薩特 Sartre - 存在與虛無 Being and Nothingness

五、“自我”和唯我性的圈子, p. 142-143. MY SELF AND THE CIRCUIT OF IPSEITY, p.218

在《哲學研究》的一篇文章中，我們已經試圖指出，“自我”(Ego)並不 屬於“自為”(for-itself)。我們不準備再談這個問題。這裡，我們只要指出“自我”的超越性的原因:作為體驗 (Erlebnisse)的統一軸心，“自我”是“自在”(in-itself)， 而不是“自為”。如果它真的是“意識的一部分”，它本身在其直接的 半透明狀態中就會是自身的基礎 了。而這樣一來，它就有可能是它 所不可能是的而又不可能是它所可能是的，這決不是“我” 的存在方 式。實際上，我從“我” 那裡所得到的意識是永遠不會窮盡“我” 的，並且也不是這種意識使“我” 來到世界上:我總是如同已經在 那裡的東西先於意識而被給定的— 同時又是作為必須逐漸被揭示 的奧秘的擁有者而被給定的。因此，“自我”作為超越的“自在”，作為人 的世界的一個存在者而不是作為意識的存在者向意識顯現。但是，不應由此而得出結論說，“自為”是一種純粹無人稱的沈思。

I tried to show, in an article in Recherches Philosophiques, that the Ego does not belong to the domain of the for-itself. We do not need to return to that. Let us merely note the reason for the Ego's transcendence: as the unifying pole of the "Erlebnisse," the Ego is in-itself, not for-itself. If it were "of consciousness," it would be its own foundation of itself, within the translucency of the immediate. But in that case it would be what it was not, and would not be what it was — which is not the mode of being of the "I." In fact, my consciousness of my "I" can never exhaust it, and neither does it bring it into existence: the "I" is always given as having been there first and, at the same time, as possessing depths that will gradually be disclosed. In this way, the Ego appears to consciousness as a transcendent in-itself, as an existent of the human world and not as [something] of consciousness. - But it would be a mistake to conclude that the for-itself is purely and simply an "impersonal" contemplation.

只不過，“自我”遠不是一種意識的人格化的極，意識沒有它就始終停留在無人稱的階段。相反，“自我”是在其根本的使“自我”得以顯現的“自我”性中的 意識，在某種條件下就像在這個“自我”性的超越現象中情況都是一樣。我們已知道，實際上不可能說“自在”是“自我”。它存在，如此而已。在這個意義上講，人們錯誤地使“我” 成為意識的寓居者。人 們會說，它是意識的“我”，但它不是其固有的“自我”。因此，由於 “自為”的被反思的存在被實體化為“自在”，人們就固定並且摧毀了對 於 “自我”的反思運動，意識是對“自我”的純粹回轉，如同對其自身的回轉一樣。但是，“自我”並不回轉到任何東西上去，人們已經把反思性的關係改造成為一種簡單的向心關係，而且中心是一個不透明的紐結。相反，我們曾指出過，“自我”原則上是不能寓於意識的。

It is simply that, far from the Ego being the personalizing pole of a consciousness that would, without it, remain at the impersonal stage, it is consciousness, on the contrary that, in its fundamental ipseity, enables the Ego to appear in certain conditions as the transcendent phenomenon of that ipseity. In fact, as we have seen, it is not possible to say, of the in-itself, that it is itself. It is, quite simply. And similarly, we should say of the "I" - which is quite incorrectly regarded as an inhabitant of consciousness — that it is the "Me" of consciousness, but not that it is its own self or itself. Thus, by hypostasizing the for-itself's reflected-being into an in-itself, we freeze and destroy the movement of reflection on the self: consciousness will refer purely to the Ego as its self, but the Ego will no longer refer to anything; the relation of reflection has been transformed into a simple centripetal relation whose center, moreover, is an opaque node. We have shown, on the contrary that, by definition, no self or itself can inhabit consciousness.

