聖奧斯定懺悔錄 卷十一，14-28
Saint Augustine: Confessions, Book XI, Time and Eternity, 14-28

十四

時間究竟是什麼？誰能輕易概括地說明它？誰對此有明確的概念，能用言語表達出來？可是在談話之中，有什麼比時間更常見，更熟悉呢？我們談到時間，當然瞭解，聽別人談到時間，我們也領會。

那末時間究竟是什麼？沒有人問我，我倒清楚，有人問我，我想說明，便茫然不解了。但我敢自信地說，我知道如果沒有過去的事物，即沒有過去的時間；沒有來到的事物，也沒有將來的時間，並且如果什麼也不存在，則也沒有現在的時間。

既然過去已經不在，將來尚未來到，則過去和將來這兩個時間怎樣存在呢？現在如果永久是現在，便沒有時間，而是永恆。現在的所以成為時間，由於走向過去；那末我們怎能說現在存在呢？現在所以在的原因是即將不在；因此，除非時間走向不存在，否則我便不能正確地說時間不存在。

What is time? Who can explain this easily and briefly? Who can comprehend this even in thought so as to articulate the answer in words? Yet what do we speak of, in our familiar everyday conversation, more than of time? We surely know what we mean when we speak of it. We also know what is meant when we hear someone else talking about it. What then is time? Provided that no one asks me, I know. If I want to explain it to an inquirer, I do not know. But I confidently affirm myself to know that if nothing passes away, there is no past time, and if nothing arrives, there is no future time, and if nothing existed there would be no present time. Take the two tenses, past and future. How can they 'be' when the past is not now present and the future is not yet present? Yet if the present were always present, it would not pass into the past: it would not be time but eternity. If then, in order to be time at all, the present is so made that it passes into the past, how can we say that this present also 'is'? The cause of its being is that it will cease to be. So indeed we cannot truly say that time exists except in the sense that it tends towards non-existence.

十五

我們說時間長短，只能對過去或將來而言。長的過去，臂如我們說百年之前，長的將來，譬如說百年之後；短的過去，譬如說十天之前，短的將來，譬如說十天之後。但不存在的時間怎能有長短呢？因為過去已經不存在，而將來尚未存在。為此，我們不要說：時間是長的；對於過去的時間，只能說： 曾是長的；對將來的時間，只能說：將是長的。

我的天主，我的光明，這裡你是否又要笑世人了？過去的時間，長在已經過去，還是長在尚未過去之時？一樣東西能有長短，才能是長是短。既然過去，已不存在，既不存在，何有長短？

因此，我們不要說：過去的時間曾是長的；因為一過去，即不存在，我們便找不到有長度的東西了；那末我們更好說：這個現在的時間曾是長的。因為時間的長短在乎現在；既然尚未過去，尚未不存在，因此能有長短，過去後就人於無何有之鄉，也就沒有長短可言了。

我的靈魂，你該追究一下，現在的時間能不能是長的，因為你有辨別快慢、衡量快慢的能力。你將怎樣答復我呢？

現在的一百年是不是長的時間？先研究一下，一百年能否全部是現在？如果當前是第一年，即第一年屬於現在，而九十九年屬於將來，尚未存在；如果當前是第二年，則第一年已成過去，第二年屬於現在，其餘屬於將來。一百年中不論把哪一年置於現在，在這一年之前的便屬於過去，以後的屬於將來。為此一百年不能同時都是現在的。

再看當前的一年是否現在呢？如果當前是正月，則其餘十一月都屬將來；如果當前是二月，則正月已成過去，其餘十個月尚未來到。因此，即使當前的一年也並非全部屬於現在，既非全部現在，則這一年也不是現在的。因為一年十二個月，當前不論是哪一個月，僅僅這一個月是現在，其餘十一個月或已成過去，或屬於將來。況且當前的一個月也不能說是現在，只有一天，如是第一天，則其餘都屬將來，如是末一天，則其餘都是過去，如是中間一天，則介乎過去和將來之間。

現在的時間，我們認為僅有可以稱為長的時間，已經勉強收縮到一天。我們再研究一下，就是這麼一天也不是整個是現在的。日夜二十四小時，對第一小時而言，其餘都屬將來，對最後一小時而言，則其餘已成過去，中間的任何一小時，則前有過去，後有將來。而這一小時，也由奔走遁逃的分子所組成，凡飛馳而去的，便是過去，留下的則是將來。設想一個小得不能再分割的時間，僅僅這一點能稱為現在，但也迅速地從將來飛向過去，沒有瞬息伸展。一有伸展，便分出了過去和將來：現在是沒有絲毫長度的。

那末我們能稱為長的時間在哪裡呢？是否將來的時間？對於將來我們不能說它是長的，因為可以名為長的時間尚未存在。那末我們只能說：將是長的。但對當前而言，既然屬於將來，不能是長的，因為還不可能有長短。假如說從尚未存在的將來，開始存在，即將成為現在，能有長的屬性，這時間才是長的，則我們上面已經聽到，現在的時間正在高喊說它不可能是長的。

xv (18) Nevertheless we speak of 'a long time' and 'a short time', and it is only of the past or the future that we say this. Of the past we speak of 'a long time', when, for example, it is more than a hundred years ago. 'A long time' in the future may mean a hundred years ahead. By 'a short time ago' we would mean, say, ten days back, and 'a short time ahead' might mean 'in ten days' time'. But how can something be long or short which does not exist? For the past now has no existence and the future is not yet. So we ought not to say of the past 'It is long', but 'it was long', and of the future "it will be long'. My Lord, my light, does not your truth mock humanity at this point? This time past which was long, was it long when it was past or when it was still present? It could be long only when it existed to be long. Once past, it no longer was. Therefore it could not be long if it had entirely ceased to exist. Therefore let us not say "The time past was long'. For we cannot discover anything to be long when, after it has become past, it has ceased to be. But let us say "That time once present was long' because it was long at the time when it was present. For it had not yet passed away into non-existence. It existed so as to be able to be long. But after it had passed away, it simultaneously ceased to be long because it ceased to be.

