俗說法把時間解釋為現在序列，在這種解釋中既沒有可定期性又沒有意涵。 它把時間描述為純粹的先後相續，這使這兩種結構都不能「映現(appear)」。 流俗的時間解釋遮蔽這兩種結構。 現在的可定期性與意蘊根據於綻出視野的時間性的建構，而這一建構在這種遮蔽中卻被敉平了(levelled down)。 就彷彿諸現在都被切除了這兩種關聯，然後作為這樣切好的現在並列起來，只是為了構成前後相續。
We can answer this if we go back to the complete essential structure of world time and compare this with that with which the vulgar understanding of time is familiar. We set forth datability as the first essential factor of time taken care of. It is grounded in the ecstatic constitution of temporality. The "now" is essentially a now-that .... The datable now that is understood in taking care, although not grasped as such, is always appropriate or inappropriate. Significance belongs to the now-structure. Thus we called time taken care of world time. In the vulgar interpretation of time as a succession of nows, both datability and significance are lacking. The characterization of time as pure sequence does not let these two structures "appear." The vulgar interpretation of time covers them over. The ecstatic and horizonal constitution of temporality, in which the datability and significance of the now are grounded, is levelled down by this covering over. The nows are cut off from these relations, so to speak, and, as thus cut off, they simply range themselves along after one another so as to constitute the succession.
流俗的時間領會以敉平的方式遮蔽世界時間，這不是偶然的。 倒恰因為日常時間解釋唯持守於有所操勞的知性眼界之中，只領會到在知性視野中「顯現」出來的東西，所以這些結構就必然不為所見。 在操勞測量時間之際所計之數即現在是在對上手事物(things at hand)與現成事物的操勞中一道得以領會的。 這種對時間的操勞一旦回到隨同得以領會的時間本身來對它加以“考察”，它見到的就是諸現在，就是這些無論如何也確實在“此”的現在；這裡所借的視野就是 這種操勞活動本身始終由之引導的那、存在領會的視野。 從而諸現在也就以某種方式一道現成存在：亦即，存在者來照面並具現在也來照面。雖然不曾明確說出諸現在也像物一樣現成存在(objectively present)，它們在存在論上卻是在 現成性觀念的視野上被“看見”的。諸現在“逝去”，而逝去的諸現在構成過去。諸現在來臨，而未來的諸現在界說著“將來”。這種把世界時間當作現在時間的流俗解釋根本不曾有一種可資利用的視野能藉以通達世界、意蘊、可定期性這樣的東西。這些結構必然始終被遮蔽著；因為流俗的時間解釋通過它藉以從概念上形成其時間描述的方式更加強了這層遮蔽，這些結構自然就被遮蔽得更深。
This covering over and levelling down of world time that is carried out by the vulgar understanding of time is no accident. Rather, precisely because the everyday interpretation of time keeps itself solely in the perspective of commonsense taking care, and understands only what "shows" itself in the commonsense horizon, these structures have to escape it. What is counted in the measurement of time taken care of, the now, is also understood in taking care of things at hand and objectively present. Since this taking care of time comes back to the time itself that has also been understood and "contemplates" it, it sees the nows (that are also somehow "there") in the horizon of the understanding of being by which this taking care is itself constantly guided. The nows are thus also in a way objectively present, that is, beings are encountered and also the now. Although it is not explicitly stated that the nows are objectively present like things, still they are "seen" ontologically in the horizon of the idea of objective presence. The nows pass away, and the past ones constitute the past. The nows arrive, and the future ones define the "future." The vulgar interpretation of world time as now-time does not have the horizon available at all by which such things as world, significance, and datability can be made more accessible. These structures remain necessarily covered over, all the more so since the vulgar interpretation of time enforces this covering over by the way in which it conceptually develops its characterization of time.
