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# THE WORLD OF JOHN OF SALISBURY

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# THOU SHALT NOT SLAY A TYRANT! THE SO-CALLED THEORY OF JOHN OF SALISBURY

by JAN VAN LAARHOVEN

IT is a commonplace in the history of political theory to mark John of Salisbury as the first medieval defender of the so-called theory of tyrannicide according to which it is allowed and properly rightful to kill a tyrant. Yet commonplaces run the risk of platitudes: they need control and regular revision; from time to time the foundations of a platform have to be revisited in order to inspect their bearing-power. That is the intention of this communication, the first section of which will investigate some traditional arguments for the existence of such a theory; the second section will replace the problematic issue in the context of John's works, especially of his main work, the *Policraticus*.

It is quite easy to find the main arguments for John's so-called 'theory of tyrannicide'. Mostly, all the authors<sup>1</sup> agree in pointing out two

<sup>1</sup> See for instance: Fritz Kern, *Gottesgnadentum und Widerstandsrecht im früheren Mittelalter. Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Monarchie (Mittelalterliche Studien I.2: Leipzig 1914; revised by Rudolf Buchner, Darmstadt 1980)*; John Dickinson, 'The medieval conception of kingship and some of its limitations, as developed in the *Policraticus* of John of Salisbury', *Speculum* 1 (1926) pp 308-37; for the most part resumed in his *Introduction* (pp XVII-LXXXII) to *The Statesman's book of John of Salisbury (Political Science Classics 4: New York 1927; reprint New York 1963)*; Wilhelm Berges, *Die Fürstenspiegel des hohen und späten Mittelalters (MGH, Schriften 2: Leipzig 1938; reprint Stuttgart 1952)*; Friedrich Schoenstedt, *Studien zum Begriff des Tyrannen und zum Problem des Tyrannenmordes im Spätmittelalter insbesondere in Frankreich (Würzburg 1938; also in Neue Deutsche Forschungen 198, Berlin 1938)*; André Bride, 'Tyrannie et tyrannicide', *DThC.* 15 (1950) 1948-2016; Johannes Spörl, 'Gedanken um Widerstandsrecht und Tyrannenmord im Mittelalter', *Widerstandsrecht und Grenzen der Staatsgewalt* (ed Bernhard Pfister and Gerhard Hildmann: Berlin 1956) pp 11-32; also now in *Widerstandsrecht* (ed Arthur Kaufmann and Leonhard Backmann, *Wege der Forschung* 173: Darmstadt 1972) pp 87-113; Harrow Brack, 'Tyrannenmord' *Staatslexikon* 7 (1962) 1101-4; Walter Laqueur, 'Revolution', *Int. Enc. of Soc. Sciences* 13 (1968) 501-7; Walter Ullmann, 'Schranken der Königsgewalt im Mittelalter', *Hist. Jahrb.* 91 (1971) pp 1-21; now also in *The Church and the Law in the Earlier Middle Ages: Selected Essays* (London 1975) Art. VIII; Richard and Mary Rouse, 'John of Salisbury and the doctrine of tyrannicide', *Speculum* 42 (1967) pp 693-709; Beryl Smalley, *The Becket Conflict and the Schools: A Study of Intellectuals in Politics* (Oxford 1973); Egbert Türk, *Nugae curialium: Le règne d'Henri II Plantagenêt et l'éthique politique* (Centre de rech. d'hist. et de philol. V.28: Geneva 1977); Max Kerner, *Johannes von Salisbury und die logische Struktur seines Policraticus*

examples: a) one sentence in a short chapter which concludes Book III of the *Policraticus*, and b) some exquisite passages from a long 'treatise on tyranny' which precedes the conclusion of Book VIII. Already one can say that the harvest is not so plenteous in view of the 192 items we have collected in our Terminological Appendix; it is rather curious that these two traditional examples seem to be strong enough to blot out the other texts. So let us inspect them briefly.

## I. The arguments reconsidered

### a) *Policraticus* iii.15

The first text, the most famous one which is always quoted, seems, indeed, very clear: 'It is not merely lawful to slay a tyrant but even right and just'.<sup>2</sup> This little sentence however is introduced by 'Porro', indicating thus a connection with the preceding sentence which is in fact part of a little syllogism on flattery. The whole of Book III dealt with dishonesty, untrustworthiness, and especially that great evil of the *curiales in aula* and of all people elsewhere: flattery, never allowed, always forbidden. The last short chapter of this book, however, gives one exception to that ethical rule, viz. you may flatter tyrants. That is a thesis. And the argumentation for this exception to standard morality follows in a classical syllogism, containing a major: 'You may flatter him whom you may kill'; a minor: 'You may kill a tyrant'; and a (preceding) conclusion: 'You may titillate the ears of a tyrant'.<sup>3</sup> Thus the permissiveness of tyrannicide is presupposed here as an argument for the permissiveness of flattery. It is an assumption, surely not an invitation; it is a statement, made in passing and not newly constructed; it seems a well-known fact, rather than a 'theory'.

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(Wiesbaden 1977); Jan van Laarhoven, 'Die tirannie verdrijven . . . John of Salisbury als revolutionair?', *Geloof en revolutie: Kerkhistorische kanttekeningen bij een actueel vraagstuk aangeboden aan prof. dr. W. F. Dankbaar* (Amsterdam 1977) pp 21-50.

<sup>2</sup> *Policraticus* iii. 15: ' . . . in saecularibus litteris cautum est quia aliter cum amico, aliter vivendum est cum tyranno. Amico utique adulari non licet, sed aures tyranni mulcere licitum est. Ei namque licet adulari, quem licet occidere. Porro tyrannum occidere non modo licitum est sed aequum et iustum. Qui enim gladium accipit, gladio dignus est interire' (232, 14-20/512c).

NB. the first reference is always to page and lines of Webb (London-Oxford 1909; reprint Frankfurt 1965), the second to column and section of Migne, *PL*.199.

<sup>3</sup> It is curious to note that Dickinson in his introduction, p LXXIII, quotes this passage without the major ('ei licet adulari quem') and without the conclusion ('aures tyranni mulcere licitum est'); that Joseph Pike in his translation *Frivolities of courtiers and footprints of philosophers* (Minneapolis 1938), p 211, leaves out the proper thesis (from 'Amico' to 'licitum est'); and that Kerner in his recapitulation, p 194, inverts the argument of the major: 'wem man aber schmeicheln dürfe, den dürfe man auch töten' (it is just the opposite).

## Thou shalt NOT slay a tyrant!

If one looks at the syllogism more closely, one discovers, in fact, not John of Salisbury as the inventor of these statements, but his beloved author Cicero, who in his treatise *On Friendship* had stated: 'One lives otherwise with a tyrant than as with a friend'.<sup>4</sup> The minor of our syllogism is clearly Ciceronian too: 'We have no communication at all with tyrants . . . , and it is not against nature to plunder him whom it is honest to kill'.<sup>5</sup> This classical argument is reinforced by John's second source, the Bible: 'He that takes the sword is worthy of perishing by the sword'.<sup>6</sup> Nobody says that Matthew or Jesus teach a theory of tyrannicide: almost everybody argues that John does so here!

So what is this short paragraph? Nothing more nor less than a moral statement on flattery—one of the hundred ones in Book III—proved in passing by a statement on 'tyrannicide' which itself has been borrowed from classical and christian antiquity. In short, a process which one can find in nearly every page in John's works. To blow up one short clause, stating an exception and said by the way in a little paragraph of a last chapter of a whole book dealing with ethical manners in court and society, to blow up the minor of a little syllogism to a kind of major 'imperative', that seems to overcharge a text whose context is clear enough. John himself warns immediately against possible misunderstandings of his argument by a traditional exposition of the right authority of he who receives his power from God; and by an original inversion of the concept of *crimen maiestatis*: the worst specimen of lèse-majesté is tyranny itself.<sup>7</sup> (Defenders of an eventual theory of tyran-

<sup>4</sup> Cicero, *De amicitia* 24/89 (in a passage about *veritas*!) 'aliter enim cum tyranno, aliter cum amico vivitur' (ed L. Laurand, coll. Budé: 1961) pp 47-8.