(19) Human soul, let us see whether present time can be long. To you the power is granted to be aware of intervals of time, and to measure them. What answer will you give me? Are a hundred years in the present a long time? Consider first whether a hundred years can be present. For if the first year of the series is current, it is present, but ninety-nine are future, and so do not yet exist. If the second year is current, one is already past, the second is present, the remainder lie in the future. And so between the extremes, whatever year of this century we assume to be present, there will be some years before it which lie in the past, some in the future to come after it. It follows that a century could never be present. Consider then whether if a single year is current, that can be present. If in this year the first month is current, the others lie in the future; if the second, then the first lies in the past and the rest do not yet exist. Therefore even a current year is not entirely present; and if it is not entirely present, it is not a year which is present. A year is twelve months, of which any month which is current is present; the others are either past or future. Moreover, not even a month which is current is present, but one day. If the first day, the others are future; if the last day, the others are past; any intermediary day falls between past and future.

(20) See present time, which alone we find capable of being called long, is contracted to the space of hardly a single day. But let us examine that also; for not even one day is entirely present. All the hours of night and day add up to twenty-four. The first of them has the others in the future, the last has them in the past. Any hour between these has past hours before it, future hours after it. One hour is itself constituted of fugitive moments. Whatever part of it has flown away is past. What remains to it is future. If we can think of some bit of time which cannot be divided into even the smallest instantaneous moments, that alone is what we can call 'present' And this time flies so quickly from future into past that it is an interval with no duration. If it has duration, it is divisible into past and future. But the present occupies no space. Where then is the time which we call long? Is it future? We do not really mean 'It is long', since it does not yet exist to be long, but we mean it will be long. When will it be long? If it will then still lie in the future, it will not be long, since it will not yet exist to be long. But if it will be long at the time when, out of the future which does not yet exist, it begins to have being and will become present fact, so that it has the potentiality to be long, the present cries out in words already used that it cannot be long.

十六

但是，主，我們覺察到時間的距離，能把它們相互比較，說哪一個比較長，哪一個比較短。我們還度量這一段時間比那一段長短多少，我們說長一倍、兩倍，或二者相等。但我們通過感覺來度量時間，只能趁時間在目前經過時加以度量；已經不存在的過去，或尚未存在的將來又何從加以度量？誰敢說不存在的東西也能度量？時間在通過之時，我們能覺察度量，過去後，既不存在，便不能覺察度量了。

xvi (21) Nevertheless, Lord, we are conscious of intervals of time, and compare them with each other, and call some longer, others shorter. We also measure how much longer or shorter one period is than another, and answer that the one is twice or three times as much as the other, or that the two periods are equal. Moreover, we are measuring times which are past when our perception is the basis of measurement. But who can measure the past which does not now exist or the future which does not yet exist, unless perhaps someone dares to assert that he can measure what has no existence? At the moment when time is passing, it can be perceived and measured. But when it has passed and is not present, it cannot be. 十七

我的慈父，我是在探索，我並不作肯定。我的天主，請你支持我，領導我。
我們從小就有人教我們，時間分現在、過去和將來，我們也如此教兒童。誰會對我說時間並無這三類，僅有現在，過去和將來都不存在？是否過去和將來也都存在？將來成為現在時，是否從某一個隱秘的處所脫身而出；現在成為過去時，是否又進入了隱秘的處所？將來既未存在，預言將來的人從何處看到將來？不存在的東西，誰也看不到。講述往事的人如果心中沒有看到，所講述的不會真實；如果過去不留一些蹤跡，便絕不能看到。據此而言，過去和將來都存在。

xvii (22) I am investigating, Father, not making assertions. My God, protect me and rule me (Ps. 22: 1; 27: 9).
Who will tell me that there are not three times, past, present, and future, as we learnt when children and as we have taught children, but only the present, because the other two have no existence? Or do they exist in the sense that, when the present emerges from the future, time comes out of some secret store, and then recedes into some secret place when the past comes out of the present? Where did those who sang prophecies see these events if they do not yet exist? To see what has no existence is impossible. And those who narrate past history would surely not be telling a true story if they did not discern events by their soul's insight. If the past were non-existent, it could not be discerned at all. Therefore both future and past events exist.