現在序列的確被看作某種現成事物，因為它甚至可以被放到「時間中」。我們說：在每一個現在之中都有現在：在每一個現在之中，現在也已消逝著。在每一個現在中現在都是現在，所以它持駐地作為自一的(same)東西在場，儘管在每一個現在中都有另一個現在一面 來臨一面消逝。作為這種更選的東西，現在卻也同時顯示著它自身的持駐的在場。從而，儘管在柏拉圖的眼界裡時間原是不斷生滅的現在序列，他卻也不得不把 時間稱為永恆的摹像：“但他決定製造一個關於永恆的運動 著的影像；在當他安排好天空的同時，製造了一種永恆的影像；這種影像按照數字運動。這是持駐於一的那一永恆的影像。我們所說的時間這個名稱正是給與這一影像的。”
The succession of nows is interpreted as something somehow objectively present; for it itself moves "in time." We say that in every now it is now, in every now it already disappears. The now is now in every now, thus constantly present as the same, even if in every now another may be disappearing as it arrives. Yet it does show at the same time the constant presence of itself as this changing thing. Thus even Plato, who had this perspective of time as a succession of nows that come into being and pass away, had to call time the image of eternity.
現在序列連續不斷、嚴絲合縫。無論我們怎樣“不斷地”把現在“分割下去”，現在總還是現在。人們是在一種不可消解的現成事物的視野上可見時間的 持續性的。人們在存在論上依照一種持駐的現成事物製定方向，或由此尋索時間的連續性問題，或由此就拋下這進退兩難之境(aporia)不管。這樣一來，世界時間所特有 的結構必然始終被遮蔽著，因為世界時間隨著可定期性—可定期性的基礎是綻出一道伸張分段。在操勞於時間之際公共化了的時間性的綻出統一(ecstatic unity)在 視野上有所延展，但時間的伸張分段卻不曾從這種視野的延展得到領會。無論每個現在如何轉瞬即逝，在其中總已經是現在；這件事必須從更「早先 」的東西來理解 — 每一個現在都生自這更早先的東西；也就是說，這件事必須從一種時間性的綻出延展(ecstatically being stretched)來理解 — 這種時間性異乎任何現成事物的連續性 ，而這本身卻又表現為之所以可能通達現成持續之事的條件。
The succession of nows is uninterrupted and has no gaps. No matter how "far" we penetrate in "dividing" the now, it is still always now. One regards the continuity of time in the horizon of something indissolubly objectively present. Ontologically oriented toward something constantly objectively present, one either looks for the problem of the continuity of time, or one leaves the aporia alone. Here the specific structure of world time must remain covered over, since it is spanned together with ecstatically founded datability. The spannedness of time is not understood in terms of the horizontal being stretched along of the ecstatic unity of temporality that has made itself public in taking care of time. The fact that it is always already now in every now, no matter how momentary, must be conceived in terms of what is still "earlier" and from which every now arises: in terms of the ecstatically being stretched along of the temporality that is foreign to any continuity of something objectively present, but that in turn presents the condition of the possibility of the access to something continuous and objectively present.