可以說，它是無限運動的理性，通過這理性，反映轉向反映者，而反映 者也轉向反映;歸根結底，它是一種理想，一種界限。而使它作為 界限湧現的，就是在作為存在類型的存在統一之中，存在對於存在在場的“虛無”化實在。這樣，一旦它湧現，意識就通過反思的“虛無”化的純粹運動，使自己成為有人稱的:因為，賦予存在以個人存在的東西，並不是對“自我”的擁有——它只不過是個人的標誌——而是作為對“自我”的在場而“自為”地存在的事實。但是，這反思的第一個運動由此又引起第二個運動或引起“自我”性。在“自我”性中，我的可能在我 的意識內被反思，而且我的可能把意識規定為它所是的。“自我”性代 表著一種比反思“自我”的純粹“對“自我”的在場” 更加深入的“虛無”化階段，因此，我所是的可能不是作為反映著的反映的對“自為”的在場，而是一種不在場的在場。但是，這種作為“自為”存在結構的回轉的存 在事實還沒有被清楚地指明。“自為”是此之在的“自我”，在能及範圍之外，在遠離其可能性的地方。但正是這個此之在的存在的自由必然性，人們在欠缺的形式下所是的東西才構成了“自我”性或人的第二種 基本形態。

It is, if you like, the reason for the infinite movement through which the reflection refers to the reflecting, and this latter to the reflection; it is by definition an ideal, a limit. And what makes it arise as a limit is the nihilating reality of being's presence to being, as a type of being within the unity of being. In this way, consciousness, from the moment it arises, makes itself personal through the pure nihilating movement of reflection: for it is not the possession of an Ego - which is only the sign of a personality - that confers personal existence on a being but rather the fact of existing for oneself as self-presence. But, in addition, this first reflective movement leads to a second movement, to ipseity. Within ipseity, my possible casts its reflection onto my consciousness and defines it as what it is. Ipseity represents a degree of nihilation that goes further than the pure self-presence of the prereflective cogito, insofar as the possible that I am is not a presence to the for-itself (in the way that the reflection relates to the reflecting) but is a presence-absence. But this underlines the existence of referral as the structure of the for-itself's being even more clearly. The for-itself is itself over there, out of reach, in the distance of its possibilities. And this free necessity to be over there what one is, in the form of a lack, is what constitutes ipseity, or the second essential aspect of a person.

那麼，如果不是對“自我”的自由關係，我們如何來定義個人呢? 至於世界，也就是存在的整體，因為存在在“自我”的圈子里存在，那它就只能是人的實在向著“自我”所超越的東西，或者可借用海德格爾的定義: “人的實在由之出發而顯示出自己所是的東西。” 可能實際上是我的可能，它“自為”地是可能，就像面對“自在”的在場、(對)“自在”(的)意識一樣。面對世界我尋找的，是與我所是的、即(對)世界(的)意識的“自為”重合。但是，這個對現在的意識是非正題地(non-thetically)不在場-在場(present-absent)的可能並不以位置的意識的對象名義而在場，否則，它就是被反思的。被滿足的乾渴糾纏著我的現時的乾渴，它不是作為被滿足的乾渴的(對)“自我”(的 )意識 : 它是對被喝的杯子(glass-being-drunk-from)的正題意識(thetic consciousness)，而且是(對) “自我”(的 )非位置意識(non-positional consciousness)。

And how indeed should we define a person, other than as a free relationship to himself? As for the world —i.e., the totality of beings as they exist within the circuit of ipseity - it cannot be anything but what human-reality surpasses toward itself or, to borrow Heidegger's definition: "That on the basis of which human-reality becomes acquainted with what it is." In effect, the possible that is my possible is a possible for-itself and, as such, it is present to the in-itself as consciousness of the in-itself. In confronting the world, what I seek is to coincide with a for-itself that I am, which is a consciousness of the world. But this possible, which is non-thetically present-absent to my present consciousness, is not present like an object of positional consciousness — otherwise it would be reflected. The satisfied thirst that haunts my current thirst is not a consciousness (of) self as a satisfied thirst: it is a thetic consciousness of the glass-being-drunk-from and a non-positional consciousness (of) self.