十八

主啊，我的希望，請容許我進一步探索下去，使我的思想不受任何干擾。

如果過去和將來都存在，我願意知道它們在啊里。假如目前為我還不可能，那末我至少知道它們不論在哪裡，決不是過去和將來，而是現在。因為如作為將來而在那裡，則尚未存在，如作為過去，則已不存在。為此，它們不論在哪裡，不論是怎樣，只能是現在。我們講述真實的往事，並非從記憶中取出已經過去的事實，而是根據事實的印象而構成言語，這些印象彷彿是事實在消逝途中通過感覺而遺留在我們心中的蹤跡。譬如我的童年已不存在，屬於不存在的過去時間；而童年的影象，在我講述之時，浮現於我現在的回憶中，因為還存在我記憶之中。

至於預言將來，是否也有同樣情況呢？是否事物雖則尚未存在，而它們的影象已經存在而呈現出來？我的天主，我承認我不知道。我知道一點：我們往住預先計劃將來的行動，計划屬於現在，計劃的行動既是將來，尚未存在；我們著手時，開始進行我所計劃的行動，這時行動出現，不是將來，而是現在了。

對將來的神妙預覺，不管它是怎樣，必須存在，才能看見。但既然存在，則不是將來，而是現在。人們所謂預見將來，不是指尚未存在的將來事物，可能是看到已經存在的原因或徵兆。因此對看見的人而言，是現在而不是將來，看見後心中有了概念，才預言將來。這些概念已經存在，預言者所看到的是目前存在的慨念。

在許多事物中，我舉一個例子談談。

我看見黎明，我預言太陽將升。我看見的是現在，而預言的是將來；我不是預言已經存在的太陽，而是預言尚未存在的日出，但如我心中沒有日出的影象，和我現在談日出時一樣，我也不能預言。我仰觀天空的黎明，雖則是日出的先導，但並非日出，而我心中所形成的影象也不是日出。二者都是現在看為此，將來尚未存在，尚為此，將來尚未存在，尚未存在即是看見；但能根據已經存在而能看見的預言將來。

xviii (23) Allow me, Lord, to take my investigation further. My hope, let not my attention be distracted. If future and past events exist, I want to know where they are. If I have not the strength to discover the answer, at least I know that wherever they are, they are not there as future or past, but as present. For if there also they are future, they will not yet be there. If there also they are past, they are no longer there. Therefore, wherever they are, whatever they are, they do not exist except in the present. When a true narrative of the past is related, the memory produces not the actual events which have passed away but words conceived from images of them, which they fixed in the mind like imprints as they passed through the senses. Thus my boyhood, which is no longer, lies in past time which is no longer. But when I am recollecting and telling my story, I am looking on its image in present time, since it is still in my memory. Whether a similar cause is operative in predictions of the future, in the sense that images of realities which do not yet exist are presented as already in existence, I confess, my God, I do not know. At least I know this much: we frequently think out in advance our future actions, and that premeditation is in the present; but the action which we premeditate is not yet in being because it lies in the future. But when we have embarked on the action and what we were premeditating begins to be put into effect, then that action will have existence, since then it will be not future but present.

(24) Whatever may be the way in which the hidden presentiment of the future is known, nothing can be seen if it does not exist. Now that which already exists is not future but present. When therefore people speak of knowing the future, what is seen is not events which do not yet exist (that is, they really are future), but perhaps their causes or signs which already exist. In this way, to those who see them they are not future but present, and that is the basis on which the future can be conceived in the mind and made the subject of prediction. Again, these concepts already exist, and those who predict the future see these concepts as if already present to their minds.
Among a great mass of examples, let me mention one instance. I look at the dawn. I forecast that the sun will rise. What I am looking at is present, what I am forecasting is future. It is not the sun which lies in the future (it already exists) but its rise, which has not yet arrived. Yet unless I were mentally imagining its rise, as now when I am speaking about it, I could not predict it. But the dawn glow which I see in. the sky is not sunrise, which it precedes, nor is the imagining of sunrise in my mind the actuality. These are both discerned as present so that the coming sunrise may be foretold. So future events do not yet exist, and if they are not yet present, they do not exist; and if they have no being, they cannot be seen at all. But they can be predicted from present events which are already present and can be seen.

十九

你是一切受造的主宰，你究竟用什麼方式把將來啓示於人們？你曾啓示先知們。為你並沒有將來，但你怎樣啓示將來呢？或更好說，你怎樣啓示將來事物的現在？因為不存在的事物，不能啓示。你啓示的方式遠遠超越我的理解力；它是太高深了；憑我本身，決不能到達，但依靠你可能到達，只要你賜與我，「你是柔和的光明，照耀我昏蒙的雙目」。①

①見《詩篇》37首11節。

xix (25) Governor of your creation, what is the way by which you inform souls what lies in the future? For you instructed your prophets. By what method then do you give information about the future - you to whom nothing is future? Is it rather that you inform how to read the future in the light of the present? What does not exist, certainly cannot be the subject of information. This method is far beyond my power of vision. 'It is too mighty for me, I cannot attain it' (Ps. 138: 6). But it would be in my power with your help if you granted it, sweet light of my uncomprehending eyes.

二十

有一點已經非常明顯，即：將來和過去並不存在。說時間分過去、現在和將來三類是不確當的。或許說：時間分過去的現在、現在的現在和將來的現在三類，比較確當。這三類存在我們心中，別處找不到；過去事物的現在便是記憶，現在事物的現在便是直接感覺，將來事物的現在便是期望。如果可以這樣說，那末我是看到三類時間，我也承認時間分三類。

人們依舊可以說：時間分過去、現在、將來三類；既然習慣以訛傳訛，就這樣說吧。這我不管，我也不反對、不排斥，只要認識到所說的將來尚未存在，所說的過去也不存在。我們談話中，確當的話很少，許多話是不確切的，但人們會理解我們所要說的是什麼。

xx (26) What is by now evident and clear is that neither future nor past exists, and it is inexact language to speak of three times past, present, and future. Perhaps it would be exact to say: there are three times, a present of things past, a present of things present, a present of things to come. In the soul there are these three aspects of time, and I do not see them anywhere else. The present considering the past is the memory, the present considering the present is immediate awareness, the present considering the future is expectation. If we are allowed to use such language, I see three times, and I admit they are three. Moreover, we may say, There are three times, past, present, and future. This customary way of speaking is incorrect, but it is common usage. Let us accept the usage. I do not object and offer no opposition or criticism, as long as what is said is being understood, namely that neither the future nor the past is now present. There are few usages of everyday speech which are exact, and most of our language is inexact. Yet what we mean is communicated.