「時間是無終的」這一流俗時間解釋的主論題最人里地表明：這樣一種解釋敉平著遮蔽著世界時間，並從而也敉平著遮蔽著一般時間性。 時間首先被表現為不間斷的相續的現在。 每一個現在也已經是剛剛與立刻。 如果對時間的措詞首先而唯一地拘泥於這種序列，那麼在這種描述中本來從原則上就不可能找到始與終。 每一個最後的現在其為現在就總已經是一種立刻不再(right-away that is no longer)，所以也就是在不再現在(no-longer-now)亦即過去這一意義上的時間。 每一個剛到的現在向來是剛剛還不(just-now-not-yet)，所以也就是在還不現在(not-yet-now)，也就是「將來」這意義上的時間。 從而時間「兩頭」都是無終端的。 這一時間命題之所以可能，其根據就在於依循某種現成的現在之流的漂浮無據的自在製定方向；在這裡，整體的現在現象就其可定期性、世界性、伸張分段(spannedness)以及「 此在」式的公共性來說全被遮蔽著，並降沉為一種不可識知的殘片。 我們的眼界若限於現成存在與不現成存在，那我們即使把現在序列“想到頭［終端］來”，也仍然絕不會找到一個終端。 像這樣去想時間的終端，就必然還可以想到在終點之外總還有時間；由此人們推論出：時間是無終的。
The main thesis of the vulgar interpretation of time - that time is "infinite" - reveals most penetratingly the levelling down and covering over of world time and thus of temporality in general in this interpretation. Initially, time gives itself as an uninterrupted succession of nows. Every now is already either a just now or a right-away. If the characterization of time keeps primarily and exclusively to this succession, no beginning and no end can be found in principle in it as such. Every last now, as a now, is always already a right-away that is no longer, thus it is time in the sense of the no-longer-now, of the past. Every first now is always a just-now-not-yet, thus it is time in the sense of the not-yet-now, the "future." Time is thus endless "in both directions." This thesis about time is possible only on the basis of an orientation toward an unattached in-itself of a course of nows objectively present, whereby the complete phenomenon of the now is covered over with regard to the datability, worldliness, spannedness, and publicness of Da-sein, so that it has dwindled to an unrecognizable fragment. If "one thinks" the succession of nows "to the end" with the perspective of objective presence or the lack of it, an end can never be found. In this way of thinking time through to the end, one must always think more time; from this one concludes that time is endless.
但如此敉平世界時間、如此遮蔽時間性的根子在哪裡呢？ 在於我們曾在準備工作中解釋為操心的「此在」的存在本身。 「此在」被拋沉淪著( thrown and entangled)首先與通常迷失於所操勞之事。 在這種迷失中卻昭示出：「此在」在其本真生存(authentic existence)──我們曾把它標識為先行的決心(anticipatory resoluteness)──面前有遮蔽地逃遁。 在所操勞的逃遁中有著在死面前的逃遁，亦即掉頭不看在世的終結。 這種「掉頭不看」... 其本身就是綻出將來的(ecstatic, futural)向終結存在的一種樣式。 沉淪的日常「此在」的非本真的時間性這樣對有終性掉頭不看，於是就必須錯識本真的將來狀態，從而也錯識一般時間性。 「表象」出來的是公共時間的「無終性」。 唯當流俗的「此在」領會是由常人(they)領導的，這種遺忘自身的「表象」才始得鞏固下來。 常人從不死；因為，只要死向來是我的而本真地只有藉先行的決心才能從生存上得到領會，常人就不可能死。 常人從不死並誤會著向終結的存在；然而它為在死面前逃遁提供出一種富有特徵的解釋。 到頭之前，「總還有時間」。 這裡昭示出的「有時間」的意義是能迷失：「現在先來這樣，然後馬上那樣，然後接下去…。」這裡不是時間的有終性得到領會，而是反過來。在這裡，操勞活動 意在從還在到來(still coming)、「繼續行進(goes on)」的時間裡盡可能地擇取。 時間公共地是每個人為自己獲取和能為自己獲取的東西。 現在序列源自於個別「此在」的時間性，而在日常共處中，被敉平的現在序列的這一來源始終完全不為識知。即使一個「在時間中」現成的人不再生存，這於「時間」的進程又何損毫呢？ 時間繼續行進，一如當時有人「出生」之際，時間也就已經曾經「存在」那樣。 人們只識公共時間；這種時間既已敉平，便屬於人人，亦即不屬於任何人。
But in what is this levelling down of world time and covering over of temporality grounded? In the being of Da-sein itself that we interpreted as care in a preparatory way. Thrown and entangled, Da-sein is initially and for the most part lost in what it takes care of. But in this lostness, the flight of Da-sein from its authentic existence that we characterized as anticipatory resoluteness makes itself known, and this is a flight that covers over. In such heedful fleeing lies the flight from death, that is, a looking away from the end of being-in-the-world.' This looking away from . .. is in itself a mode of the ecstatic, futural being toward the end. Looking away from finitude, the inauthentic temporality of entangled everyday Da-sein must fail to recognize authentic futurality and thus temporality in