它於是向著它就是其意識的杯子而“自我”超越，被喝的杯子作為這種非正題可能意識的相關物糾纏著作為其可能的滿溢的杯子並且把它構成為待喝的杯子(glass for drinking from)。這樣，世界從本質上講是我的世界，因為它是“虛無” 的“自在”相關物，也就是我在建立自身為在應該是的形式 下我所是的東西時所超出的必然障礙的“自在”相關物。沒有世界，就沒有“自我”性，就沒有個人; 沒有“自我”性，沒有個人，就沒有世界。然而世界與個人之間的這種所有關係決不是在反思前的我思範圍內被確立 的。說由於世界被認識，因而它是像我的世界那樣被認識，那是荒謬的。可是，這個世界的“一半”都是一種稍縱即逝並且始終是如我所見那樣顯現的結構。世界是我的世界，因為它被我所是的(對)“自我”(的)可能意識是其意識的一些可能糾纏著，正是這樣的可能 給予世界以世界的統一和意義。

It is therefore transcended toward the glass of which it is conscious and, as the correlative of this possible non-thetic consciousness, the glass-drunk-from haunts the full glass as its possible and constitutes it as a glass for drinking from. Thus the world, in its nature, is mine insofar as it is the in-itself correlative of nothingness; in other words, the correlative of the necessary obstacle, beyond which I rediscover myself as what I am in the form of "having it to be." Without the world there would be no ipseity, and no person; without ipseity, and without the person, there would be no world. But the world's belonging to the person is never posited at the level of the prereflective cogito. It would be absurd to say that the world, insofar as it is known, is known as mine. And yet this "mine-ness" of the world is a fugitive and ever present structure that I live. The world (is) mine because it is haunted by possibles, of which the possible [acts of] consciousness (of) self that I am are conscious, and it is these possibles as such that give the world its unity and its meaning as a world.

對否定行為和自欺的考察已使我們可以進人對我思的本體論研究，而我思的存在就像“自為”的存在一樣對我們顯現出來了。這種存在在我們的注視下已經向著價值和可能超越了，我們不能使它置於 笛卡爾我思的瞬間性的實體論的界限之內。而正是由於這點，我們才不能滿足於我們剛剛得到的結果: 我思之所以拒絕接受瞬間性，並向其可能超越，是因為它只能存在於時間的超越之中。正是在時 間中，“自為”才以“不是” 的方式是它自身的可能;正是在時間中，我的諸種可能才在它們構成我的世界的範圍內顯現出來。所以，如果人的實在本身被看作是時間的，如果其超越的意義是它的時間性，那麼，我們就只能指望“自為”的時間在我們描述、規定“時間”的意義之前被闡明。只是在這個時候，我們才能著手研究那個我們關注的問題: 即意識與存在的原始關係的問題。

Our examination of negative forms of behavior and of bad faith has allowed us to make a start on the ontological study of the cogito, and the cogito's being has appeared to us as being-for-itself. Before our eyes, this being has transcended itself, toward value and toward its possibles; we have not been able to contain it within the substantialist limits of instantaneity that belong to Descartes's cogito. But, precisely for that reason, we cannot be content with the results we have just obtained: if the cogito rejects instantaneity, and if it transcends itself toward its possibles, a temporal surpassing is required. It is "in time" that the for-itself is its own possibles in the mode of "not being"; it is in time that my possibles appear at the horizon of the world which they make into "mine." If, therefore, human-reality grasps itself as temporal, and if the meaning of its transcendence is its temporality, we cannot hope to elucidate the for-itself's being until we have described and established the meaning of the Temporal. It is only then that we will be able to turn to the problem that concerns us: the problem of consciousness's original relation to being.

第二章: 時間性 - TEMPORALITY
一、三維時間的現象學 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE THREE TEMPORAL DIMENSIONS

B)現在, p. 163-167; THE PRESENT p,237-241
與“自在”的過去不同，現在是“自為”。現在的存在是什麼呢?這裡 有一個屬於現在的二律背反: 一方面，人們樂於用存在給它下定義;這是相對 於尚未存在的將來，相對於已不復存在的過去而言的。但是另一方面，也有一種嚴格的分析，企圖把現在從非現在的一切中分離出來，就是說從過去、從最近的將來中分離出來，這樣 的分析將可能僅僅得到一個極其短暫的時刻，即如胡塞爾在 《時間內在意識的教程》 一書中所指出的那樣，一種被推至無限分裂的理想極限就是虛無。因此，每當我們用一種新觀點來研究人的實在的 時候，我們都會發現不可分割的 一對: 存在與“虛無”。