二十一

我上面說過：我們能度量經過的時間，我們能說這一段時間和另一段時間是一與二之比，或二者相等；我們度量時間的時候對每一段時間能作各種比較。

我也說過，我們是在時間經過時度量時間。如果有人問，你怎樣知道的呢？我將回答說：我知道，因為我是在度量時間；不存在的東西，我們不能度量，而過去和將來都不存在。但現在的時間沒有體積，我們怎樣度量呢？在它經過之時我們進行度量，過去後便不能度量了，因為沒有度量的可能。

我們度量時間時，時間從哪裡來，經過哪裡，往哪裡去呢？從哪裡來？來自將來。經過哪裡？經過現在。往哪裡去？只能走向過去。從尚未存在的將來出現，通過沒有體積的現在，進入不再存在的過去。

可是度量時間，應在一定的空間中度量？我們說一倍、兩倍、相等，或作類似的比例，都是指時間的長度。我們在哪一種空間中度量目前經過的時間呢？是否在它所自來的將來中？但將來尚未存在，無從度量。是否在它經過的現在？現在沒有長度，亦無從度量。是否在它所趨向的過去？過去已不存在，也無從度量。

xxi (27) A little earlier I observed that we measure past periods of time so that we can say that one period is twice as long as another or equal to it, and likewise of other periods of time which we are capable of measuring and reporting. Therefore, as I was saying, we measure periods of time as they are passing, and if anyone says to me 'How do you know?' I reply: I know it because we do measure time and cannot measure what has no being; and past and future have none. But how do we measure present time when it has no extension? It is measured when it passes, but not when it has passed, because then there will be nothing there to measure. When time is measured, where does it come from, by what route does it pass, and where does it go? It must come out of the future, pass by the present, and go into the past; so it comes from what as yet does not exist, passes through that which lacks extension, and goes into that which is now non-existent. Yet what do we measure but time over some extension? When we speak of lengths of time as single, duple, triple, and equal, or any other temporal relation of this kind, we must be speaking of periods of time possessing extension. In what extension then do we measure time as it is passing? Is it in the future out of which it comes to pass by? No, for we do not measure what does not yet exist. Is it in the present through which it passes? No, for we cannot measure that which has no extension. Is it in the past into which it is moving? No, for we cannot measure what now does not exist.

二十二

我的心渴望能揭穿這個糾纏不清的謎！主、我的天主、我的慈父，請不要堵塞，我通過基督懇求你，請你對我的志願不要堵塞通往這些經常遇到的奧妙問題的途徑，許我進入其中，用你慈愛的光輝照明這些問題。對於這些問題，我能向誰請教呢？除了向你外，我能向誰承認我的愚昧無知而更取得進益？只有你不會討厭我熱烈鑽研你的聖經。把我所喜愛的賜與我，因為我有此愛好。這愛好也是你的恩賜。我在天之父，你是真正「知道拿好東西給你的兒女們的」，①請你賜給我，因為我正在鑽研；擺在我面前的是一項艱難的工作，我要堅持下去，直到你使我豁然開朗。我通過基督，用聖中之聖的名義懇求你，使任何人不來阻撓我。「我相信，因此我說話」。②我的希望便是「瞻仰主的榮華」，③我為此而生活。「你使我的時日消逝」，④時日正在過去，怎樣過去的呢？我不知道。

①見《馬太福音》7章11節。
②見《詩篇》115首1節。
③同上，26首4節。
④同上，38首6節。

我們說時間、時間，許多時間：「多少時間前，這人說了這話」；「那人做這事花了多少時間」；「已有多少時間我沒有見過這東西」；「這一個音節比那一個短音節時間長一倍」。我們這麼說，這麼聽；別人懂我的話，我也懂別人的話。這是最明白、最尋常的事。但就是這些字句含有深邃莫測的意義，而研究發明是一樁新奇的事。

xxii (28) My mind is on fire to solve this very intricate enigma. Do not shut the door, Lord my God. Good Father, through Christ I beg you, do not shut the door on my longing to understand these things which are both familiar and obscure. Do not prevent me, Lord, from penetrating them and seeing them illuminated by the light of your mercy. Whom shall I ask about them? And to whom but you shall I more profitably confess my incompetence? You are not irritated by the burning zeal with which I study your scriptures. Grant what I love. For I love, and this love was your gift. Grant it, Father. You truly know how to give good gifts to your children (Matt. 7: 11). Grant it, since I have undertaken to acquire under-standing and 'the labour is too much for me' (Ps. 72: 16) until you open the way. Through Christ I beg you, in the name of him who is the holy of holy ones, let no one obstruct my inquiry. 'I also have believed, and therefore speak' (Ps. 115: 1; 2 Cor. 4: 13).24 This is my hope. For this I live 'that I may contemplate the delight of the Lord' (Ps. 26: 4). 'Behold you have made my days subject to ageing' (Ps. 38: 6). They pass away, and how I do not know. And we repeatedly speak of time and time, of times and times: 'How long ago did he say this?' 'How long ago did he do this?' 'For how long a time did I fail to see that?' And "These syllables take twice the time of that single, short syllable.' We speak in this way, and hear people saying this, and we are understood and we understand. These usages are utterly commonplace and everyday. Yet they are deeply obscure and the discovery of the solution is new.