<sup>5</sup> Cicero, *De officiis* iii.6/32, 'Nulla est enim societas nobis cum tyrannis . . . , neque est contra naturam spoliare eum, si possis, quem est honeste necare' (ed M. Testard, coll. Budé: 1970) p 86; cf also iii.4/19: 'Num igitur se adstrinxit scelere si qui tyrannum occidit quamvis familiarem? Populo quidem Romano non videtur, qui ex omnibus praeclaris factis illud pulcherrimum exisitimat' (79). See the thorough analysis by Karl Büchner, 'Der Tyrann und sein Gegenbild in Ciceros Staat', *Hermes* 80 (1952) pp 343-71.

<sup>6</sup> *Matt* xxvi.52, 'omnes enim, qui acceperint gladium, gladio peribunt'. Notice the restricted exegesis of the general biblical sentence. The same text returns in another context, but again in company with Cicero, in *Policraticus* vi.8 (22, 7-13/600b).

<sup>7</sup> *Policraticus* iii.15 (immediately following the quotation above in n. 2) 'Sed accipere intelligitur qui eum propria temeritate usurpat, non qui utendi eo accipit a Domino potestatem. Utique qui a Deo potestatem accipit, legibus servit et iustitiae et iuris famulus est. Qui vero eam usurpat, iura deprimit et voluntati suae leges summittit' (232, 20-25/512c). The remarkable last sentences of iii.15 are not intended to put the potential murderer of a tyrant at ease: 'Do not worry, your manslaughter is not lèse-majesté'; they ought to make the tyrant himself uneasy: 'cum multa sint crimina maiestatis, nullum gravius est eo, quod adversus ipsum corpus iustitiae exercetur.

nicide had better argue on this last sentence than on the ground of our meagre *porro*-clause.)

b) *Policraticus* viii.17-23

The second example traditionally quoted in order to demonstrate John's theory of tyrannicide, is not one text but a whole treatise. It is in fact a broad corollary after the ample treatment of the five Epicurean strivings which fill Books VII and VIII.<sup>8</sup> Before the final conclusion of Book VIII in chapters 24-25, this treatise offers in seven long chapters a very practical consequence of those Epicurean tendencies, viz. tyranny. So it should be a gold-mine for defenders of a Salisburian theory of tyrannicide, if only that old gold were more pure and not so molten down into curious amalgams and strange emollients. Strange, indeed, if we forget the moral context of Books VII-VIII and if one does not mind the structure of these seven chapters, which is rather clear. After a broad introductory thesis (chs. 17-18), there follows an extremely long list of *exempla* (chs. 19-21), and finally a tail with some additional conclusions (chs. 22-23). The accent is clearly on the central part: history and its moral lessons. One may say beforehand that it will not do to pick out some isolated sentences in order to demonstrate something. So let us regard the three parts as a whole.

The treatise opens with the question: 'Wherein consists the difference between a tyrant and a prince?'. The answer is simple but fundamental: the tyrant is the counterpart of the good, that is the law-loving, prince. Even so far that as the last one may be called 'an image of divinity', so the first one is 'an image of Luciferian wickedness'. In John's view all authority, good or bad, appears to be finally a religious category. The conclusion of this thesis is: 'As being an image of divinity, the prince is to be loved, worshipped, and cherished; as being an image of wickedness the tyrant is generally to be even killed'.<sup>9</sup> Notice the gerundive, the

Tirannis ergo non modo publicum crimen sed, si fieri posset, plus quam publicum est' (232,27-233,3/512c-d). Cf the classical statements on *crimen maiestatis* in *Policraticus* vi.25 (73-77/626b-628d).

<sup>8</sup> The complicated 'Boethian' structure of the last two books of the *Policraticus* has been clarified very well by Hans Liebeschütz, *Mediaeval humanism in the life and writings of John of Salisbury* (*Studies of the Warburg Institute* 17: London 1950; reprint Nendeln 1968) pp 28-33; see also his section about *Tyrannus*, *loc. cit.* pp 50-5. Cf Kerner, *Strukture*, pp 183-8.

<sup>9</sup> *Policraticus* viii.17, under the title 'In quo tyrannus a principe differat ...' (345, 1/777c), 'Est ergo tyrannus, ut eum philosophi depinxerunt, qui violenta dominatione populum premit, sicut qui legibus regit princeps est. . . . Princeps pugnat pro legibus et populi libertate; tyrannus nil actum putat nisi leges evacuet et populum devocet in servitutem. Imago quaedam divinitatis est princeps et tyrannus est



## *Thou shalt NOT slay a tyrant!*

restriction of *plerumque*, and the unpolitical reason. For immediately afterwards the author emphasizes the biblical, theological origin of his 'tyrant', viz. 'iniquity and injustice, exterminating charity'.<sup>10</sup> And the following exposé makes still more clear what he means: all tyranny, private or public, has its roots in the original sin and will receive God's corresponding judgment. 'Both of them (clerical as well as lay tyrants) I should like to convince that the divine judgment which was imposed on the first-borns (i.e. Adam and Eve) and their seed, has not yet expired'.<sup>11</sup> In John's view tyranny appears to be first of all a moral category carrying with it moral consequences and divine punishments. Moreover, his concept of tyranny covers a field which exceeds largely our political limits. Bad priests and greedy prelates populate John's tyrannical cosmos. The greatest part of this long chapter 17 is filled with text and commentary and application of *Ezekiel* 34 (on the bad shepherds of Israel) and of *John* 10 (on the thief and robber and the hireling). It will not do to neglect these impassioned pages as 'of no importance for the theory'.

Chapter 18 is also disappointing to some readers. For it opens with a warning by the author: 'Do not think I am denying that tyrants also are ministers of God'.<sup>12</sup> Notice the biblical example of Saul. And still stronger, as John says himself: 'Even the tyrants of the gentiles (again that double source!), damned unto death from eternity (notice this apposition), are ministers of God and are called (like Cyrus in *Is.* liv. 1) anointed of the Lord'. For according to *Rom.* viii. 28, 'to them that love God, all things work together for good', even such a really bad thing—

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adversariae fortitudinis et Luciferianae pravitatis imago [cf *Is.* xiv.12-14], . . . Imago deitatis, princeps amandus venerandus est et colendus; tyrannus, pravitatis imago, plerumque etiam occidendus' (345, 8-11. 19-23. 28-30/777d-778a).

<sup>10</sup> *Policraticus* viii. 17, immediately after the last quotation: 'Origo tyranni iniquitas est et de radice toxicata mala et pestifera germinat et pullulat arbor securi qualibet succidenda [cf *Luke* iii. 9 and 13, 7]. Nisi enim iniquitas et iniustitia caritatis exterminatrix tirannidem procurasset, pax secunda et quies perpetua in evum populus possedisset [cf *Aug.*, *De Civitate Dei* iv. 15], nemoque cogitaret de finibus producendis' (345, 30-346, 5/778a-b).

<sup>11</sup> *Policraticus* viii. 17, 'sive ecclesiastici sive mundani sint, omnia posse volunt, . . . Utrisque tamen hoc persuaderi vellem, divinum nondum exprisae iudicium quo primigenis et semini eorum inflicto est' (347, 16-20/778d-779a).

<sup>12</sup> *Policraticus* viii. 18, 'Ministros Dei tamen tyrannos esse non abnego, qui in utroque primatu, scilicet animarum et corporum, iusto suo iudicio esse voluit per quos punirentur mali et corrigerentur et exercerentur boni [cf *Rom.* xiii. 1-6 and *I Petr.* ii. 13-15]' (358, 7-10/785a-b).