Unlike the past, which is in-itself, the present is for-itself. What is its being? The present has its own antinomy: on the one hand, we readily describe it in terms of being: what is present is opposed to the future, which is not yet, and also to the past, which is no longer. But, on the other hand, a strict analysis that aimed to rid the present of everything it is not — ie., its immediate past and future — would in fact find nothing more than an infinitesimal instant, which is to say, as Husserl observes in his Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, the ideal term of an infinitely pursued division: a nothingness. Thus, as on every occasion when we approach the study of human-reality from a new point of view, we find ourselves back with this indissoluble pair: Being and Nothingness.

現在的意義是什麼呢?很清楚，現在存在著的東西，就其現時 的性質而言，是區別於其它一切存在的。當點名的時候，士兵或學生回答說: “到!” 其意義就是“Adsum” (在)。而這個“到” 字是與不在場，也是與過去相對立的。因此，現在的意義，就是面對 ...在場。所以，我們就該問一間，現在面對什麼在場，誰又是現在的? 這大概能使我們去廓清現在的存在的意義。

What is the primary meaning of the present? Clearly, what distinguishes anything existing in the present from any other existence is its character of presence. When the register is called, the soldier or the pupil replies "Present!" in the sense of "adsum." And the opposite of present can be absent, just as much as past. Thus the meaning of present is "presence to..." We ought therefore to ask to what is the present a presence? And who is present? These questions will doubtless lead us now to elucidate the very being of the present.

我的現在，就是在場。面對什麼在場呢?是對這張桌子、這個房間、對巴黎、對界，簡言之，是對“自在”的存在而言的。但是，反過來說，“自在”的存在是否面對我在場、對它所不是的“自在”的存在在場呢?假定是這樣的話，那就成了各種在場的一種相互關係了。 然而很容易看到，它全然不是那樣的。面對...的在場是存在的一種內在關係，這存在是與它對之在場的諸種存在同在的。在任何情況下，這都不會是一種簡單的外部接近的關係。面對......在場意味著“自我”之外的與...接近的存在。凡是可以面對...在場的東西，就應當這樣地在其存在之中，在其存在之中有一種存在與其它諸種 存在的關係。我只有通過一種綜合的本體關係與這把椅子聯結起來，只有當我在那里，在這把椅子的存在中是以一個不是這椅子的身份而存在著的情況下我才能夠面對這把椅子在場。面對...在場的存在因此不能是靜止的 ““自在””，“自在”不能是現在的，也不能是業已過去的: 它存在，如此而已。關鍵不在於一個“自在”與另一“自在”的某種同時性，除非從某種存在的觀點來看此問題; 這一存在將與兩個“自在”同在，而且在其本身中有在場的能力。

My present is being present. Present to what? To this table, to this bedroom, to Paris, to the world — in short, to being-in-itself. But, inversely, is being-in-itself present to me, and to the rest of being-in-itself? If so, the present would be a reciprocal relation between presences. But, as we can easily see, it is nothing of the kind. Presence to... is an internal relation between the present being and the beings to which it is present. In no case can it be a matter of a mere external relation of contiguity. Presence to... means existence outside itself, alongside... Anything that can be present to... must be in its being such as to have within it a relationship of being with other beings. I can be present to this chair only if I am unified with it in an ontological relation of synthesis, only if I am over there, in the being of this chair as not being this chair. A being that is present to... cannot therefore repose "in-itself"; the in-itself cannot be present, any more than it can be past; it is, quite simply. There can be no question of any one in-itself existing in some kind of simultaneity alongside another in-itself - other than from the point of view of a being who was co-present to the two in-itselfs, and who had its own capacity for presence.

