存在與時間 - 海德格 Martin Heidegger, 1927.
Being and Time - Martin Heidegger, 1927.

第六章 時間性(Temporality)以及作為流俗(Vulgar)時間概念源頭的時間內狀態(Within-Timeness)
VI. Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time

第七十八節 前面的「此在」時間性分析之不充分
78. The Incompleteness of the Foregoing Temporal Analysis of Da-sein

為了指明時間性組建著以及如何組建「此在(Da-sein)」的存在，我們曾顯示： 歷史性(historicity)作為生存的存在建構歸根到底是時間性(temporality)。 在對歷史的時間性質進行闡釋的時候，我們沒有去考慮一切演歷都「在時間中」進行這一「事實」。

To demonstrate that and how temporality constitutes the being of Da-sein, we showed that historicity, as the constitution of being of existence, is "basically" temporality. Our interpretation of the temporal nature of history was carried out without regard to the "fact" that every occurrence runs its course "in time."

日常的「此在」領會實際上把所有歷史都只識認為「時間內的」演歷；在從生存論時間性(ontic-temporal)上分析歷史性的進程中還始終未談這種日常的領會。 如果說生存論分析工作恰恰要就「此在」的實際狀態來從存在論上透視「此在」，那麼，我們也就必須明確地把對歷史的實際的、「存在者層次上時間性上的」解釋所具有 的權力還給它。 因為除了歷史而外，自然進程也是「透過時間」得到規定的。 於是愈加有必要為存在者「在其中」照面的時間提供一種原則性的分析。 雖說在歷史科學與自然科學中都有「時間因素」出現這一境況是基本的，但「此在」先於一切專題研究就已經「計算時間」並且依照時間調整自己這一實情卻要來得更基本些 ，而在這裡，關鍵復又是「此在」“對它的時間”的那種“計算”，它領先於所有適合於規定時間的測量用具的使用。 計算走在用具前頭並從而才使鐘錶之類的使用成為可能。

In the course of the existential and temporal analysis of historicity, there was no room for the everyday understanding of Da-sein that factically knows all history only as an occurrence "within time." If the existential analytic is to make Da-sein ontologically transparent in its very facticity, the factical, "ontic-temporal" interpretation of history must also explicitly be given its due. It is all the more necessary that the time "in which" beings are encountered be given a fundamental analysis, since not only history, but natural processes, too, are determined "by time." However, more elemental than the circumstance that the "time factor" occurs in the sciences of history and nature, is the fact that, before all thematic investigation, Da-sein "reckons with time" and orients itself according to it. And here again the "reckoning" of Da-sein "with its time" remains decisive, the reckoning that precedes any use of instruments that are geared to determining time. The reckoning is prior to such instruments, and first makes possible something like the use of clocks.

各個「此在」實際生存之際「有」「時間」或「沒有時間」。 它「取得時間」或「留不下任何時間」。 「此在」為什麼要取得「時間」，為什麼會「失掉」時間？ 它從何處取得時間？ 這個時間與「此在」的時間性關係如何？實際「此在」計算時間而未從生存論領會時間。計算時間這種行為是基本的；在解答什麼叫「存在者存在在時間中」這個問題之前先須澄清這種行為。

Factically existing, actual Da-sein either "has" "time" or it "has none." It either "takes time" or "cannot take time." Why does Da-sein take "time" and why can it "lose" it? From where does it take time? How is this time related to the temporality of Da-sein? Factical Da-sein takes account of time without existentially understanding temporality. The elemental mode of behavior of reckoning with time must be clarified before we turn to the question of what it means that beings are "in time."

「此在」的一切行為都應從它的存在亦即從時間性來闡釋。應得顯示「此在」作為時間性是如何使得以計時方式與時間相關聯這樣一種做法到時的。 所以，前此對時間性特徵的描述不僅由於未曾把這一現象的各個維度都注意到，因而一般來說就是不充分的； 而且它在原則上也是殘缺不全的，因為從生存論時間性上 的世界概念的嚴格意義上看，時間性(temporality)本身就包含有世界時間(world time)這樣的東西。

All the modes of behavior of Da-sein are to be interpreted in terms of its being, that is, in terms of temporality. We must show how Da-sein as temporality temporalizes a mode of behavior that is related in such a way to time that it takes account of it. Our characterization of temporality up to now is thus not only generally incomplete, since we did not pay heed to all the dimensions of the phenomenon, but it has fundamental gaps in it because something like world time belongs to temporality itself, in the strict sense of the existential and temporal concept of world.