general. And if the vulgar understanding of Da-sein is guided by the they, then the self-forgetful "representation" of the "infinitude" of public time can first anchor itself. The they never dies because it is unable to die, since death is always my own and is understood authentically only in anticipatory resoluteness in an existentiell way. The they, which never dies and misunderstands being-toward-the-end, nonetheless interprets the flight from death in a characteristic way. Up to the end "it always has more time." Here a way of having time makes itself known in the sense of being able to lose it: "right now this, then that...". Here it is not as if the finitude of time were understood, but quite the opposite. Taking care is out to snatch as much as possible from time that is still coming and "goes on." Publically, time is something that everyone can and does take. The levelled-down succession of nows remains completely unrecognizable with regard to its provenance from the temporality of individual Da-sein in everyday being-with-one-another. How should that affect "time" in its course even in the least if a human being objectively present "in time" no longer exists? Time goes on as it already "was," after all, when a human being "entered life." One knows only public time that, levelled down, belongs to every-one, and that means to no one.
只不過，即使在閃避死之際，死也總跟著逃遁者，逃遁者在避棄之際也恰恰不得不看到死。 而正與此相同，即使那隻僅行進的、無關痛癢的、無終的現在序列也還是在一團觸目的謎氛中凌駕「此在」。 我們為什麼說時間逝去而不同樣強調時間生出？ 從純粹的現在序列著眼，兩種說法可以同樣有道理。 在時間逝去這話裡，「此在」對時間的領會歸根到底多於它所願承認的；亦即：世界時間在其中到時的時間性(temporality in which world time temporalizes)儘管多受遮蔽卻仍不是完全封閉著的。 時間逝去這話表達出了這樣一種「經驗」：無持守(cannot be halted)的時間。 而這種「經驗」則唯根據我們願讓時間駐留才是可能的。 這裡就有一種對諸「當下即是(moments)」的非本真的期備，這種期備連諸「當下即是」正在滑開也已經遺忘了。 非本真生存的這種有所當前化有所遺忘的期備是人們之所以可能以流俗方式經驗到時間逝去的條件。 因為「此在」在先行之際是將來的，所以它必定有所期備地把現在序列領會為滑開著逝去的現在序列。 「此在」從對其死的「逃遁的」知的方面識認逃道的時間。 強調時間逝去這話，也就是以公共方式反映出「此在」時間性的有終的將來狀態。 因為連時間逝去這話裡，死仍可能被遮蔽著，所以時間作為一種「自在(in itself)」的逝去顯現出來。
However, just as one who flees death is pursued by it even as one evades it, and just as in turning away from it one has to see it nonetheless, the harmless endless succession of nows that just runs on imposes itself "on" Da-sein in a remarkably enigmatic way. Why do we say that time passes away when we do not emphasize just as much how it comes into being? With regard to the pure succession of nows, both could, after all, be said with equal justification. In talking about time's passing away, Da-sein ultimately understands more about time than it would like to admit, that is, the temporality in which world time temporalizes itself is not completely closed off despite all covering over. Talking about time's passing away gives expression to the "experience" that time cannot be halted. This "experience" is again possible only on the basis of wanting to halt time. Herein lies an inauthentic awaiting of "moments" that already forgets the moments as they slip by. The awaiting of inauthentic existence that makes present and forgets is the condition of the possibility of the vulgar experience of time's passing away. Since Da-sein is futural in being ahead-of-itself, it must, in awaiting, understand the succession of nows as one that slips away and passes away. Da-sein knows fleeting time from the "fleeting" knowledge of its death. In the kind of talk that emphasizes time's passing away, the finite futurality of the temporality of Da-sein is publicly reflected. And since even in the talk about time's passing away death can remain covered over, time shows itself as a passing away "in itself."