'nothing is worse'—as tyranny.<sup>13</sup> See those famous examples of the Roman empire, Caligula, Nero, and others, and notice in all of them their 'miserable end' (the phenomenon of the tyrant's 'wretched death' will occupy us further on). And then, suddenly, the chapter ends with a repetition of our first text, iii. 15: 'From all these stories it will readily be clear that one might always flatter a tyrant, deceive him, and that it was honest to kill him, if, however, he could not be checked in another way'.<sup>14</sup> Again, the syllogism on flattery appears to be an historical datum, and its conclusive force for the 'theory' is strongly weakened by the remarkable clause stating a fundamental exception. John's conclusion is another one: 'It does not seem beside the point, however, if we support by some examples what has been said',<sup>15</sup> i.e. as much a repetition of iii. 15 as the whole of these two chapters 17 and 18.

The main part of the treatise is well provided with *exempla*: sixteen Roman emperors from Caesar to Septimius in chapter 19, ten biblical kings or commanders from Nimrod to Holofernes in chapter 20, and a motley from Jesabel and Pharaoh until Julian the Apostate and nine English barons and robber knights in chapter 21. A reader who without prejudice goes through these endless series of stories will notice three points. First, the forty different examples have one main function: to illustrate historically the *Exitus tyrannorum* (according to the title of John's booklet), or to make clear 'that all tyrants come to a bad end' (according to the title of chapter 21).<sup>16</sup> Tyranny carries its own punish-

<sup>13</sup> *Policraticus* viii. 18, after the example of Saul (358, 18-359, 3/785b-c): 'Amplius quidem adiciam; etiam tyranni gentium reprobati ab eterno ad mortem: ministri Dei sunt et christi Domini appellantur [*Is.* liv. 1]. . . . Omnis autem potestas bona [cf *Rom.* xiii. 1], quoniam ab eo est a quo solo omnia et sola sunt bona. Utenti tamen interdum bona non est aut patienti sed mala, licet quod ad universitatem sit bona, . . . [Cf the black colour in a picture: 'indecens est, et tamen in tota pictura decet.] . . . Ergo et tyranni potestas bona quidem est, tyrannide tamen nichil est peius' (359, 3-5. 13-23/785c-786a).

<sup>14</sup> *Policraticus* viii. 18, at the end: 'Ex quibus facile liquebit quia semper tyranno licuit adulari, licuit eum decipere et honestum fuit occidere, si tamen aliter coherceri non poterat' (364, 5-7/788d). Notice that the first 'conclusion' in John's moral exposé bears upon such vices as flattery and deception, and that without restriction! Remember, again, the main tendency of iii. 15.

<sup>15</sup> *Policraticus* viii. 18, last sentence: 'Praeter rem tamen non videtur, si haec, quae dicta sunt, aliquibus astruamus exemplis' (364, 15-16/788d).

<sup>16</sup> *Policraticus* viii. 20, first sentence: 'Longum est si gentilium tyrannorum ad tempora nostra seriem voluero trahere; sed unius hoc etatis non memorabitur homo. . . . Libellus tamen qui De Exitu Tyrannorum inscriptus est quid de tyrannis sentiam plenius poterit aperire, . . .' (372, 25-373, 3/793b-c). Webb suggests here that this booklet 'aut numquam in lucem prodiit aut omnino amissus est'. It is needless to lament its being missing: there is no reason at all to think that it would be much

## *Thou shalt NOT slay a tyrant!*

ment, that is the dominant conclusion of all these stories. A second striking point is the author's emphasis, not to say his amazement, in regard to the historical fact that many tyrannicides remain unpunished. It is in this sense that murder, curiously enough for John, appears to be *licitum*, that is, negatively, not punished; and even—think of the praise of Judith—it can be, positively, *gloriosum*, because the result answers to God's justice.<sup>17</sup> Thus the accent in these examples is never 'It ought to be done' but 'If it is done in history, it appears to remain often without punishment, because it was God's judgment.' For this is the third point: finally and fundamentally, the real actor behind all these historical tyrannicides was not the assassin, but God himself. He was at work in all these stories, for He revenges, always and everywhere, all injustice. He will find all those tyrants, and will punish them 'sometimes by His own weapon, sometimes by man's weapon'.<sup>18</sup>

These three points may be helpful to solve the many problems these chapters pose for the defenders of a theory of tyrannicide. Not only because there is more history than theory and more theology than politicology, but above all because the so-called theory, if any, seems to be buried under so many exceptions and restrictions that any practical application fades away. The title of chapter 20 is *luce clarius*. The opening statement that not only pagan history (viewed in the preceding chapter) but also the biblical authority says that is 'lawful and glorious to slay public tyrants', continues immediately with two strong and strange conditions, likewise borrowed from history: a potential murderer ought not to be bound to the tyrant by fealty, and he must not in any

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different from the leaflet of 67 pages we have in fact in *Policraticus* viii.17-23. The title of viii.21: 'Omnium tyrannorum finem esse miseriam' (379,6/797a) and its first sentence: 'Finis enim tyrannorum confusio est' (379,10/797a) are variants of *Phil.* 3, 19: 'inimicos crucis Christi, quorum finis interitus, . . . et gloria in confusione ipsorum, qui terrena sapiunt'. Cf also viii.23, quoted below n. 23.

<sup>17</sup> Cf the title of *Policraticus* viii.20 (below n. 19) and notice the formula about the tyrants in Israel and about their murderers: 'servierunt saepenumero filii Israel sub tyrannis, . . . saepeque sunt clamantes ad Dominum liberati. Licebatque finito tempore dispensationis nece tyrannorum excutere iugum de cervicibus suis [cf *Gen.* xxvii.40]; nec quisquam eorum, quorum virtute penitens et humiliatus populus liberabatur, arguitur, sed iocunda posterorum memoria quasi minister Domini memoratur' (374, 11-18/794a-b). The story of Judith in the same chapter (376,2-377,31/795a-796b).

<sup>18</sup> *Policraticus* viii.21, 'Punitur autem malitia semper a Domino; sed interdum suo, interdum quasi hominis utitur telo in penam impiorum' (379, 21-23/797b). Cf the title of this chapter: 'Omnium tyrannorum finem esse miseriam; et quod in eos Deus vindictam exercet, si manus cesserit humana . . .' (379, 6-8/797a).



way sacrifice justice and honour.<sup>19</sup> What this concretely means in a feudal society with its many personal ties and social links is clear. Moreover the same chapter culminates in the best example, viz. David, who had all the chances and all the reasons in the world to kill the real tyrant Saul, but who did not do it. Bravo, concludes John, for the best way to expel tyrants, 'the most useful and safest method', is to pray and to live without sin.<sup>20</sup> It is a somewhat disappointing phrase in the mouth of a theoretician of tyrannicide.

The third and last part of the treatise gives in a short chapter 22 an example of a good as well as of a bad ruler, viz. Gideon and Antiochus. It ends with a longer chapter 23 on the great dangers if one takes matters into one's own hands, and on the terrible consequences of violent resistance, revolution, and civil war, in the state as well as in the church.<sup>21</sup> It is better, repeats John, to suffer, to tolerate, and to pray. Remember the counsel of even that classical prototype of a tyrannicide, Brutus, on the danger of civil war and the horror of bloodshed.<sup>22</sup> Again,

<sup>19</sup> *Policraticus* viii.20, title: 'Quod auctoritate divinae paginae licitum et gloriosum est publicos tyrannos occidere, si tamen fidelitate non sit tyranno obnoxio interfecto aut alias iustitiam aut honestatem non amittat' (372, 21-24/793b). The two conditions are repeated at the end of the chapter: 'Hoc tamen cavendum docent historiae, ne quis illius moliat interitum cui fidei aut sacramenti religione tenetur astrictus' (377, 31-378, 2/796b), and explained by three biblical examples: the infidelity of Sedechias 'etiam cum ex iusta causa cavetur tyranno' (378, 5-6/796b-c); the patient fidelity of David who 'causam agebat iustiore' (378, 22/796d); and the good counsel of the heathen Achir to Holofernes 'quoniam Deus eorum defendet illos' (379, 4/797a). Cf about fealty *Policraticus* vi.25 with the six demands of Fulbert of Chartres (also in the *Decretum Gratiani* XXII.v.18, ed Friedberg 887-8) whose claims are introduced by John with the statement: 'ex quibus quid non liceat commodissime colligi potest' (75, 26-27/627d). In the same chapter a typical text about *religio*: after an attestation of loyalty, together with a biblical restriction ('God rather than men', *Acts* v.29), John concludes: 'Sic ergo cohereant inferiora superioribus, sic universa membra se subiciant capiti ut religio servetur incolumis' (73, 16-18/626b). Cf also below n. 34.