我們應該領會：這事如何可能以及為何必要。這將使我們明見存在者發生“在其中”的流俗所識的“時間”，並與此一道明見這一存在者的時間內狀態(within-timeness)。日常的、取獲時間的「此在」首先在世內照面的上手事物(in things at hand)與現成事物那裡發現時間。 它在切近的存在之領會的視野中領會以這種方式「經驗」到的時間，亦即把時間本身領會為某種現成事物。

We wish to understand how that is possible and why it is necessary. Thus we can throw light on the vulgarly familiar "time" "in which" beings occur, as well as the within-time-ness of these beings. Everyday Da-sein taking time initially finds time in things at hand and objectively present encountered within the world. It understands time thus "experienced" in the horizon of the understanding of being that is nearest to it, that is, as something that is itself somehow objectively present.

它如何以及為什麼形成這種流俗的時間概念，這要從操勞於時間的「此在」的存在建構得到澄清，而這建構本身又有其時間性上的根基。 流俗的時間概念淵源於源始時間(primordial time)的敉平。 待把流俗時間概念的這個源頭顯明，先前我們將時間性闡釋為源始的時間，也就不無道理了。

We must clarify how and why the development of the vulgar concept of time comes about in terms of the temporally grounded constitution of being of Da-sein taking care of time. The vulgar concept of time owes its provenance to a levelling down of primordial time. By demonstrating that this is the source of the vulgar concept of time, we shall justify our earlier interpretation of temporality as primordial time.

在流俗時間概念的成形過程中顯現出一種引人注目的游移(vacillation)：究竟應得把「主觀的」還是「客觀的」性質歸屬於時間呢？ 把它看作是自在存在的吧，它卻又顯著地歸於「心靈」；說它具有「意識」性質吧，然而卻又「客觀地」起作用。 在黑格爾對時間的詮釋中，這兩種可能性得到某種揚棄。 黑格爾試圖規定「時間」與「精神」之間的聯繫，以便藉此弄清楚為什麼精神作為歷史「落在時間之中」。 就結果來看，前面對「此在」時間性的詮釋以及對世界時間歸屬於「此在」時間性的詮釋似乎與黑格爾相似。

In the development of the vulgar concept of time, there is a remarkable vacillation as to whether a "subjective" or an "objective" character should be attributed to time. When one conceives it as being in itself, it is attributed primarily to the "soul." And when it has the character of "belonging to consciousness," it still functions "objectively." In Hegel's interpretation of time both possibilities are in a way elevated to a higher unity. Hegel attempts to determine the connection between "time" and "spirit" in order to make it intelligible why spirit, as history, "falls into time." In its results, the foregoing interpretation of the temporality of Da-sein and the way world time belongs to it seems to agree with Hegel.

但因為前面的時間分析從著手處與黑格爾有原則上的區別，而且這一分析的目標即基礎存在論的目的地也恰恰與他南轅北轍，所以，簡短地重現黑格爾對時間與 精神的關係的看法，可能有助於間接弄清楚我們對「此在」的時間性、對世界時間、對流俗時間概念的源頭的生存論存在論的闡釋，並可能有助於暫時了結這些闡釋。時間是否以及如何有一種「存在」？ 我們為什麼以及在何種意義上稱時間「存在」？ 只有顯示出在何種程度上時間性本身在其到時的整體性中使存在之領會與就存在者而談這回事成為可能，上面的問題才能得到回答。

But since our analysis of time is already distinguished from the outset in principle from that of Hegel, and since its orientation is precisely the opposite of his in that it aims at fundamental ontology, a short presentation of Hegel's interpretation of the relation between time and spirit can help to clarify indirectly our existential and ontological interpretation of the temporality of Da-sein, world time, and the origin of the vulgar concept of time and may conclude our discussion for now. The question as to whether and how time has any "being," why and in what sense we designate it as "being," cannot be answered until we have shown how temporality itself makes possible something like an understanding of being and addressing of beings in the whole of its temporalizing.