二十三

我曾聽見一位學者說時間不過是日月星辰的運行。我不敢贊同。為何不更好說是一切物體的運行呢？如果星辰停止運行，而陶人執鈞製作陶器，便沒有時間來計算旋轉之數嗎？便不能說每一轉速度相等，或這幾轉快一些，那幾轉慢一些，這幾轉時間長一些，那幾轉時間短一些嗎？或是我說這些話，不是在時間中說的嗎？我們言語的語音不是有長有短，聲響也不是有長有短嗎？

天主，請你使人們能通過一個小小的例子而理解大小事物的共同概念。天空有星辰和「光體」作為標識，分別日子、季節和年代。事實是如此。我並不說木輪子一轉即是一日，但我也不說輪子的旋轉不代表時間。

我願知道的是；我們賴以度量物體運動的時間，譬如說這一運動比那一運動時間長一倍，這時間具有什麼性質和能力。人們所謂一天，不僅指太陽在大地上空而區分的白天和黑夜，也指太陽自東徂西的整個圓周，為此我們說：「過去了多少日子」，這裡日子也包括黑夜，並不把黑夜除外。既然一天的完成在乎太陽的運行，在乎太陽自東至西的圓周，我問：是否這運行即是時間，或運動的持續是時間？或包括二者？

假定前者是時間，則太陽即使僅僅用一小時完成這運動，也是一天。假定後者是時間，如果太陽一次升起至另一次升起僅僅相隔一小時，則必須太陽環繞二十四次，才成為一天。如果包括二者，則即使太陽以一小時環繞一圈，不能名為一天；即使太陽停止運行，經過了相當於太陽自早晨至另一早晨運行一圈經常花去的時間，也不能名為一天。

現在我並不問所謂一天是什麼，而是問借以度量太陽環行的時間是什麼。譬如我們說，如果太陽環繞一周的時間是十二小時，即僅為尋常運行時間的一半，我們把二者一比較，說是一與二之比，即使太陽東西運行的時間有時是一半，有時是一倍。

為此，誰也不要再對我說：時間是天體的運行，因為聖經記載有人祝禱太陽停止，使戰爭勝利結束，太陽果然停止不動，①但時間仍在過去，戰爭在他所需要的時間中進行而結束。

①《舊約·約書亞記》10章12節，載以色列人和亞庫利人交戰，約書亞禱告天主，使太陽停止不動。

因此，我看出時間是一種延伸。但我真的看清楚嗎？是否我自以為看清楚？真理、光明，只有你能指點我。

xx111 (29) I have heard a learned person say that the movements of sun, moon, and stars in themselves constitute time. But I could not agree. Why should not time consist rather of the movement of all physical objects? If the heavenly bodies were to cease and a potter's wheel were revolving, would there be no time by which we could measure its gyrations, and say that its revolutions were equal; or if at one time it moved more slowly and at another time faster, that some rotations took longer, others less? And when we utter these words do not we also speak in time? In our words some syllables are long, others short, in that the sounding of the former requires a longer time, whereas the latter are shorter. God grant to human minds to discern in a small thing universal truths valid for both small and great matters. There are stars and heavenly luminaries to be 'for signs and for times, and for days and for years' (Gen. 1: 14). But I would not say that a revolution of that wooden wheel is a day; and that learned friend could not assert that its rotation was not a period of time.


(30) I desire to understand the power and the nature of time, which enables us to measure the motions of bodies and to say that, for instance, this movement requires twice as long as that. I have this question to raise: the word 'day' is used not only of the interval of time when the sun is up over the earth, so that day is one thing, night another, but also of the sun's entire circuit from east to west, as when we say 'so many days have passed' where 'so many days' includes the nights, and the periods of night-time are not counted separately. So a complete day is marked by the, movement and circuit of the sun from east to west. My question then is whether the sun's movement itself constitutes the day? or the actual interval of time during which it is accomplished? or both? In the first instance, it would still be a day even if the sun completed its course in the space of a single hour. In the second case, it would not be a day if from one sunrise to the next so short an interval as one hour passed, but only if the sun completed a day of twenty-four hours. In the third case— a day being both the circuit and the time taken—it could not be called a day if the sun completed its entire circuit in an hour, nor if the sun ceased to move and the length of time passed were the twenty-four hours normally taken by the sun in completing its entire course from sunrise to sunrise. I will not, therefore, now investigate what it is which we call a day, but the nature of time by which we can measure the sun's circuit and by which we might say that, if all was accomplished in twelve hours, the sun had completed its course in half the usual time. I ask what time is when we make a comparison and say that one interval is single and another double, even if the sun were to make its transit from east to west sometimes in single time, sometimes in twice the time. Let no one tell me then that time is the movements of heavenly bodies. At a man's prayer the sun stood still, so that a battle could be carried through to victory (Josh. 10: 12 ff): the sun stopped but time went on. That battle was fought and completed in its own space of time such as was sufficient for it. I therefore see that time is some kind of extension. But do I really see that? Or do I imagine that I see? You, light and truth, will show me.