但即使在這種自在逝去著的純粹現在序列中，源始時間(primordial time)仍然穿透一切敉平與遮蔽公開出來。 流俗解釋把時間流規定為一種不可逆轉的前後相續。時間為什麼不可逆轉？ 正是在這種盯著現在之流的眼界裡本來就看不出一一相續的現在為什麼不也會得在逆轉的方向上表現出來。 逆轉之所以不可能的根據在於：公共時間出自時間性，時間性的到時首要地是將來的，是以綻出方式向其終結“行進”的，也就是說，時間性的到時已經「是」向著終結的「存在」。
But even in this pure succession of nows passing away in itself, primordial time reveals itself in spite of all levelling down and covering over. The vulgar interpretation determines the flux of time as an irreversible succession. Why can time not be reversed? Especially when one looks exclusively at the flux of nows, it is incomprehensible in itself why the sequence of nows should not accommodate itself to the reverse direction. The impossibility of this reversal has its basis in the provenance of public time in temporality, whose temporalizing, primarily futural, "goes" ecstatically toward its end in such a way that it "is" already toward its end.
把時間當作一種無終的、逝去著的、不可逆轉的現在序列，這種流俗的時間描述源自沉淪著的「此在」的時間性。 流俗的時間表像有其自然權利。 它屬於「此在」的日常存在方式，屬於首先佔據統治地位的存在領會。 從而，歷史也首先與通常被公共地領會為時間內的演歷。 只有當這種時間解釋聲稱它所傳達的是「真正的」時間概念，聲稱它能夠為闡釋時間草描出唯一可能的視野，這種時間解釋才失去它唯一的與優先的權利。 已顯示的結果倒是：只有從「此在」的時間性及其到時(temporalizing)才能夠理解世界時間為什麼以及如何屬於時間性。 世界時間的全體結構都是從時間性汲取出來的；只有對這種來自時間性的全體結構的闡釋才能提供出一條線索，藉以“看到”流俗的時間概念所包含的一般遮蔽情況，藉以估價 時間性綻出視野的建構被敉平的情況。 而依據「此在」的時間性制定方向同時又使我們能夠展示這類敉平活動的遮蔽的來源與實際必然性並考驗關於時間的諸種流俗論題是否有道理有根據。
The vulgar characterization of time as an endless, irreversible succession of nows passing away arises from the temporality of entangled Da-sein. The vulgar representation of time has its natural justification. It belongs to the everyday kind of being of Da-sein and to the understanding of being initially prevalent. Thus even history is initially and for the most part understood publicly as an occurrence within time. This interpretation of time loses its exclusive and distinctive justification only if it claims to convey the "true" concept of time and to be able to sketch out the sole possible horizon for the interpretation of time. Rather, we found that only from the temporality of Da-sein and its temporalizing does it become intelligible why and how world time belongs to it. This interpretation of the complete structure of world time is drawn from temporality and gives us guidelines for "seeing" the covering over contained in the vulgar concept of time and for estimating how far the ecstatic and horizonal constitution of temporality has been levelled down. This orientation toward the temporality of Da-sein, however, at the same time makes it possible to demonstrate the provenance and the factical necessity of this covering over that levels down, and to examine the arguments for the vulgar theses on time.
相反，在流俗時間領會的視野中，時間性則倒轉過來成為不可通達的。 而因為現在式時間不僅就可能解釋的次序來說必須首要地依時間性制定方向，而且連它本身也只有在「此在」的非本真的時間性之中才到時，所以，我們著眼 於現在式時間來自於時間性而把時間性說成源始時間，也就是理所當然的。
On the other hand, temporality remains inaccessible in the horizon of the vulgar understanding of time. Not only must now-time be oriented primarily toward temporality in the order of possible interpretation, but it temporalizes itself only in the inauthentic temporality of Da-sein; so if we pay attention to the derivation of now-time from temporality we are justified in addressing temporality as primordial time.