<sup>20</sup> *Policraticus* viii.20, after the story of I *Sam.* xxiv: 'Et hic quidem modus delendi tyrannos utilissimus et tutissimus est, si qui premuntur ad patrociniū clementiae Dei humiliati confugiant et puras manus levantes ad Dominum devotis precibus flagellum quo affliguntur avertant. Peccata etenim delinquentium vires sunt tyrannorum' (378, 22-27/796d).

<sup>21</sup> The whole chapter (399-411/809a-814d) bears the stamp of the painful memories of the schism of 1130 and of the political disagreements which led to the imperial schism of 1159; cf the same distaste for disruption and rebellion in the last chapter of the *Metalogicon* iv.42 (ed Webb 216-219/945a-946c).

<sup>22</sup> In the warnings of John's beloved author, Lucan, *Pharsalia* (13 quotations in this chapter!), in *Policraticus* viii.23: 'Utinam secuti essent qui ea viderunt tempora consilium Bruti, a quo eum imminente bello civili Catonis avertit auctoritas [*Phars.* 2, 234-6]. Deceverat enim manus suas ab armis continere civilibus, quibus quanto quisque libentius et fortius immiscetur, tanto iniquior et immanior est. Ait ergo:

## *Thou shalt NOT slay a tyrant!*

the lack of any 'advice' for resisting or killing is compensated, so to say, by the repetition of the author's proper meaning, the great warning of all these seven chapters: 'Verily, for a tyrant there is no safety, no peace'.<sup>23</sup> And the last example from this endless series evokes in the very last sentence of the treatise the famous founder of Rome as a horrible murderer: Romulus, the parricide!<sup>24</sup>

### II. Problem and proposal

The problem is clear. Anyone who has read the long treatise of Book VIII must be disappointed if he had expected an elucidation of a real theory of tyrannicide. Once a little clause of iii. 15 is read as a kind of imperative, these 67 pages do not only cause a thorough disappointment, but they pose real troubles for maintaining such a 'theory'. There is nothing in these texts on the right of resistance, nothing on other forms of government, nothing on any sovereignty of the people, nothing on practical questions like 'Who could be the murderer?' or 'Who should be the judge to exonerate him?'. Only one practical detail: poison is not nice!<sup>25</sup> On the contrary, we find only moral lessons and endless historical examples which argue more the terrible death than the possible killing of tyrants. The same negative and positive result will appear to anyone who reads through the long list of our Terminological Appendix.<sup>26</sup>

All authors who defend a licence for tyrannicide in the works of John of Salisbury, have to squirm and wriggle to find an escape. The

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Nunc neque Pompeii Brutum nec Cesaris hostem, post bellum victoris habes [*Phars.* 2, 283-4] (402, 14-21/810b).

<sup>23</sup> *Policraticus* viii.23, 'adversus carnales non ego sed . . . apostolica intonat tuba: Quorum, inquit, finis interitus, quorum Deus venter et gloria in confusione, quia terrena sapiunt [*Phil.* iii.19]; si, ut suam expleant voluntatem, aliis dominantes, quod tyrannicum est, eis nichil minus proveniet; tyranno siquidem nichil tutum est aut quietum' (408, 9-14/813a).

<sup>24</sup> *Policraticus* viii.23, last sentences of this treatise: 'Quid ergo erit ei quem nulla vocat electio sed repugnante in membris Christi ambitio ceca et cruenta non sine sanguine fraterno intrudit? Hoc quidem est Romulo succedere in parricidiis, non Petro in commissi dispensatione ovilis' (411, 14-18/814d).

<sup>25</sup> As an historical fact, in *Policraticus* viii.19: 'veneficium detestabile semper' (366, 9/789d); or because of the lack of 'authorization', in viii.20: 'nec veneni . . . ullo umquam iure indultam lego licentiam' (378, 7-9/796c); or as a matter of national pride, in viii.19: 'Britannia venena semper exhorruit et in principes non novit sed pro suis principibus invictos gladios exercere' (372, 11-13/783a).

<sup>26</sup> Its function, if any, could, indeed, be to demonstrate on the one side the importance of a term and a concept occurring so often, on the other side to point out how many times a writer like John lets slip the opportunity to elaborate a so-called 'theory'.

'solutions' of their problem run from complete inconsistencies, or scruples of conscience, or personal prudence, to historical circumstances, or to statements like this: 'It is a mere theory but with practical purposes.'<sup>27</sup> But all authors must agree that the solutions are as bad as the problem. If the 'theory' allows tyrannicide, but the practice does not, what is the use of it? Why should an expert and capable writer like John of Salisbury conceal his theory in inconsistencies? and why should a practical moralist like our humanist produce all that fuss and bother for a theory which hardly can be found?

The answer is simple. Because he does not have such a theory. John has a *praxis*: he knows the historical practice, classical as well as biblical, and he draws only one conclusion: tyrants come to a miserable end. And he passes only one moral judgment on this fact: they are really deserving it. For in his theory tyranny is indeed a terrible thing—'nichil peius'. It is in fact the most inhuman sin in society. And this moral statement agrees fully with his theological view on man and history, wherein finally all injustice will be slain by God's judgment, even 'if there is no human hand'.<sup>28</sup> Thus the so-called 'active' is in fact a 'passive'. The real sense is not: 'You, murderer, have to kill' but 'You, tyrant, will be slain.' In this sense, it ought to be done, and it will be done, surely and absolutely, for God wins. That is the clear tendency of these seven chapters of Book VIII and of all John's other utterances on tyranny and injustice.<sup>29</sup> This all is not an invitation to take tyrannicide in hand; it is a very serious warning to take tyranny off one's hands. The whole accent is on the tyrant, not on his eventual murderer. John does not write for the latter: he views tyrants, actual as well as potential ones, in church and state, at home and in society. And as a good traditional moralist he warns and threatens them: 'Be aware, you tyrants, you also

<sup>27</sup> Kern, 'Gewissenseinschränkungen . . . Folgerichtigkeit ist Salisburys Sache nicht' (*Gottesgnadentum* p 425; ed Buchner, p 356); Dickinson, 'inconsistencies . . . the more or less confused mass of contradictory ideas' ('Medieval conception', pp 335 and 337); Liebeschütz, 'an expression of John's feelings about the experiences of the English church . . . during the period of anarchy under Stephen' (*Mediaeval humanism*, p 52); Rouse, 'the doctrine of tyrannicide is purely theoretical, in the sense that John was not proposing it as a plan of action' ('Doctrine of tyrannicide' p 709). Remember the sarcastic comment of Berges: 'wir leisten uns das Kuriosum, J(ohann von Salisbury) die Klarheit abzusprechen, weil sie uns selbst fehlt' (*Fürstenspiegel* p 139 n. 8).

<sup>28</sup> According to the title of viii.21 (above n. 18).

<sup>29</sup> See for the classical and biblical notion of justice/injustice in the *Policraticus* my article 'Iustitia bij John of Salisbury. Proeve van een terminologische statistiek', *Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis* 58 (1977) pp 16-37, with at least one conclusion: 'The death of justice is the birth of tyranny' (p 36).