二十四

是否你命令我贊同時間為物體運動的主張？不，你並未有這樣的命令。我聽說物體只能在時間之中運動。這是你說的。至於說物體運動即是時間，我沒有聽見你說過。物體運動時，我用時間來度量物體從開始運動至停止共歷多少時間。如果運動持續不輟，我沒有看見運動的開始，也看不到它的停止，我便不能度量，只能估計我從看見到看不見所歷的時間。如果我看見的時間很久，也只能說時間很長。因為要確定多少時間，必須作出比較，譬如說：彼此一樣，彼此相差一倍，或類似的話。如果我們能在空間中確定一個物體的運動自哪里開始到達哪裡，或者物體在自轉，則確定這一部分至那一部分的脫離，那末我們能說物質，或它的某一部分從這裡到那裡經過多少時間。

既然物體的運動是一件事，估計運動歷時多少是另一件事，那末誰會看不出二者之中哪一樣應名為時間？各種物體有時活動，有時靜止，我們不僅估計活動的時間，也估計靜止的時間，我們說：「靜止和活動的時間相等」，或「靜止的時間為活動時間的一倍或兩倍」，或作其他定斷，或作所謂近似的估計。

所以時間並非物體的運動。

xxiv (31) Do you command me to concur if someone says time is the movement of a physical entity? You do not. For I learn that no body can be moved except in time. You tell me so, but I do not learn that the actual movement of a body constitutes time. That is not what you tell me. For when a body is moved, it is by time that I measure the duration of the movement, from the moment it begins until it ends. Unless I have observed the point when it begins, and if its movement is continuous so that I cannot observe when it ceases, I am unable to measure except for the period from the beginning to the end of my observation. If my observing lasts for a considerable time, I can only report that a long time passed, but not precisely how much. When we say how much, we are making a comparison —as, for example, 'This period was of the same length as that', or "This period was twice as long as that', or some such relationship. If, however, we have been able to note the points in space from which and to which a moving body passes, or the parts of a body when it is spinning on its axis, then we can say how much time the movement of the body or its parts required to move from one point to another. It follows that a body's movement is one thing, the period by which we measure is another. It is self-evident which of these is to be described as time. Moreover, a body may sometimes be moving, sometimes be at rest. We measure by time and say 'It was standing still for the same time that it was in movement', or 'It was still for two or three times as long as it was in movement', or any other measurement we may make, either by precise observation or by a rough estimate (we customarily say "more or less'). Therefore time is not the movement of a body.

二十五

主啊，我向你承認，我依舊不明瞭時間是什麼。但同時我承認我知道是在時間之中說這些話，並且花了很長時間討論時間，而這「很長時間」，如果不是經過一段時間，不能名為「很長」。既然我不知道時間是什麼，怎能知道以上幾點呢？是否我不知道怎樣表達我所知道的東西？我真愚蠢，甚至不知道我究竟不知道什麼東西：我的天主，你看出我並不說謊：我的心怎樣想，我便怎麼說。「你將使我的燈發光，主、我的天主，你將照明我的黑暗。」①

①見《詩篇》17首29節。

xxv (32) 1 confess to you, Lord, that I still do not know what time is, and I further confess to you, Lord, that as I say this I know myself to be conditioned by time. For a long period already I have been speaking about time, and that long period can only be an interval of time. So how do I know this, when I do not know what time is? Perhaps what I do not know is how to articulate what I do know. My condition is not good if I do not even know what it is I do not know. See, my God, 'before you I do not lie' (Gal. 1: 21). As I speak, so is my heart. You, Lord, 'will light my lamp'. Lord, my God, 'you will lighten my darknesses' (Ps. 17: 29).

二十六

我的靈魂向你承認我在度量時間，我所承認的是否符合事實呢？主、我的天主，我在度量時間時，真的不知道度量什麼嗎？我用時間來度量物體的運動，是否我也同時在度量時間？是否我要度量物體運動自始至終所歷的時間，必須度量物體在其中運動的時間本身？

我用什麼來度量時間本身呢？是否以較短的時間來度量較長的時間，猶如用一肘之長來量一柱之長？我們用短音來量長音的時間，說長音是短音的一倍；我們用詩句的多少來量一首詩的長短，用音節的數目來量詩句的長短，用字音的數目來量音節的長短，用短音來量長音；度量的方式，不在紙上——如在紙上，則和度量空間的長短一樣，不是在度量時間的長短了——而在我們所發出的聲音經過時，我們說：「這首詩有多少句，是長詩；這一句有多少音節，是長句；這一音節有多少音，是長音節，這一音是短音的兩倍，所以是長音。」

即使如此，依舊得不到時間的準確長度：一句短詩讀得慢一些，可能比一句迅速讀過的長詩時間長。一首詩，一個音節，一個音都能如此。

根據以上種種，我以為時間不過是伸展，但是什麼東西的伸展呢？我不知道。但如不是思想的伸展，則更奇怪了。我的天主，我問你：假如我大約估計說：「這一段時間比那一段長」；或正確地說：「這一段時間是那一段的一倍」；我在度量什麼？當然在度量時間，這一點我知道；但我不量將來，因為將來尚未存在；我不量現在，因為現在沒有長短；也不量過去，因為過去已不存在。那末我量什麼？是否量正在經過的時間，不是量過去的時間？這一點我上面已經說過。

