on Husserl 論胡塞爾

The existential beliefs (in question) are not doubted, or negated, but rather suspended: no use may be made of them. For this exercise, Husserl borrows the Greek term epoche (which is used in ancient sceptical discussions to refer to 'suspension of judgement' and, outside philosophy, literally translates as 'check' or 'hindrance').

（所討論的）存在主義信念並沒有被懷疑或否定，而是被懸置了：不能利用它們。在這個討論中，胡塞爾借用了希臘術語“epoche”（在古代懷疑論討論中用來指“暫停判斷”，在哲學之外，字面意思是“檢查”或“阻礙”）。

The epoche, according to Husserl, opens up the philosopher's proper domain of enquiry: his own 'pure consciousness', which remains available as an object of study even after all assumptions about the existence of the world and its contents have been bracketed. Like Descartes, Husserl regards the experience of one's own conscious states as indubitable: as Husserl often puts it, such experience provides evidence that is apodictic, whose falsity is inconceivable. Although I may doubt whether an experience accurately represents reality, I cannot doubt the experience as an appearance or 'phenomenon'.

根據胡塞爾的說法，epoche開闢了哲學家適當的探究領域：他自己的“純粹意識”，即使在所有關於世界及其內容的存在的假設都被括起來之後，它仍然可以作為研究對象。和笛卡兒一樣，胡塞爾認為一個人自己的意識狀態的經驗是不容置疑的：正如胡塞爾經常所說的那樣，這種經驗提供了絕對的證據，其虛假性是不可想像的。儘管我可能懷疑某種體驗是否準確地代表了現實，但我不能懷疑這種體驗作為一種表像或「現象」。


Sarah Richmond - in the INTRODUCTION to "The Transcendence of the Ego" of Jean-Paul Sartre.