綻出視野的時間性首要地從將來到時。 而流俗時間領會則在現在中看到基本的時間現象，而這個現在是從其全體結構切開的純現在，人們稱之為「當前(present)」。 由這裡可以得知，要從這種現在來澄清，甚至於來導出屬於時間性的、綻出視野的當下即是現象，在原則上必然不會有前途。 與此相應，從綻出方面領會的將來，即可定期的、含有意蘊的“而後”，與流俗的“將來”概念——其意義是還未來臨的和正恰來臨的純粹現在——是不相涵蓋的。 同樣，綻出的曾在狀態，即可定期的、有意蘊的“當時”，與已經過去的純粹現在這一意義上的過去概念也非一事。 現在不是由還不現在孕育的；而是當前在時間性到時的源始綻出統一中源自將來。
Ecstatic and horizonal temporality temporalizes itself primarily from the future. However, the vulgar understanding of time sees the fundamental phenomenon of time in the now, and indeed in the pure now, cut off in its complete structure, that is called the "present." One can gather from this that there is in principle no prospect of explaining or even deriving the ecstatic and horizonal phenomenon of the Moment that belongs to authentic temporality from this now. Thus the ecstatically understood future - the datable, significant "then" - does not coincide with the vulgar concept of the "future" in the sense of the pure nows that have not yet arrived and are only arriving. Nor does the ecstatic having-been, the datable, significant "on that former occasion," coincide with the concept of the past in the sense of the past pure nows. The now is not pregnant with the not-yet-now, but rather the present arises from the future in the primordial, ecstatic unity of the temporalizing of temporality.
雖然流俗的時間經驗首先與通常只識得“世界時間”，這種時間經驗都總同時使世界時間突出地與“心靈”和“精神”相關聯。 即使有時還遠遠不是明確地首要地依循哲學上的「主體」問題制定方向，情況仍是如此。 為此提出兩個富有特徵的證據大概就夠了：亞里斯多 - "心靈與心靈之努斯外就沒有任何東西自然地有計數禀賦，那麼 ，如果沒有心靈，時間就是不可能的""。又有奧古斯丁寫道："來，時間無非是一種延展，但我不知它是何種事物的延展。而它若不是心靈自身的延展，那倒令人驚異了"。所以，就連把「此在」當作時間性的詮釋原則上也並非處在流俗時間概念的視野之外。黑格爾就已經明確地嘗試提出流俗領會的時間同精神的聯繫；康德則相反，在他那裡，時間雖是“主觀的” ，卻不是與「我思」連結在一起，而是相互並列。我們前面把「此在」詮釋為時間性並且展示了世界時間是從時間性發源的；而黑格爾對時間與精神之 間的連結的明確論證頗適合用來間接地輪廓以上諸點。
Although, initially and for the most part, the vulgar experience of time knows only "world time," it nonetheless also always accords world time an eminent relation to "soul" and "spirit." And it does this even when an explicit and primary orientation toward philosophical questioning of the "subject" is absent. Two characteristic passages will suffice as evidence for this. Aristotle says: "ei de mèden allo pephuken arithmein e psychè kai psychès nous, adunaton einai chronon psychès mè ousès."'" And Augustine writes: "inde mihi visum est, nihil esse aliud tempus quam disten-tionem; sed cuius rei nescio; et mirum si non ipsius animi.!" Thus in principle the interpretation of Da-sein as temporality does not lie beyond the horizon of the vulgar concept of time. And Hegel made an explicit attempt to point out the way in which time, understood in the vulgar sense, is connected with spirit. For Kant, on the other hand, time is indeed "subjective," but stands unconnected "next to" the "I think." The grounds that Hegel explicitly gave for the connection between time and spirit are well suited for clarifying indirectly the foregoing interpretation of Da-sein as temporality and our exhibition of the origin of world time from it.