## *Thou shalt NOT slay a tyrant!*

are in God's hand!' And as a sincere christian he is convinced that this case could not be in better hands. The title of his treatise is not *De tirannicidio*, but—rightly—*De exitu tyrannorum*. The *Policraticus*, whatever its title means, is not a handbook for murderers, but a guide-book for people in the *polis*, especially for those who *ex officio* have to dominate themselves—rather than others ('quod tyrannicum est').<sup>30</sup>

The simplest way to 'solve' a problem is to deny its existence; but this runs the risk of simplification. Defenders of a theory of tyrannicide in John of Salisbury, puzzled about its factual denials, run the risk of complications. Let us come to terms and pull together in using another and better term. Let us speak about and study John's 'tyrannology' and let us avoid that problematic term 'tyrannicide'. The first one is essential in John's political theory, the second one is too suggestive and, in point of fact, anachronistic. John of Salisbury has, indeed, a real *Tyrannenlehre*, an elaborated theory about tyranny and tyrants, the wealth of which is oddly indicated by a term and a concept which, in fact, are more denied than confirmed. We have to read and to study his tyrannology, positively and within its own context, and not through the theories of his later plagiarists.

Strictly speaking this communication too is too negative: it is an attack against a defence. The right method would be to go the other way round, i.e. to start with the Appendix, to read through John's works, to see its structure, and to grasp the main tendencies of his statements.<sup>31</sup> And then other thoughts and other texts will come in the picture: John's modest and rather monarchical political theory in Book IV (less 'democratic' than some medieval political writers);<sup>32</sup> his well-considered nuances in vi.25 on *lèse-majesté* and even on *sacrilege*

<sup>30</sup> According to viii.23 (above n. 23).

<sup>31</sup> We have tried to do so in our article, quoted above n. 1, in which the incompleteness of our Terminological Appendix (see the NB at its head) has been partly corrected by some 'parallel' texts, for instance from the important excursus *Policraticus* vi.25-30 (30-32). Generally speaking, John's 'tyrannology' concludes the three main parts of his book, viz. in iii.15; in vi. 25-30; and before the two concluding chapters in viii.17-23.

<sup>32</sup> Despite the stimulating chapter of Friedrich Heer, *Aufgang Europas* (Vienna-Zurich 1949), pp 290-383, the 'bourgeois citoyen' from Old Sarum is not a republican. In this sense he is not a disciple of Cicero, but of his teachers Robert Pullen and Robert of Melun (see Smalley, *Becket Conflict*, pp 39-58). In fact, a man like Manegold von Lautenbach was far more 'revolutionary' than our so-called theoretician of tyrannicide (see for instance *Ad Gebhardum* in MGH, *Libelli de lite* 1, 365).

(in view of the organic coherence between 'head' and 'members');<sup>33</sup> his moral moderation in vi.26 in regard to vices to be either tolerated or removed (with that curious comparison with divorce);<sup>34</sup> the important psychological and moral elaboration of the concept of tyranny in vii.17 (almost never quoted by authors on tyrannicide);<sup>35</sup> the theological function of tyrants in the 'anti-paradise' of human sin in viii.16 (in the end as a demonstration of God's eternal government!);<sup>36</sup> or that typical description of the death of a tyrant, William Rufus (n.b. in the hagiography of Anselm);<sup>37</sup> and the manifold use of the term in his letters with the same accents as in the *Policraticus* (even if he uses it for that most hateful 'tyrant' Frederick Barbarossa).<sup>38</sup>

<sup>33</sup> John had to defend himself against the accusation of lèse-majesté (cf *Policraticus* vii.20 (186, 19-25/689a) and the *Entheticus in Policraticum* 5-8 (1, 5-8/379a) and the letters during his 'disgrace') not, however, because of statements on tyrannicide, but because of his defence of ecclesiastical rights: see *Policraticus* vii.20, 'Qui . . . de iure divino aliquid loquitur, . . . est aut invidus aut (quod capitale est) principis inimicus' (188, 6-9/689c); and 'Si enim ipsis creditum fuerit, tu quasi lesae maiestatis reus hostis publicus iudicaberis' (189, 3-5/690a).

<sup>34</sup> Notice the same 'conditions' as above (n. 19). After a quotation from Varro 'Vitium coniugis aut tollendum est aut ferendum' (Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* I 17, 4) John comments, 'Hoc tamen fidelis adicit interpretatio ut vitium intelligatur quod honeste ferri potest et religione incolumi' (78, 3-4 and 11-13/629 a and b). John the moralist seems to be more 'consistent' than some authors like to allow for.

<sup>35</sup> *Policraticus* vi.17: 'A tyrannide . . . omnino immunis est aut nullus aut rarus. Dicitur autem quia tyrannus est qui violenta dominatione populum premit; sed tamen non modo in populo sed in quantavis paucitate potest quisque suam tyrannidem exercere' (161, 28-32/765d). Cf also the expressive quotation from Macrobius (*Saturn.* i.2) in viii.12: 'Domi enim nobis animos induimus tyrannorum' (308, 27/757c). Dickinson quoted the first text in order to illustrate, however, 'the absence of any clear distinction in John's thought between the social and the political' (*Introduction* p LXVII)! But the real function of vii.17 in John's tyrannology is precisely its ethical foundation in the context of inhuman unnatural *ambitio*. Berges' warning 'Die Tyrannis ist also keine Verfassung!' (*Fürstenspiegel* p 142 n. 5), was a better conclusion.

<sup>36</sup> *Policraticus* viii.16 is the last chapter before the great excursus of viii.17-23. It repeats, in fact, the theological origin of tyranny according to vii.17, but elaborates also the short antithesis 'hortus deliciarum—terra oblivionis' of that chapter (160, 15-21/675a) in a vivid description of the counterpart of the four rivers of Eden, viz. 'de quatuor fluminibus quae de fonte libidinis oriuntur Epicureis faciuntque diluvium' (341, 16-19/775d). One of these four streams, viz. strong ambition, 'prosilit in odibilem tyrannidis venam' (342, 14/776ab), and is 'tyrannidis procurans ortum' (343, 27/777a). The word of God, however, summons men 'ad aquas oppositas' (344, 5-6/777a) i.e. the waters of *Is.* lv.1, sweetening the 'bitter waters' of *Ex.* xv.23: 'Hae . . . dulces aquae . . . liberant et totius tyrannidis incursum impediunt aut premunt aut puniunt' (344, 16-17.20-22/777b).

<sup>37</sup> See the predictions of his death in cap. 11 (1030a-c); the death—or murder?—itself in cap. 12 (1031a-b), with the typical conclusion: 'Et profecto quisquis hoc fecerit, Dei Ecclesiae suae calamitatibus compatientis dispositioni fideliter obedivit' (1031b).

<sup>38</sup> *Tyrannus* and *tyrannus teutonicus* in the letters of exile are the stereotyped indication

## *Thou shalt NOT slay a tyrant!*

It would appear then that tyranny is, indeed, a very important and even crucial concept in John's thought: not so much as a political issue, but as an ideological resumé of inhuman, unnatural pride, of moral injustice, and of theological iniquity. It is in fact the diabolical counterpart of God's intentions for man and society. For it is in the end the devil, that enemy from the beginning, who is acting through human behaviour; but—and this is John's conviction and the essence of his warning—God will win. That is the nucleus of his 'tyrannology'. The terms used may indicate the incompleteness of our Terminological Appendix. A sum total of John's tyrannology should have to sample terms and concepts like *superbi*, *iniqui*, *potentes*, *ambitiosi*, *publicus hostis*, *persecutor*, *dictator*, let alone the many biblical and classical proper names. John as a good humanist has more synonyms and parallels than one Appendix could list; and as a good moralist he has a more consistent 'theory' than one detail could show. Max Kerner, as far as we know the latest author on this subject, is right: John's doctrine on tyranny is, indeed, 'an argument for the moralistic-humanistic form of the coherence of the *Policraticus*',<sup>39</sup> and, we should add, of most of his other works.

Finally, two short remarks in answer to two questions, an historical one and an historiographical one. How could the thesis of the 'theory' have originated? Why should it be so continuously held up to the present?