因此，現在只能是“自為”對“自在”的存在的在場。這在場不是一偶然事件或一伴隨事件的結果;相反，它是以一切伴隨事件為前提的，而且應是“自為”的一種本體論的結構。在人的實在作為一種顯現而出沒的世界中，這張桌子應該面對這把椅子在場。換句話說，人們不會設想有那麼一種存在，它首先是“自為”以便繼而面對存在在場。然而“自為”在使自己成為“自為”的過程之中就使自己面對存在在場了，而且當它停止成為“自為” 的時候也就停止了它的在場。這種“自為”被定義為對存在的在場。

Therefore the present can only be the for-itself's presence to being-in-itself. And this presence cannot be the outcome of some accident, of concomitance: on the contrary, any concomitance presupposes it, and presence must be an ontological structure of the for-itself. This table must be present to this chair in a world haunted by human-reality in the form of a presence. In other words, we cannot conceive of a type of existent that exists first as for-itself in order afterward to be present to being. Rather, the for-itself makes itself present to being in making itself be for-itself, and it ceases to be presence when it ceases to be for-itself. The for-itself's presence to being defines it.

那麼，“自為”是使自己面對何種存在在場的呢?回答是明確的: “自為”是面對整個的“自在”存在在場的。或者毋寧說，正是“自為”的在場 使得“自在”的存在作為總體存在。這是因為，恰恰是通過面對存在之為存在的在場的方式，沒有任何可能可使“自為”面對一個特的存在的在場勝過於面對所有其它存在的在場。即使其存在的人為性使得此之在優於在別處，此之在也並非是現在的。此之在的存在僅僅決定一種角度，根據這個角度實現著面對“自在”之整體的在場。因而“自為”就使得諸存在都是為著同一個在場。諸存在被揭示為在一個世界上的共同在場;在這個世界上，通過名為在場的“自我”的全部出神的犧牲，自把這些存在與它自身的融為一體。在“自為”做出犧牲“之 前” 我們既不可能說諸種存在共同存在著的，也不能說它們是分別存在著的。但是，“自為”是現在賴以進入世界的存在。世界的諸種存 在實際上都是共同在場的，因為同一個“自為”同時又面對所有的存在在場。因此，人們通常稱之為現在的東西，對於諸“自在”而言，是與 它們的存在迥然相異的，儘管除此以外它什麼也不是 :這僅僅是在一個“自為”向諸存在顯現時“自為”與諸存在的共同在場。

To which being does the for-itself make itself a presence? The answer is clear: the for-itself is present to being-in-itself as a whole. Or rather the for-itself's presence makes it the case that there is a totality of being-in-itself. Indeed, by this very mode of presence to being in its capacity of being, any possibility of the for-itself being more present to some favored being than to other beings is set aside. Even if the facticity of the for-itself's existence means it is there - rather than elsewhere — to be there is not to be present. Being-there only determines the perspective from which the presence to the totality of the in-itself takes place. The for-itself thereby brings it about that the beings are for one same presence. The beings are disclosed as co-present in a world in which the for-itself unites them with its own blood through the complete ecstatic sacrifice of itself that we know as "presence." "Before" the for-itself's sacrifice it would have been impossible to say any beings existed - either together or separately. But the for-itself is the being through whom the present enters the world; effectively, worldly beings are co-present insofar as the same for-itself is present to them all at the same time. Thus what we ordinarily describe as "present," in the case of in-itself beings, is to be clearly distinguished from their being, even though it is nothing more: it is merely their co-presence insofar as a for-itself is present to them.

我們現在知道了誰在場，以及現在是對什麼而言才是現在。然而，在場又是什麼呢?

We know now who is present and to what the present is present. But what is presence?

我們曾經看到，這不可能是兩種存在的純粹的共存，如同外在性的 一種簡單的關係，因為它需要第三項才能確立起這種共存。這個第三項存在於世內諸事物的共存之內: 正是因為在使自身與一切事物共同在場的過程中建立了這種共存。但是，在“自為”面對“自在”的存在在場的情況下，那就不會有第三項。沒有任何證人，即使上帝也不能建立它，“自為”本身只有這種在場業已存在時才能認識它。儘管如此，在場不能以“自在”的方式而存在的。這意味著，“自為”從一開始就面對存在在場，因為就其自身而言它就是共同在場的證明。我們該如何理解這一點呢?人們知道“自為”是以作 其存在的證人的方式而存在的。因此，如果“自為”是蓄意要在“自我”之外趨向這一存在的話，那“自為”就面對這個存在在場。“自為”應該盡可能緊密地和存在結 合起來，然而又不與之同一化。