xxvi (33) My confession to you is surely truthful when my soul declares that times are measured by me. So my God, I measure, and do not know what I am measuring. I measure the motion of a body by time. Then am I not measuring time itself? I could not measure the movement of a body, its period of transit and how long it takes to go from A to B, unless I were measuring the time in which this movement occurs.
How then do I measure time itself? Or do we use a shorter time to measure a longer time, as when, for example, we measure a transom by using a cubit length? So we can be seen to use the length of a short syllable as a measure when we say that a long syllable is twice its length. By this method we measure poems by the number of lines, lines by the number of feet, feet by the number of syllables, and long vowels by short, not by the number of pages (for that would give us a measure of space, not of time). The criterion is the time words occupy in recitation, so that we say "That is a long poem, for it consists of so many lines. The lines are long, for they consist of so many feet. The feet are long for they extend over so many syllables. The syllable is long, for it is double the length of a short one.'
Nevertheless, even so we have not reached a reliable measure of time. It may happen that a short line, if pronounced slowly, takes longer to read aloud than a longer line taken faster. The same principle applies to a poem or a foot or a syllable.
That is why I have come to think that time is simply a distension? But of what is it a distension? I do not know, but it would be surprising if it is not that of the mind itself. What do I measure, I beg you, my God, when I say without precision 'This period is longer than that', or with precision 'This is twice as long as that'? That I am measuring time I know. But I am not measuring the future which does not yet exist, nor the present which has no extension, nor the past which is no longer in being. What then am I measuring? Time as it passes but not time past? That is what I affirmed earlier.

二十七

我的靈魂，你再堅持一下，努力集中你的注意力。「天主是我們的幫助」，「是他造了我們，不是我們自己造自己的」①。 瞧，真理的黎明在發白了！

①見《詩篇》61首9節；99首3節。

譬如一個聲音開始響了，響著……繼續響著……停止了，靜默了，聲音已成過去，已沒有聲息了。在未響之前，沒有聲音，不能度量，因為並不存在。而現在聲音已經不存在，也不可能度量。在響的時候可以度量，因為具有度量的條件。可是在當時聲音並非停留不動的，它是在疾馳而過。是否它的可能度量在乎此？因為它在經過時，伸展到一定距離的時間，使它可能度量，而當前則沒有絲毫長度。

假定在當時可以度量，則設想另一個聲音開始響了，這聲音連續不斷地響著。在聲音響的時候，我們度量它，因為一停止，將成為過去，不可能度量了。我們仔細地量著，說它有多長。但聲音還在響著；要度量，必須從它開始響量到終止。我們是量始終之間的距離。為此一個聲音沒有停止，便不能度量，不能說它有多少長，不能說它等於另一聲音或為另一聲音的一倍等等……但聲音一停，便不存在。這樣我們又何從量起呢？我們是在度量時間，但所量的不是尚未存在的時間，不是已經不存在的時間，不是絕無長度的時間，也不是沒有終止的時間。所以我們不量過去、現在、將來、或正在過去的時間，但我們總是在度量時間。

「Deus creator omnium」：①這一句詩共有長短相間八個音，第一、三、五、七、四個短音，對二、四、六、八、四個長音而言是單音，每一個長音對每一短音而言是有一倍的時間。我讀後便加以肯定，而且感覺也清楚覺察到確實如此。照我的感覺所能清楚覺察到的，我用短音來度量長音，我覺察到長音是短音的一倍。但字音是先後相繼讀出的，前一個是短音，後一個是長音，在短音停止後長音才開始作聲，我怎樣抓住短音去度量長音，說長音是短音的一倍？至於長音，是否我乘它現在而加以度量？可是如果它不結束，我不可能進行度量，而它一結束，卻又成為過去。

①引安布羅西烏斯的一句詩，意思是：「天主，萬有的創造者。」

那末我量的究竟是什麼？我憑什麼來量短音？當我度量時，長音在哪裡？長短兩音響後即飛馳而去，都已不存在。而我卻度量二者，非常自信地說：前者是一，後者是二，當然指時間的長短而言。而且只有在它們過去結束後，我們才能如此說。因此我所度量的不是已經不存在的字音本身，而是固定在記憶中的印象。

我的心靈啊，我是在你裡面度量時間。不要否定我的話，事實是如此。也不要在印象的波浪之中否定你自己。我再說一次，我是在你裡面度量時間。事物經過時，在你裡面留下印象，事物過去而印象留著，我是度量現在的印象而不是度量促起印象而已經過去的實質；我度量時間的時候，是在度量印象。為此，或印象即是時間，或我所度量的並非時間。

我們還度量靜默，說這一段靜默的時間相當於那聲音的時間；這怎麼說呢？是否我們的思想是著重聲音的長度，好像聲音還在響著，然後才能斷定靜默歷時多少？因為我們不作聲，不動唇舌，心中默誦詩歌文章時，也能確定動作的長短與相互之間的比例，和高聲朗誦時一樣。一人願意發出一個比較長的聲音，思想中預先決定多少長，在靜默中推算好多少時間，把計劃交給記憶，便開始發出聲音，這聲音將延續到預先規定的界限。聲音響了，將繼續響下去：響過的聲音，已經過去，而延續未完的聲音還將響下去一直到結束。當前的意志把將來帶向過去，將來逐漸減少，過去不斷增加，直到將來消耗淨盡，全部成為過去。