Historically speaking, John of Salisbury has of course been a dangerous man! Anyone who in the later middle ages—in the context and defence of actual tyrannicides—set out in search of a theoretical construction or reconstruction could find good stuff in the examples so amply provided by our prolific author. Thus the *Policraticus* especially has functioned as a real storehouse of building-materials, for instance for Jean Petit in his *Justification du Duc de Bourgogne* (1408) or for Jean Boucher in his *De iusta Henrici tertii abdicatione* (1589), both defenders of

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for the detested German emperor (cf F. Böhm, *Das Bild Friedrich Barbarossas und seines Kaisertums in den ausländischen Quellen seiner Zeit* (Hist. Studien 289: Berlin 1936); never any allusion to an attempt or assault.

<sup>39</sup> Kerner: 'in unserem Zusammenhang dürfte es wichtiger sein, the Auffassung des Johannes . . . in der Eigenart seiner Überlegungen herauszuarbeiten und dadurch vielleicht einen zusätzlichen Beleg für die moralisch-humanistische Form des Zusammenhalts im *Policraticus* zu erhalten' (*Logische Struktur* p 193); see also his conclusion 'Die einheitliche "ratio" des *Policraticus* dürfte in dessen Charakter liegen, eine moralische Lehrschrift humanistisch-christlicher Prägung darzustellen' (p 203).



real murderers.<sup>40</sup> Yet, the history of the aftermath of one's works is a different story to the painstaking historiography about an author and his thoughts in the midst of the twelfth century. It is a truism to state that the effects of a text, especially in the long run, are not the same as its original meanings. Should it not be possible however that in this case later medieval history had influenced historians to trace back too far the origins of a real theory of tyrannicide?

This leads to a second remark on the influence of historiography itself. Once a statement is made by a 'classical' expert, it is not so easy to revise it. Once the term is coined, all handbooks of political theory use *Tyrannenmordlehre* and 'theory of tyrannicide' as currency. For more than half a century the great synthesis of Fritz Kern has been without any doubt the indispensable standard work on *Widerstandsrecht* (rightly re-edited and fortunately again available in a seventh impression).<sup>41</sup> But the pages on John of Salisbury are not only not convincing but truly incomplete. Yet they seem to have influenced most of the authors writing on such historical—and actual—questions as the right of resistance, democracy versus tyranny, liberation against oppression, and so on. Only reluctantly have some critical tendencies appeared. The neglected warnings of Berges (1938), the historical commentaries of Liebeschütz (1950), the penetrating questions of R. and M. Rouse (1967), and lastly the coherent view of Kerner (1977)<sup>42</sup> are steps which recede in fact from the massive *Tyrannenmordlehre* stated above all in

<sup>40</sup> Cf Schoenstedt, *Studien* (quoted above n. 1). Cf also Walter Ullmann, 'The influence of John of Salisbury on medieval Italian jurists', *EHR* 59 (1944) pp 384-93, now also in *The Church and the Law in the Earlier Middle Ages: Selected Essays* (London 1975) Art. XV.

<sup>41</sup> See esp. *Anhang XXIII: 'Rex und Tyrannus'* (pp 396-401, ed Buchner pp 334-8); *Anhang XXXI: 'Tyrannenmord'* (pp 424-6 = 356-7); and *Anhang XXXIII: 'Lehre von der unbedingten Gehorsamspflicht im 11./12. Jahrhundert'* (pp 428-32 = pp 359-62). Buchner has made some good additions, but did not change, of course, the main tendency of Kern.

<sup>42</sup> Berges: 'Johanns Lehre vom Tyrannenmord, zwar ganz und gar nicht die Quintessenz seines Systems, sondern eher eine Glosse' (*Fürstenspiegel* p 59); Liebeschütz: 'John never intended the radical ancient doctrine to be applied to his own royal lord ... this was indeed inconceivable to him' (*Mediaeval humanism* p 53); Rouse: 'John was not, even in hypothesis, propounding the doctrine of tyrannicide as a plan of action. The book's discussion of tyrannicide should not distract attention from the obvious fact that the *Policraticus* is, after all, a prince's manual, ... The Statesman's Book' ('Doctrine of tyrannicide' p 705); Kerner: 'Soziale und politische Konflikte werden ... zu moralischen Problemen und als solche durch christlich-humanistische Mittel gelöst. Dies kann wohl kaum deutlicher als an der Tyrannenlehre des *Policraticus* aufgezeigt werden' (*Logische Struktur* pp 192-3; and see above n. 39).

## *Thou shalt NOT slay a tyrant!*

German historiography around 1900. Thus, from Kern to Kerner, the defence of the theory of tyrannicide in John of Salisbury seems to weaken, becoming more nuanced and thereby increasingly complicated. Is it not time, historiographically speaking, to draw the conclusions and to take a step forward by moving backwards? Denying an untenable 'theory', we are better prepared, I think, to refind John's real theory, viz. his own twelfth-century tyrannology. Then we can also find out that an eventual 'murder' is but a transitory, historical element in some examples which serve, in fact, his clear, main, moralistic tendency: to warn against inhuman tyranny itself. Less technically than theorists after him, but better and deeper than all writers before him, Bible and Cicero included, John of Salisbury uncovered and pointed out the temptation of tyranny for mankind, at heart and at home, in church and in society, individually and institutionally. He warned against it vigorously and emphatically. It was his new and real contribution to the christian humanism of his time—and perhaps still of our own time.

Catholic University of Nijmegen

### TERMINOLOGICAL APPENDIX

NB. All the terms *tyrannus* and *tyrannis*, used or quoted by John of Salisbury, have been listed (we hope at least to have gathered all of them), but not the many parallel terms like *iniqui*, *potentes*, *publicus hostis*, *dictator*, etc.

References in brackets are double: first to page and line of the known critical editions, after the oblique line to the most current edition of the *Opera omnia* in Migne.

Remember finally the warning of John himself in his *Entheticus de dogmate philosophorum* 31-2, '... bonus auditor pensat de mente loquentis, non quovis sensu, quem sibi verba ferunt'.

*Policraticus* (Webb 1/PL.199)

- i.4 ( 27,14/394b) Tyrannidis ergo fastigium ... a venatore incipiens
- ii.7 ( 80,6/424b) '[Mariae] reliquas quidem facultates ... tyranni invasere'
- ii.15 ( 93,15/431d) [Romani] tyrannidis ... tam crebra dampna senserunt  
( 93,20/431d) 'pauci descendunt ... sicca morte tyranni'

- ii.27 (145,30/462d) Saul in tirannum versus ex principe  
 (147,12/463d) tumor, qui tyrannidis iniquitate in corde Saulis  
 . . . coaluerat  
 (149,23/465b) Cum . . . tyranni nequitia iuste deiectus con-  
 tempti meruerim
- iii.8 (192,3/489d) [Fortuna] tyrannorum et principum sanguine  
 . . . cruentat gladios
- iii.10 (202,25/496a) ac si . . . regendo nisi tyranni ascitis Omnipotentis  
 non sufficiat manus  
 (203,29/496d) Nonne tyranni opinio  
 ( 30/496d) ad tyrannidis transiit suc-  
 cessores . . . ?
- iii.14 (227,19/509c) 'O tiranne!' 'Si essem, inquit [Augustus], non  
 diceres'.
- iii.15 (232,8/512b) [Tit.:] quod tyrannus publicus hostis est  
 ( 16/512c) aliter cum amico, aliter vivendum est cum  
 tiranno  
 ( 17/512c) aures tyranni mulcere licitum est  
 ( 18/512c) tyrannum occidere non modo licitum est sed  
 aequum et iustum  
 (233,1/512d) Tyrannis ergo . . . plus quam publicum (crimen)  
 est.
- iv.1 (235,1/513b) [Tit.:] De differentia principis et tyranni  
 ( 3/513b) Est ergo tyranni et principis haec differentia  
 (*Webb 2/PL.199*)
- vi.25 ( 76,10/628a) a dominis insularum, qui frequentius tyran-  
 nidem induunt,  
 ( 11/628a) ne a tyrannorum sevitia penae severitas pro-  
 cessisse credatur
- vii.17 (160,9/674d) [Tit.:] quis sit ortus tyrannidis;  
 (161,26/675d) Cum vero [quis] potentiam nactus est, erigitur in  
 tyrannidem  
 ( 28/675d) a tyrannide . . . omnino immunis est aut nullus  
 aut rarus  
 ( 30/675d) 'tirannus est qui violenta dominatione populum  
 premit'  
 ( 32/675d) in quantavis paucitate potest quisque suam tiran-  
 nidem exercere  
 (162,9/676a) calcata aequitate procedit iniustitia . . . , tyrannidis  
 procurans ortum,