We have seen that it cannot be the pure coexistence of two existents, conceived as a mere relation of externality, because a third term would be required, in order to establish this coexistence. This third term exists in the case of things' coexistence in the midst of the world: what establishes their coexistence is the for-itself, as it makes itself co-present to all of them. But in the case of the for-itself's presence to being-in-itself, there can be no third term. No witness - not even God - can establish this presence; even the for-itself cannot know it unless it already is. Nonetheless, it cannot have the in-itself's mode of being. In other words, the for-itself is originarily presence to being insofar as it is its own witness of coexistence, in relation to itself. How should we understand this? We know that the for-itself is the being whose existence takes the form of witnessing its own being. Now the for-itself is present to being if it is intentionally directed outside itself on to that being. And it has to stick as closely to being as possible, short of identification.

我們將在下一章中看到這種結合是現實性的，因為“自為”是在與存在的原始聯繫之中誕生於“自我”的 :它是對自身而言的“自我”見證，猶如它不是這一存在那樣。鑒於此，“自為”是脫離自身的、趨向存在，寓於存在之中卻又不是這一存在。進而言之，這就是我們能夠從在場的意義本身所推斷出來的東西: 對某一存在的在場意味著人們用一種內在性的關係同這一存在相聯，否則，在場和存在的任何聯繫都將是可能的; 但這種內在性的聯繫是否定性的，它否認現時的存在是它面對其在場的存在。若非如 此，內在性的聯繫就會消散成純粹的同一性了。因此，“自為”對存在的在場意味著“自為”是面對存在的“自我”見證，又好像並非是存在;對存在的在場就是“自為”的在場，因“自為”並不存在，這是由於否定並不是有關把“自為”與存在區分開來的一種存在方式的差異，而是有關一 種存在的差異，這就是當人們說“現在不存在” 的時候所要表達的。

We will see in the following chapter that this adherence is realist, by virtue of the for-itself's being born to itself in an original connection with being: it bears witness to itself of itself as not being that being. And it is thereby outside itself - on being and in being - as not being this being. Moreover, we can infer this from the very meaning of presence: our presence to any being implies that we are linked to that being by an internal connection; otherwise no link between the present and being would be possible. But this internal connection is negative: it denies, with respect to a present being, that it is that being to which it is present. Otherwise the internal connection would disappear into a straightforward identification. Thus the for-itself's presence to being implies that the for-itself bears witness to itself, in the presence of being, as not being that being: presence to being is the for-itself's presence, insofar as it is not. That is because the negation does not bear on a difference in a way of being — which might distinguish the for-itself from being - but on a difference in being. We can express this concisely by saying that the present is not.

那麼，現在和“自為”的這個非存在又意味著什麼呢?為了把握這一點，就必須再回到“自為”及其存在方式的問題上來並且簡略地描述它與存在之間的本體論關係。人們永遠不可能談論真實的“自為”: 例如當人們說現在是九點鐘了，從這個意義上講，“自為”存在著，這意思就是說，在此時存在與自身完全相合，它提出並取消著“自我”而且提供出被動性的種種外表。這是因為“自為”有著一種與反映的見證相 聯袂的表面之存在，這種反映又回到某種反映物上去，儘管它沒有任何對象可使其反映成為反映。“自為”沒有存在，這是因為它的存在 總是與它有距離的，如果您考慮顯象的話，它就在那裡的反映物中，僅僅對於反映物而言是顯象或反映; 而如果您考慮反映物不再是“自在”，而僅僅是一種把這一反映反映出來的純粹功能的話，它就在彼處的反映之中。

What does this non-being of the present and of the for-itself mean? To grasp this we must return to the for-itself, to its mode of existing, and briefly sketch a description of its ontological relationship to being. We can never say of the for-itself as such that it is, in the sense in which, for example, we can say: "It is nine o'clock," which is to say in the sense of being's total self-adequation, which posits and eliminates the "itself," and offers the outward appearance of passivity. For this reason, the for-itself exists as an appearance, paired with a witness of a reflection, and the reflection refers to a reflecting, without there being any object whose reflection could be the reflection. The for-itself does not have being because its being is always at a distance: over there, in the reflecting, if you are considering the appearance, which is an appearance or reflection only for the reflecting; over there, in the reflection, if you are considering the reflecting which, in itself, is purely the function of reflecting this reflection.