xxvii (34) Stand firm, my mind, concentrate with resolution. 'God is our help, he has made us and not we ourselves' (Ps. 61: 9; 99: 3). Concentrate on the point where truth is beginning to dawn. For example, a physical voice begins to sound. It sounds. It continues to sound, and then ceases. Silence has now come, and the voice is past. There is now no sound. Before it sounded it lay in the future. It could not be measured because it did not exist; and now it cannot be measured because it has ceased to be. At the time when it was sounding, it was possible because at that time it existed to be measured. Yet even then it had no permanence. It came and went. Did this make it more possible to measure? In process of passing away it was extended through a certain space of time by which it could be measured, since the present occupies no length of time. Therefore during that transient process it could be measured. But take, for example, another voice. It begins to sound and continues to do so unflaggingly without any interruption. Let us measure it while it is sounding; when it has ceased to sound, it will be past and will not exist to be measurable. Evidently we may at that stage measure it by saying how long it lasted. But if it is still sounding, it cannot be measured except from the starting moment when it began to sound to the finish when it ceased. What we measure is the actual interval from the beginning to the end. That is why a sound which has not yet ended cannot be measured: one cannot say how long or how short it is, nor that it is equal to some other length of time or that in relation to another it is single or double or any such proportion. But when it has come to an end, then it will already have ceased to be. By what method then can it be measured? Nevertheless we do measure periods of time. And yet the times we measure are not those which do not yet exist, nor those which already have no existence, nor those which extend over no interval of time, nor those which reach no conclusions. So the times we measure are not future nor past nor present nor those in process of passing away. Yet we measure periods of time.

(35) 'God, Creator of all things'—Deus Creator omnium - the line consists of eight syllables, in which short and long syllables alternate. So the four which are short (the first, third, fifth, and seventh) are single in relation to the four long syllables (the second, fourth, sixth and eighth). Each of the long syllables has twice the time of the short. As I recite the words, 1 also observe that this is so, for it is evident to sense-perception. To the degree that the sense-perception is unambiguous, I measure the long syllable by the short one, and perceive it to be twice the length. But when one syllable sounds after another, the short first, the long after it, how shall I keep my hold on the short, and how use it to apply a measure to the long, so as to verify that the long is twice as much? The long does not begin to sound unless the short has ceased to sound. I can hardly measure the long during the presence of its sound, as measuring becomes possible only after it has ended. When it is finished, it has gone into the past. What then is it which I measure? Where is the short syllable with which I am making my measurement? Where is the long which I am measuring? Both have sounded; they have flown away; they belong to the past. They now do not exist. And I offer my measurement and declare as confidently as a practised sense-perception will allow, that the short is single, the long double-I mean in the time they occupy. I can do this only because they are past and gone. Therefore it is not the syllables which I am measuring, but something in my memory which stays fixed there.

(36) So it is in you, my mind, that I measure periods of time. Do not distract me; that is, do not allow yourself to be distracted by the hubbub of the impressions being made upon you. In you, I affirm, I measure periods of time. The impression which passing events make upon you abides when they are gone. That present consciousness is what I am measuring, not the stream of past events which have caused it. When I measure periods of time, that is what I am actually measuring. Therefore, either this is what time is, or time is not what I am measuring. What happens when we measure silences and say that a given period of silence lasted as long as a given sound? Do we direct our attention to measuring it as if a sound occurred, so that we are enabled to judge the intervals of the silences within the space of time concerned? For without any sound or utterance we mentally recite poems and lines and speeches, and we assess the lengths of their movements and the relative amounts of time they occupy, no differently from the way we would speak if we were actually making sounds. Suppose someone wished to utter a sound lasting a long time, and decided in advance how long that was going to be. He would have planned that space of time in silence. Entrusting that to his memory he would begin to utter the sound which continues until it has reached the intended end. It would be more accurate to say the utterance has sounded and will sound. For the part of it which is complete has sounded, but what remains will sound, and so the action is being accomplished as present attention transfers the future into the past. The future diminishes as the past grows, until the future has completely gone and everything is in the past.

二十八

但將來尚未存在，怎樣會減少消耗呢？過去已經不存在，怎樣會增加呢？這是由於人的思想工作有三個階段，即：期望，注意與記憶。所期望的東西，通過注意，進入記憶。誰否定將來尚未存在？但對將來的期望已經存在心中。誰否定過去已不存在？但過去的記憶還存在心中。誰否定現在沒有長度，只是疾馳而去的點滴？但注意能持續下去，將來通過注意走向過去。

xxviii (37) But how does this future, which does not yet exist, diminish or become consumed? Or how does the past, which now has no being, grow, unless there are three processes in the mind which in this is the active agent? For the mind expects and attends and remembers, so that what it expects passes through what has its attention to what it remembers. Who therefore can deny that the future does not yet exist? Yet already in the mind there is an expectation of the future. Who can deny that the past does not now exist? Yet there is still in the mind a memory of the past. None can deny that present time lacks any extension because it passes in a flash. Yet attention is continuous, and it is through this that what will be present progresses towards being absent. So the future, which does not exist, is not a long period of time. A long future is a long expectation of the future. And the past, which has no existence, is not a long period of time. A long past is a long memory of the past.
(38) Suppose I am about to recite a psalm which I know. Before I begin, my expectation is directed towards the whole. But when I have begun, the verses from it which I take into the past become the object of my memory. The life of this act of mine is stretched two ways, into my memory because of the words I have already said and into my expectation because of those which I am about to say. But my attention is on what is present: by that the future is transferred to become the past. As the action advances further and further, the shorter the expectation and the longer the memory, until all expectation is consumed, the entire action is finished, and it has passed into the memory. What occurs in the psalm as a whole occurs in its particular pieces and its individual syllables. The same is true of a longer action in which perhaps that psalm is a part. It is also valid of the entire life of an individual person, where all actions are parts of a whole, and of the total history of' the sons of men' (Ps. 30: 20) where all human lives are but parts.