*Thou shalt NOT slay a tyrant!*

- vii.20 (187,7/689b) *conquisita tyrannorum exempla proponunt*  
( 11/689b) *quis tyrannus [= Stephanus?]*
- vii.24 (211,15/702b) *Si de tyranni . . . quis prosperitate tristatur*  
(212,8/702c) *tormentum . . . nullum gravius potuerunt Siculi*  
*excogitare tyranni*  
(215,25/704c) *reprehendendi licentiam . . . tyrannica rabies*  
*perhorrescit*
- vii.25 (221,11/707c) *Pisistratus Atheniensium tyrannus*  
( 16/707d) *Vox quidem cive dignior quam tyranno*  
(222,18/708b) *simplex confessio veritatis iram tyranni convertit*  
*in risum*  
( 26/708c) *salutem . . . importabilis tyranni Dionisii . . .*  
*exorabat*  
(223,1/708c) *cum gravem tyrannum haberemus, carere eo*  
*cupiebam*
- viii.7 (264,16/732a) *in re publica nemo tyrannorum Cesare magis*  
*accessit ad principem*
- viii.12 (308,27/757c) *'Domi enim nobis animos induimus*  
*tyrannorum'*
- viii.13 (324,23/766c) *(Albanus) seipsum maluit tyrannorum exponere*  
*telis*
- viii.16 (342,14/776b) *cum viribus habundaverit, prosilit in odibilem*  
*tyrannidis venam*  
(343,27/777a) *virium affectatio . . . , tyrannidis procurans*  
*ortum,*  
(344,21/777b) *Hae dulces aquae . . . totius tyrannidis incursum*  
*impediunt*  
( 27/777c) *nec tibi conditio magis servilis occurret quam*  
*tyranni*
- viii.17 (345,1/777c) *[Tit.:] In quo tyrannus a principe differat*  
( 2/777c) *[Tit.:] et de tyrannide sacerdotum*  
( 4/777c) *In quo princeps differat a tyranno, . . . superius*  
*dictum est*  
( 8/777c) *Unde . . . poterunt innotescere quae . . . dicenda*  
*sunt de tyranno.*  
( 9/777d) *Est ergo tyrannus, ut eum philosophi*  
*depinxerunt,*  
( 19/777d) *tyrannus nil actum putat nisi leges evacuet*  
( 22/778a) *tyrannus est . . . Luciferianae pravitatis imago*

- ( 29/778a) tyrannus, pravitatis imago, plerumque etiam  
occidendus
- ( 30/778a) Origo tyranni iniquitas est
- (346,3/778b) Nisi enim iniquitas . . . tyrannidem procurasset
- ( 11/778b) non soli reges tyrannidem exercent
- ( 12/778b) privatorum plurimi tyranni sunt
- ( 14/778b) Nec moveat quod reges tyrannis visus sum  
sociasse
- ( 15/778b) appellatio (regis) abusu cadit in tyrannum
- ( 20/778c) 'Spes michi pacis erit dextram tetigisse tyranni'
- ( 23/778c) sententia unius omnium aperit . . . vitia  
tyrannorum
- (347,2/778c) Photinus . . . mores tyrannorum . . . exprimens  
ait
- ( 16/778d) respectus honesti et iusti . . . nullus est in facie  
tyrannorum
- (348,16/779b) Itaque et tyranni nomine rex et
- ( 18/779b) e converso interdum principis nomine tyrannus  
appellatur
- ( 24/779c) in sacerdotio . . . sub praetextu officii suam tyrannidem  
exercere
- ( 27/779c) Caput (rei publicae impiorum) tyrannus est  
imago diaboli
- (349,6/779d) et in (sacerdotibus) inveniri posse tyrannos
- ( 25/780a) tyrannidem sacerdotii videtur exprimere  
manifestam
- (357,28/785a) Si . . . tyrannus secularis iure divino et humano  
perimitur,
- ( 29/785a) quis tyrannum in sacerdotio diligendum censeat?
- viii.18 (358,4/785a) [Tit.] Ministros Dei esse tyrannos;
- ( 4/785a) [Tit.] et quid tyrannus
- ( 7/785a) Ministros Dei tamen tyrannos esse non abnego
- ( 12/785b) defectus sacerdotum in populo Dei tyrannos  
induxit
- ( 27/785c) (Saul) tyrannidem exercens regium non amisit  
honorem
- (359,4/785c) etiam tyranni gentium . . . ministri Dei sunt
- ( 22/786a) Ergo et tyranni potestas bona quidem est,
- ( 23/786a) tyrannide tamen nichil est peius.

*Thou shalt NOT slay a tyrant!*

- ( 24/786a) Est enim tyrannis a Deo concessae homini  
potestatis abusus
- ( 26/786a) Patet ergo non in solis principibus esse  
tirannidem,
- ( 27/786a) sed omnes esse tyrannos qui ... potestate ...  
abutuntur
- (363,32/788c) (historici), qui tyrannorum ... exitus miseros  
plenius scribunt
- (364,6/788d) liquebit quia semper tyranno licuit adulari
- ( 8/788d) Non ... de privatis tyrannis agitur
- ( 11/788d) etsi [sacerdos] tyrannum induat
- viii.19 ( 18/789a) [Tit.:] De morte ... aliorum gentilium  
tyrannorum
- (365,28/789c) [Cesar] quia rem publicam armis occupaverat,  
tyrannus reputatus
- (366,5/789c) Augustus ... tyrannidis rem declinavit et notam
- ( 13/789d) Tertius tyrannus Gaius Caligula occisus est
- ( 15/789d) Tiberius ..., etsi tirannidem vitaverit, ... ex-  
tinctus est
- (367,14/790b) adversus tirannidem tantum licere legibus
- ( 22/790c) Domitianus ... post cruentam tirannidem ...  
interfectus est
- (369,8/791c) Nerva, ascriptus principibus non tyrannis
- (371,5/792c) haec ... est descriptio tyranni, qua explicatur res  
... in nomine
- ( 7/792c) Sicut ergo dampnatum hostem licet occidere, sic  
tyrannum
- ( 11/792c) attenditur, quomodo omnium domuerit tiran-  
nidem ... clementia Dei
- ( 17/792d) Severus ..., qui ... tirannidem gravem exercuit
- (372,1/792d) [Severus] Nigrum ad tirannidem aspirantem ...  
interfecit
- ( 17/793a) [Severum] tirannidem in Christianos exercuisse  
... certum est
- viii.20 ( 22/793b) [Tit.:] Quod ... licitum ... est publicos tyrannos  
occidere,
- ( 23/793b) [Tit.:] si tamen fidelitate non sit tyranno  
obnoxius interfecto
- ( 25/793b) Longum est si gentilium tyrannorum ... seriem  
voluero trahere