但此外，“自為”在其自身中並不是存在，因為它自身潛在地成為“自為”，而又好像並非是存在。它是對…的意識，如同是對…..的內在否定。意向性和“自我”性的基礎結構，就是否 定，如同“自為”對於事物的內在關係一樣; 從作為這一事物的否定的事物出發，“自為”從外部“自我”確立，因此，“自為”與“自在”的存在的最初 的關係就是否定，它以“自為”的方式“存在”，就是說如同分散的存在物那樣，因為它並不對自己把自己揭示為存在。它以內在的分解和明確的否定加倍地逃脫存在。現在恰恰就是存在的這種否定，就是存在的這種逃遁，因為存在是作為人們由之逃脫出來的地方，而在那裡的。“自為”是以逃遁的方式對存在顯現的，對於存在而言，現 在永遠是一種逃遁。

But in addition, the for-itself, taken by itself, is not being — because it explicitly makes itself be for-itself as not being being. It is consciousness of... as the inner negation of.. The basic structure of intentionality and of ipseity is negation, as an internal relation of the for-itself to a thing; the for-itself is constituted outside itself, on the basis of the thing, as the negation of that thing; in this way, its first relationship with being in itself is negation; it "is" in the mode of the for-itself, i.e., as an existent which, insofar as it is revealed to itself as not being being, is dispersed. It doubly escapes being, through its inner disintegration and through its explicit negation. And the present is precisely this negation of being, this escape from being insofar as being is there, as what we escape from. The for-itself is present to being in the form of flight; the present is a constant flight in the face of being.

這樣我們就明確了現在的最初意義: 現在不存在; 現在的瞬間源於“自為”的一種正在實現的、物化的概念，正是這種概念導致以一種是其所是的方式表現“自為”並且“自為”面對其在場。 比如說，以表面上的措針的方式表現“自為”。在這種意義上說，對“自為”而言，說現在是九點鐘，那將是荒唐的; 但是，“自為”可以面對指 著九點鐘的分針在場。這就是人們謬稱為現在的東西，就是現在面對其在場的存在。以瞬間的方式去把握現在是不可能的，因為瞬 間是現在在其中存在的時刻。然而現在不存在，它以逃遁的方式現 時化。

Thus we have clarified the primary meaning of the present: the present is not; the present instant comes from a reifying and actualizing conception of the for-itself; this conception leads to the practice of denoting the for-itself by means of what is, and of what it is present to — for example, by this hand on the dial. In this sense, it would be absurd to say that, for the for-itself, it is nine o'clock; rather, the for-itself can be present to a hand that points at nine o'clock. What we incorrectly refer to as "the present" is the being to which the present is presence. It is impossible to grasp the present in the form of an instant, because the instant would have to be the moment at which the present is. Yet the present is not; it is presentified in the form of flight.

但是，現在並不僅僅是對“自為”進行現時化的非存在。作為“自為”，它有著在其前後的脫離自身的存在。在其後，是說它曾是其過去， 而在其前，則是說它將是它的未來。它逃脫於與之共同在場的存在之外，還逃脫於它曾經是的又朝著它將要是的存在的存在。因為它 是現在，它並不是它所是的 (過去)，而它又是它所不是的 (將 來)。這樣我們就被推到將來的問題上來了。

But the present is not only the for-itself's presentifying non-being. As for-itself, it has its being outside, in front of and behind itself. Behind it, it was its past; and in front of it, it will be its future. It is the flight out of co-present being and away from the being that it was, toward the being that it will be. As present, it is not what it is (past) and it is what it is not (future). We are hereby directed to the Future.


【文本來源： 存在与虚无 修订译本 ［法］萨特 著 陈宣良 等译 杜小真校, 2014
Being and Nothingness - An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology： Jean-Paul Sartre Translated by Sarah Richmond, 2021】