- (373,2/793b) Libellus tamen qui De Exitu Tirañnorum in-  
scriptus est,  
( 3/793c) quid de tyrannis sentiam plenius poterit aperire  
( 12/793c) Primum . . . tyrannum nobis obicit divina pagina  
Nembroth  
( 26/793d) Israel edocetur sub tyrannis ab initio laborasse  
(374,8/794a) [Israel] pro principibus meruisse tyrannos  
( 8/794a) Nam tyrannos quos peccata impetrant . . . peni-  
tentia delet  
( 11/794a) servierunt saepenumero filii Israel sub tyrannis  
( 14/794a) Licebat . . . nece tyrannorum excutere iugum de  
cervicibus suis  
(376,3/795a) Ut . . . constet iustum esse publicos occidi  
tyrannos  
( 10/795b) feminae [= Judith] ad tyrannum [= Holofernes]  
accessus  
(378,6/796c) etiam cum ex iusta causa cavetur tyranno  
( 9/796c) Non quod tyrannos de medio tollendos esse non  
credam  
( 13/796c) David . . . , licet tyrannum gravissimum  
sustineret, . . . parcere maluit  
( 23/796d) hic quidem modus delendi tyrannos utilissimus  
et tutissimus  
( 27/796d) Peccata . . . delinquentium vires sunt tyrannorum  
viii.21 (379,6/797a) [Tit.:] Omnium tyrannorum finem esse  
miseriam  
( 10/797a) Finis enim tyrannorum confusio est  
(380,9/797c) Aquis . . . pro telo ad subversionem tyranni usus  
est Dominus  
( 12/797d) (Ezechias) adversus minas tyranni clipeum  
divinae protectionis opposuit  
(381,15/798b) in omni gente . . . manifesta est nequitia  
tyrannorum  
( 24/798c) (Mercurius) tyrannum [= Jul.Apost.] lancea  
perforavit  
(382,16/799a) Orosius . . . tyrannum [= Jul.] refert . . . telo esse  
peremptum  
(393,31/806c) ad compescendam et puniendam tyrannidis  
rabiem

*Thou shalt NOT slay a tyrant!*

- (394,10/806c) ne ... tyrannus [= Suanus] indebita premeret  
servitute  
( 18/806d) tyrannus [= Suanus] e vestigio [Eadmundi]  
expiravit  
( 19/806d) licet insula [Britanniae] graves tyrannos habuerit  
(396,8/807b) Si quis ... praecipitia praecedentium non recolit  
tyrannorum  
( 10/807b) luce clarius intuebitur omnes tyrannos miseros  
esse  
viii.22 (397,4/807c) tyranni voluntas concupiscentiae servit  
viii.23 (399,20/809a) [Tit.:] quod tyrannis nichil quietum  
(401,11/809d) licet [episcopi] pastorem induant, tyrannis ...  
accedunt  
( 16/809d) in eis tyrannus secularis aut ecclesiasticus per-  
niciosior est  
(408,13/813a) aliis dominantes, quod tyrannicum est  
( 13/813a) tyranno siquidem nichil tutum est aut quietum  
( 15/813b) (Damocles) se hoc a tyranno Siciliae didicisse  
fatebitur  
( 20/813b) 'Qui terret plus ipse timet, sors ista tyrannis  
convenit'  
(410,7/814b) et Romani serviunt Deo, et tyranni

*Letters (Brooke 1/PL.199)*

- 23/126 ( 37c/106b) ille tyrannus et ecclesiae nostrae persecutor Will  
de Hipra  
( 38a/106c) cum supradictus tyrannus a regno Angliae  
exterminaretur  
24/127 ( 39c/107b) ille tyrannus et ecclesiae nostrae persecutor Will  
de Hipra  
( 40c/107d) cartam ... vi et metu supradicti tyranni extortam  
124/59 (212c/41d) et siquid tyrannicum atrocius excogitari potest  
(Brooke 2/PL.199)  
136/134 ( 2c/111d) castrum, a quo tyrannus Yprensis ... obsidione  
exclusus est  
152/140 ( 52c/121a) ex mandato Teutonici tyranni [= Fred.Barb.]  
168/145 (102b/133d) Teutonicus tyrannus nominis sui fama ... orbem  
perculerat  
176/175 (166b/166d) nec timeri oportet ... tyrannorum minas  
177/148 (182b/142c) ex litteris Teutonici tyranni ... perspicuum est

- (182c/142c) cum Iohannes ... Teutonico tyranno con-  
iuraturus esset
- 181/180 (200c/178b) Teutonici tyranni et haeresiarchae sui vias
- 184/185 (216c/194a) Quis similis Frederico ... antequam in tyrannum  
verteretur ex principe?
- 186/189 (226c/200a) pacem fuerat tyrannus vester ecclesiae redditurus
- 187/193 (236c/208d) (iudices) parati iudicare quicquid tyranno  
[= Henr.II] libuisset  
(236c/208d) tyrannus [= Henr.II] plura iubere erubuit quam  
illi adimplere
- 219/219 (376c/245d) vos [= Alex.III] qui gladium Dei videtis educ-  
tum in capita tyrannorum
- 225/225 (392b/252d) Teutonicum tyrannum scismaticorum principem
- 234/201 (428b/222d) eo magis crudescunt cornua tyrannorum  
(428c/223a) nec crimina punientur nec tyrannorum arguetur  
immanitas  
(430c/224a) (Deus) qui Fredericum deiecit ... et alios tiran-  
nos ... subiciet
- 235/200 (434b/221b) si ecclesia Dei ... conculcanda tyrannis exponitur
- 242/218 (472c/242b) Cum ... pontifex Teutonicum tyrannum diutius  
expectasset
- 269/280 (544a/316d) gladium ..., non quo carnificinas expleant  
veterum tyrannorum
- 272/244 (554b/281c) miseriam tyranni, aut potius gloriam Dei ...  
viderunt  
(554c/281d) ad saepe dictum tyrannum [= Fred.Barb.]  
legatione  
(556c/282c) qui a tyranno [= Fr.B.] exploraret ubi et quando  
(558a/282d) cives (Secusiae) ... tyranno obsides abstulerunt
- 274/245 (576a/287d) ne (Henricus) tyrannum [= Fred.] praeuium  
habeat in ruina
- 275/239 (580b/272a) quia placuit tyranno [= Henr.II]  
(580c/272b) (episcopus Caturicensis) ilius [= H.II] tiran-  
nidem sentit
- 277/238 (529b/269a) quod [Ludovicus VII] barbarum more tyrannum  
non induit
- 281/301 (616a/352a) si vellet (ecclesia) acquiescere iussionibus  
tyrannorum  
(616a/352b) corpus ... tyrannorum carnificinis torqueatur ad  
praesens

*Thou shalt NOT slay a tyrant!*

- (616b/352b) etsi . . . tyrannorum rabies invaluerit  
287/287 (632c/327d) Ecce cum Teutonico tyranno quid egerit  
(Dominus)  
288/285 (648b/326a) Teutonicus tyrannus . . . abbates accivit  
289/292 (656c/337a) Fredericus Teutonicus tyrannus . . . pacem fac-  
turus creditur  
291/291 (664b/334a) principibus et tyrannis . . . perniciosum relin-  
quetur exemplum  
298/293 (696b/339c) Hystorias replica, tyrannorum gesta revolve  
305/304 (726c/355d) (Thomas) pro evacuandis abusionibus veterum  
tyrannorum certavit  
307/305 (744b/360a) abusiones veterum tyrannorum . . . honori Dei  
anteferre

*Vita Thomae (PL.190)*

- (205a) (Thomas) pro evacuandis abusionibus veterum  
tyrannorum certavit

*Vita Anselmi (PL.199)*

- 11 (1028d) (Urbanus) causam . . . ad petitionem tyranni [=  
Wilh.R.] distulerat  
(1030a) (Anselmus) pro . . . salute tyranni [= Wilh.R.]  
. . . precabatur

*Historia pontificalis (Chibnall)*

- 3 (9b) si quis ex iniquo tyranni cuiusque mandato . . .  
hoc egerit  
32 (65b) [Rogerus] aliorum more tyrannorum ecclesiam  
. . . redegerat

*Entheticus (Pepin/PL.190)*

- 1299 (177/993b) Anglia . . . esse putans reges, quos est perpessa  
tyrannos  
1313 (178/993c) Juvit eum [Hircanum] pacis cultus, sed more  
tyranni  
1341 (178/994a) Illa tyrannorum pax est, ut nemo reclamet  
1347 (179/994b) Libertas haec est populi dominante tyranno  
1413 (180/995c) Carnificina vetus est aula subacta tyrannis  
1499 (183/997b) Sunt nugatores inimici suntque tyranni